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'Visegrad' Military Experts Meet on Security

LD1212165591 Budapest MTI in English 0756 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, December 12 (MTI)—Europe is not threatened by a global war, the dangers inherent in the economy, society and the environment are much graver, military experts of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary concluded in Warsaw on Wednesday. Holding a consultation on security in Europe and the region, the high-ranking experts of the Visegrad triangle countries stressed that the optimism related to the changes in the political and economic systems of the former socialist countries should be accompanied by a sense of reality. In view of the unstable situation in the Soviet Union which gives cause to the biggest concern, all states concerned have a vested interest in establishing a European security system, they said. The Hungarian delegation was headed by Colonel Gyorgy Vad, head of the cabinet office in the Ministry of Defence.

Assess Danger of Conflict

LD1112234191 Warsaw PAP in English 2205 GMT 11 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 11—High ranking representatives of the Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish defence ministries agreed on Wednesday that the danger of an outbreak of a military conflict embracing the entire continent has considerable decreased.

Representatives of three ministries, attending a seminar on European security which ended in Warsaw on Wednesday, expressed an opinion that the biggest source of concern is the unstable situation in the East. There is a need for the continuation of work by all states on the construction and improvement of European security, stressed the participants.

The Warsaw seminar was the first such meeting of representatives of defence ministries and security experts from the three Central-East European countries.

Plan to 'Tighten' Military Contacts

LD1212202891 Prague CSTK in English 1636 GMT 12 Dec 91

[By CSTK correspondent]

[Text] Warsaw Dec 12 (CSTK)—Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary are concerned about the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but do not think the situation justifies setting up a new military bloc in central Europe, Czechoslovak Deputy Defence Minister General Imrich Andrejcak told CSTK today.

Speaking after the conclusion of a two-day meeting of military representatives from the three countries, Andrejcak said the dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet Union "weigh on our countries with an equal intensity".

Though they do not want to form a military bloc, the three central European countries, or "troika" as they are sometimes referred to, will tighten their contacts in the military area, Andrejcak said.

Poland's Kolodziejczyk Interviewed

LD1012203691 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 10 Dec 91

[Interview with Polish National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk by correspondent Marian Dachniewski on a trilateral defense seminar involving representatives from Poland, Hungary, and the CSFR in Warsaw; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Dachniewski] Representatives from Hungary and Czechoslovakia are present. Will it be something, as it were, reminding the association of countries in the sphere of defense? [question as heard]

[Kolodziejczyk] We have cooperated with one another within our triangle for some time. We have signed appropriate agreements that were partly agreed upon together, as they are bilateral agreements. Today's seminar is one of the items we are implementing together. We hope that what we are starting within the triangle will acquire a wider sense and will allow for us to include other countries into certain [word indistinct] from the grey zone that remains in Central Europe.

[Dachniewski] Sovereign states are being created beyond our eastern border. Do you see a widening of the triangle by allowing in other presently sovereign but former parts of the USSR?

[Kolodziejczyk] Yes, this issue is ahead of us. This hall witnessed words that European security is indivisible and that, therefore, there can be no exceptions. That is why the formula must be open. Another issue is how those countries will respond to this formula. All this is ahead of us. First, economic problems must be solved, as everything else is connected with the solution of those problems. One cannot build a sufficient army—sufficient as far as defense is concerned—without money. Therefore, I think that talks must proceed on different tracks.

Alia Appeals to Parliament on Election Date

AU1412154391 Tirana ATA in English 1019 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Tirana, December 14 (ATA) — The president of the Republic of Albania, Ramiz Alia sent a letter on December 13 to the Presidency of the People's Assembly, the Presidency of the Socialist Party, the Presidency of the Democratic Party, the Presidency of the Republican Party, the Presidency of the Social Democratic Party, the Presidency of the Agrarian Party, who took part in the meeting with the president of the republic dated December 3, 1991.

The letter says:

"With the agreement reached on December 3, 1991, which has become public, you should propose the date of the untimely elections, which in that meeting was said that should be made within the coming three months' time. So far, I have not received even a concrete proposal.

In the conditions created after the government crisis, the holding of new elections has become even more urgent. Hence, I am waiting your proposal, so that I declare the exact date of elections.

In order to adopt a correct decision and elections be conducted according to the laws, be free and democratic, it is indispensible to have the following questions clarified:

1. Elections will be conducted only for the deputies to the People's Assembly or for the organs of the local power as well?
2. Will the elections be conducted according to the new Constitution or on the basis of the constitutional amendments, which, with the lack of the Constitution, will be indispensible for many fundamental questions?
3. Should the new electoral law be approved for the elections or the existing law with some changes and supplements will be applied?
4. How much time is needed for the People's Assembly to adopt the above documents, indispensible for the elections? I need this to decide on what day elections will be conducted and how much time will be planned for the new electoral campaign.

I ask the parties, that, in cooperation also with the Presidency of the People's Assembly, to inform me verbally of their proposals within December 20, 1991.

Regarding the above mentioned questions, the president of the republic Ramiz Alia expects verbal opinions and suggestions of the other political parties of the country as well.

Alia Approves Ahmet's New Cabinet 14 Dec

LD1512102291 Tirana ATA in English 0909 GMT 15 Dec 91

["The New Government Formed"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, December 14 (ATA)—Mr. Vilson Ahmeti, charged by the president of the republic, Ramiz Alia, to form the new government, presented to him its composition on December 14. On the same day, by Decree No. 84, dated December 14, 1982 [as received] Ramiz Alia, president of the republic, approved the cabinet headed by Mr. Vilson Ahmeti. As known, taking into consideration the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the political forces of the country, this cabinet has in its fold nonparty members, intellectuals, and specialists.

As reported by the press office at the prime minister's office and president's one, members of the new government are:

1. Chairman of the Council of Ministers: Vilson Ahmeti
2. Deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of mining and energy resources: Abdyl Xhaja
3. Deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of agriculture: Zydi Pepa
4. Minister for foreign affairs: Ilir Bocka
5. Minister of economy: Gjergji Kondo
6. Minister of defence: Alfred Moisiu
7. Minister of public order: Vladimir Hysi
8. Minister of justice: Kudret Cela
9. Minister of finances: Robert Ceku
10. Minister of light and food industry: Iliaz Mehmeti
11. Minister of foreign economic relations: Ylli Gabiri
12. Minister of home trade and tourism: Robert Gjini
13. Minister of construction: Luigj Aleksi
14. Minister of transports: Ilir Mataj
15. Minister of education: Alfred Pema
16. Minister of culture, youth, and sports: Vath Koreshi
17. Minister of health: Kristo Pano
18. Chairman of State Control Commission: Ylli Memisha
19. Chairman of committee of science and technique: Petrit Skendo

Kapllani Not Interested in Changing Borders

AU1312140391 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2100 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Interview with Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani by Otto Hoermann in Vienna on 12 December; recorded—Kapllani speaks in English with superimposed German translation]

[Text] [Hoermann] After talks with Foreign Minister Mock, Albanian Foreign Minister Kapllani met with

Chancellor Vranitzky in the afternoon. Austria promises Albania humanitarian and economic aid. The political situation on the Balkans is also on the agenda of the talks. The Albanians in Kosovo are interested in entering into a union with the motherland, Albania, if Croatia and Slovenia are diplomatically recognized.

[Kapllani] You have to respect the will of the people, just as we respect the right to self-determination. Whatever the Albanians on the other side of the border say—in what is still called Yugoslavia—we will never ignore what these people want.

[Hoermann] But that would mean that the borders have to changed.

[Kapllani] We do not want to change any borders, even less so through the use of force. If things develop in a natural way, that is to say once the borders cease to be dead-end streets and become rather means of human communication, then a natural homogenization of the entire Albanian nation will take place. This is in the European spirit and within the framework of the CSCE documents and principles.

[Hoermann] Are you for or against a Greater Albania?

[Kapllani] I am for Albania.

Albanian National Union Publishes Platform

AU1112095091 Tirana BASHKIMI KOMBETAR in Albanian 30 Nov 91 pp 1-2

["Platform of the Sociopolitical Organization 'The Albanian Union'"]

[Text] Albania is undergoing a period of profound democratic changes. The establishment of political pluralism, this great historic victory, has given new and much broader inspiration to the country's political, economic, and social life.

The creation of many parties, organizations, and associations is to the good of the democratic changes at which we are aiming. Under the new political and economic conditions, the unity of the Albanian people, stronger friendship and respect among people, and a spirit of humanism and tolerance become more necessary than ever.

The road toward Europe on which we have embarked requires us to be united as a people and a nation. Political diversity and different religious beliefs have not been and will not be obstacles to the nation's unity and economic and social prosperity.

The Albanian National Union [BKSh] will work for these high ideals, on which the programs of all the country's political and social forces converge.

I. The BKSh Is an Independent Organization

The BKSh is an independent sociopolitical organization. It is a voluntary association of Albanian citizens and members of the Albanian nation beyond the territory of the Republic of Albania, wherever they live and work, for the realization of the aims defined in this platform.

The ideals inspiring this union are patriotism and sacrifice to the end for the pan-Albanian national cause.

The BKSh relies totally on our popular and national traditions. Its motto comes from the Assembly of Lezhe [summoned by Skenderbeg in 1444].

II. The BKSh's Aims

1. Achieving the unification and unity of the Albanian people requires love and harmony among people, families, kin, and in society, in the towns and the countryside. Pan-national Albanian unity and unification cannot be achieved without fraternal unity and human love at all levels of society. The BKSh will work for the spiritual unity of the Albanian people, as one of the oldest indigenous peoples in the Balkans, for the unification in one state of the Albanians living on their own territories, for the unity of the efforts of all members of the Albanian nation wherever they live and work, and for the social emancipation and economic prosperity of the homeland and the people.
2. The BKSh will work to raise national awareness and pride in order that we may assume with dignity the place we deserve among other nations in Europe.
3. This organization will work to preserve and hand down to the younger generations the traditions and noble virtues of our people, such as loyalty, generosity, honesty, humanism, etc.
4. The BKSh will contribute to the growth of the Albanian people's democratic culture and the defense of the cultural rights and freedoms of all Albanians, wherever they live and work. It will support and assist the efforts of the Albanian diaspora to maintain the purity of our language, culture, and national traditions. The BKSh achieves its aims solely by democratic means. It dissociates itself from everything that conflicts with a spirit of democracy and democratic concepts, means, and methods, as well as censorship and dictatorship of whatever kind, that threaten the people's unity and the homeland's freedom and independence. The BKSh carries out its work through assemblies at various levels, conferences, meetings, commemorative and jubilee meetings, statements, petitions, and publications of various kinds. The BKSh carries out its work on the basis of the state's basic laws, relying on and respecting the UN Charter, the Helsinki and Paris documents, and the principles of the CSCE. The BKSh's central publication is the newspaper BASHKIMI KOMBETAR and other organs that may appear.

III. Relations With Sociopolitical Bodies and the State

1. The BKSh is an independent sociopolitical organization. It is neither a party nor a coalition of parties.
2. It recognizes and respects all the country's political parties and other social organizations created on the basis of the law and does not encroach on their individuality. It maintains ties and openly cooperates

with sociopolitical bodies at home and abroad in order to publicize and fulfill the national cause.

3. The BKSh will support the standpoints and work of the organs of the legitimate government as long as they are in the interests of the national cause and the freedom, independence, and democratic progress of Albania and the Albanian nation. It will call for an active stand from all levels of the state toward the grievances and needs of people where they live, in the towns and the countryside. It will demand increasing opportunities for the Albanians of the diaspora to communicate and maintain full ties with their mother country.
4. The BKSh will ask all levels of the state to respect and commemorate noted historical events, distinguished national personalities, and those who shed their blood for the homeland's freedom and independence, the democratization of the country's life, and the Albanian nation's emancipation.
5. The BKSh does not sponsor candidates in national or local electoral campaigns.

IV. The Pan-Albanian Cause

The Albanian nation, one of the oldest in Europe, is still crippled at the end of the 20th century. The sacred ideal of every Albanian and our organization is the unification of the Albanian nation. The democratic developments in Europe and the world have given life and strength to this ideal.

The BKSh considers it a fundamental duty to defend freedom, independence, sovereignty, and pan-Albanian national interests. It determinedly and unreservedly supports the rights of the Albanian people living on their own territories in Kosovo and other areas of Yugoslavia, recognizes the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state, and, in accordance with the CSCE documents, will strive for national unification.

The BKSh considers the cause of Cameria to be an inseparable element of the national cause and will struggle to solve it fairly in accordance with international regulations.

The BKSh sees the solution of the pan-Albanian cause as a matter that assists peace and stability in the Balkans and the democratic spirit to which the world is now inclined. It will work to ensure that the Albanian people will always live on good terms with their neighbors and will join as equals the mainstream of European processes toward integration.

V. Organizational Regulations

A. Membership

1. Membership of the BKSh is on an individual basis. Any member of the Albanian nation over the age of 16, regardless of his party allegiance and religious beliefs, who lives within or beyond the borders of the Albanian state, and who accepts this platform and commits himself to working to realize its goals, may be a member. All members of minorities living in the Republic of Albania have the same membership rights.
2. Membership is individual, voluntary, and on the basis of a person's oral request.
3. Members of the BKSh accept this platform, are registered in the relevant documentation kept by the assembly's managing councils in villages and city neighborhoods, and pay membership dues of two leks a year.
4. All members of the organization have the right to elect and be elected to all the BKSh's managing bodies, and to express their opinions openly and without restriction up to the organization's highest forums.

B. Structure: The BKSh is structured on a territorial basis.

1. The BKSh's basis lies in assemblies in every village and city neighborhood. Every two years, the assembly elects a managing council of between five and 11 members. Assemblies are also created beyond the territory of the Republic of Albania. The assembly meets when its managing council feels it necessary and when the assembly members demand it.
2. Every two years, representatives elected by the grass-roots assemblies gather in a district assembly, which elects a district managing council of 17-21 members. This council elects a chairman, one or two deputy chairmen, and a secretary. Where districts are divided into regions, this is also done in regions.
3. The National Assembly is the BKSh's highest body, and is summoned at least once every five years. It elects a managing council that leads the BKSh in the period between national assemblies and consists of no more than 41-51 members. The Managing Council elects a presidium consisting of a chairman, two deputy chairmen, a secretary, and three members, who may not be elected more than once.
4. Elections to the BKSh's management bodies at all levels are by an open ballot. These bodies elect their members by secret ballot.
5. The BKSh's Managing Council and Presidium organize, manage, and control the organization's political, social, economic, and financial activities centrally and in the districts.
6. The chairmen of managing councils at central, district, and grass-roots levels cannot be holders of party offices. At the grassroots and in the districts, they cannot be elected more than twice in succession, or more than once at central level.

C. Income

1. Membership dues.
2. The press and publications.
3. Other legal sources.

D. Representation and Seal

The BKSh is a juridical person, based in Tirana. It is represented by the Presidium of the Managing Council and persons it appoints. The BKSh's managing council and its district councils have the right to keep a seal. The seal is circular and bears the inscription "BKSh." The council's name is underneath, and the symbols of the national flag of the Republic of Albania are in the center.

Tirana, 19 October 1991.

BKSh's Founding Aktiv.

Independent Trade Unions Hold Rally in Shkoder

AU1512144591 Tirana ATA in English 0959 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Tirana, December 15 (ATA)—In the square in front of "Migjeni" Theatre of Shkoder District, the Union of the Independent Trade Unions of the district organised a rally in defence of the working people's interests.

The chairman of the Union of the Independent Trade Unions of the district, Muhamet Gradeci, held the speech on the occasion. He said that the coming on the scene of the Independent Trade Unions, alongside the other progressive forces, has given an impulse to the development of the country's democratic processes. He dwelt on the grave economic situation at home, the difficulties created due to the incessant raising of the prices, the acute economic and social problems brought about by the assistance, the government's incapability, etc.

Representatives of the student youth of "Luigj Gurakuqi" University of Shkoder District, of the DP [Democratic Party], RP [Republican Party], SDP [Social Democratic Party] and Democratic Union branches of the other districts greeted at the rally as well.

The rally was held conform the law. [sentence as received] It was regular and peaceful.

AFP Notes Tirana Without Newspapers, Electricity

AU1312214391 Paris AFP in English 1959 GMT 13 Dec 1

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 13 (AFP) - Tirana, in the grips of winter, Friday [13 December] shivered amid ever worsening power cuts and dwindling supplies of food and domestic fuel.

There were no newspapers in the Albanian capital for the third day in a row because of a strike by type-setters, an opposition Democratic Party spokesman said by telephone.

Meanwhile, the capital was running out of supplies of wood and coal.

Coal mines this year produced only half their usual output.

Albanian radio, monitored in Yugoslavia, said hundreds of transformers in Tirana and in the countryside were out of service.

Albanian authorities have asked for emergency aid for Italy and Greece, the source added.

Status of Land Distribution Reported

AU1612112491 Tirana ATA in English 0908 GMT 16 Dec 91

["Announcement on Land Distribution"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, December 16 (ATA)—During the last week land has been distributed at higher rates, providing the peasants with over 27 thousand of hectares. There are districts which claim distinction in distributing the land at higher rates. Hence on December 14 as against December 7, the districts of Gjirokaster managed to distribute 63 per cent as against 47 per cent it had previously distributed, Sier 61 per cent as against 47 per cent, Tepelena 66 per cent as against 48 per cent, Kavaja 61 per cent as against 50 per cent, Durres 68 per cent as against 58 per cent, Pogradec 68 per cent as against 58 per cent.

Seventeen out of 27 districts have distributed from 60 to 91 per cent of land. Besides this one also notices an increase of the acreage sown to grain by the individual peasantry which has almost doubled. This process is continuing with more intensity and each family aims to sow about 5-7 dynym (one-tenth of a hectare) to grain.

Ukraine Foreign Minister Zlenko Arrives on Visit

AU1312110391 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Ukraine Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko arrived in Bulgaria today on a visit at the invitation of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev.

The Ukrainian minister is on a one-day working visit. Official talks between the two foreign ministers have already begun at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss prospects and relations between the two countries in various spheres. A protocol restoring diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the Ukraine is expected to be signed today along with a protocol for consultations between the two countries' ministries of foreign affairs.

The Ukrainian foreign minister will meet with President Zhelyu Zhelev and Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov.

Signs Diplomatic Relations Protocol

AU1312193491 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Interview with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko by correspondent Khristo Khristov in Sofia on 13 December; recorded—Zlenko speaks in Ukrainian with superimposed Bulgarian translation]

[Text] [Khristov] Mr. Zlenko, can you say a few words for our Khorizont listeners on the purpose of your visit and the results of your talks and meetings here?

[Zlenko] I would like to thank your president and the Bulgarian Government for giving me the opportunity to come here to make the first contacts between our independent countries. As a representative of an independent Ukraine, I am quite sure that we can work together in the future on a new basis.

[Khristov] Mr. Minister, your visit to Bulgaria lasted only six hours. Was this long enough for you to achieve any concrete results?

[Zlenko] Despite the short duration of our visit, I consider that the talks we held with your president, prime minister, and foreign minister provided grounds for believing that in the near future we will be able to sign treaties for economic cooperation between our two countries. Only a few minutes ago, we signed a protocol on establishing diplomatic relations and a document on consular relations between the Republics of Bulgaria and the Ukraine. I regard this as the most important result of our visit.

[Khristov] Mr. Minister, certain media have carried reports that in the view of your president, Mr. Kravchuk, Bulgaria might join in signing the new union document as well.

[Zlenko] I believe that every country has to decide its own fate, [words indistinct] in accordance with the wishes of its own people.

Comments on Nuclear Arms Destruction

AU1312173591 Paris AFP in English 1718 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, Dec 13 (AFP)—Ukraine will destroy all its nuclear weapons within seven years, the republic's foreign minister Anatoli Zlenko said here Friday. "But if other interested countries help us materially, the time period could be cut to three to five years," he said during a meeting with his Bulgarian counterpart Stoyan Ganev, an official Bulgarian source reported. Ukraine favored the destruction of all the nuclear weapons on its territory and this would take place in three stages over a seven-year time period, Zlenko said, according to the official source.

Ganev and Zlenko signed a protocol Friday establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, in keeping with an earlier announcement.

The Ukrainian diplomatic chief also said that the Soviet nuclear arsenal located in the territories of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan should be placed under the republics' control. "Ukraine wants to take control of the nuclear weapons on its territory so that they will never be used," he said.

Ganev, for his part, pledged that a Bulgarian ambassador would be dispatched to Kiev in a few weeks.

Discusses Economic Pact, Departs

AU1312174491 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Today a Ukrainian delegation led by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko visited Bulgaria at the invitation of Stoyan Ganev, deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs.

The 6-hour visit was filled with many discussions. It began with talks between the two foreign ministers on a wide range of issues of mutual interest. Problems regarding bilateral relations were the central topic covered. Views were exchanged on certain topical issues in international affairs, during which it was confirmed that the views of the two sides were very similar.

Shortly before the delegation departed, protocols for establishing diplomatic relations and a consular protocol were signed which, as Ganev put it, went beyond the preliminary agreements and provisos. Ganev added that it is possible that Bulgaria will send an ambassador to Kiev next week.

At its meeting with Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, the delegation discussed certain economic problems and agreement was reached that the economic pact now being prepared will be signed at a meeting of the Bulgarian and Ukrainian prime ministers in January.

Zlenko and Mr. Pavlichko [not further identified] were also received by President Zhelev and the delegation departed from Bulgaria literally a few minutes ago.

40th Bulgarian Socialist Party Congress Opens

Lilov Offers Resignation

AU1412145091 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Report by Nina Spasova on the 40th Bulgarian Socialist Party Congress opening in Georgi Kirkov Hall in Sofia on 14 December]

[Text] At precisely 0900 this morning, Aleksandur Lilov opened the 40th Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Congress. He announced that 650 of the 665 elected delegate were present in the hall, and declared: You are in your own Party House. It may be confiscated or set on fire, but its sacred name—People's Home of the Party—cannot be erased from our memory.

The atmosphere in the Georgi Kirkov Hall in Sofia was businesslike rather than festive, and even strained at times. Even during the election of the congress ancillary organs, a brief verbal crossfire developed between the delegates on whether representatives of the Organizational Department of the BSP Supreme Council should serve in the commissions.

Aleksandur Lilov's political report proved to be extremely wide-ranging. The sociological situation in the country and analysis of it following the elections featured prominently in his report. At the very start of the report, when making an analysis of the BSP's performance in the elections, Aleksandur Lilov said: As chairman of the party, I declare that I assume the political responsibility for the party's mistakes, and make a declaration that I wish to withdraw from the leadership.

Among some of the reasons why the BSP was relegated to the opposition in parliament, Aleksandur Lilov mentioned errors in the exercise of power, delay in dealing with the party property issue, and conflicts within its leadership. He devoted much time to the issue of the need for the BSP to change and transform itself into a new party. Reform is the name of the day, and reformers are needed. Accordingly, the most important thing is for the 40th congress to be a congress of reform, and I believe that it will be, stated the party chairman.

According to Lilov, two views exist on how to turn the BSP into a new party: First, to make it a social democratic party; and second, to transform it into a modern left socialist party. Mr. Lilov did not conceal his preference for the second concept.

I will mention two interesting figures given in the report. According to the documents, on 11 November 1991 the BSP had 476,840 members, and about 10,000 new members joined in the interval between the 39th and 40th BSP congresses. I will give a further quotation from the political report: The BSP needs a new leadership, which should eliminate self-blocking and behind-the-scenes actions. The congress will act well if it discusses in specific terms the responsibility of the party chairman, deputy chairmen, and every member of the Presidium, Aleksandur Lilov stated in his report.

Auditing Commission Reports

AU1412170491 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] The 40th Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Congress is continuing in Sofia today. After the delegates heard the main report delivered by BSP leader Aleksandur Lilov, the BSP parliamentary faction, the Mandate Commission, and Control Auditing Commissions presented reports on their work. At the moment Anzhel Vagenshtayn is briefing the congress delegates on the party leadership's view on the continued use of the party's property. After this, debates will commence on the documents and proposals submitted to the congress.

The congress will end with the election of a new party leadership, which observers expect will be announced on the morning of 16 December.

Delegates Discuss New Leadership

AU1612110091 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 16 Dec 91

[Report by Nina Spasova on the 40th Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Congress in Sofia]

[Text] I cannot tell you much, because this morning's session is a closed one. The delegates are discussing the composition of the BSP leading organs. As I heard unofficially, the commission on the proposals has prepared a draft list of 200 candidates for membership in the BSP Supreme Council. The delegates have voted on electing a Supreme Council of 101 members. Afterward stormy debates, proposals, counterproposals, and withdrawals from the candidates list have begun. Personal debates about whether Andrey Lukanov should be a member of the BSP Supreme Council have developed. The procedure envisages a secret vote, after which the delegates will continue to debate the congress resolutions at an open session.

According to information published by the BSP Press Center, the 15 December session continued until 0215 on 16 December. Changes in the charter have been discussed. The opinion that the party chairman should be elected directly by the congress, rather than by the BSP Supreme Council, has prevailed. The proposed changes in the charter are numerous, but because of the closed character of the session I was not able to learn anything specific about what has been adopted or rejected. More information will follow later on.

SDS Member Parties Discuss Political Situation

AU1412164391 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] We start the news with reports on national meetings being held in Sofia by parties that are members of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS].

At the national conference of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP] held today, the members acquainted themselves with an analysis of the parliamentary election results and a political survey made by BSDP Chairman Ivan Kurtev, who was elected at the extraordinary BSDP congress held last August. The participants also heard a report on the BSDP's development, on extending its influence in the parts of society that have not yet been won over by other political parties, on cooperation with the trade unions, and on participation in the SDS and the administration of the state and the economy.

This morning the Federative Council of Democracy Clubs opened a meeting in the hall of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Mr. Yordan Vasilev spoke about the topical political situation following the parliamentary elections and about the SDS's expectations in the presidential elections. The members of the Federative Council of Democracy Clubs will make changes in the federation's leadership, program, and statute.

Today's session of the National Council of the Radical Democratic Party opened, in which members of the SDS parliamentary group are taking part. It will vote on a resolution that gives a high assessment to the results of the local and parliamentary elections and expresses gratitude to all the party's members and sympathizers for their active and effective participation in the election campaign.

This morning Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov briefed the Federative Council on the work of the SDS parliamentary group and its main task of establishing complete harmony between the SDS members of parliament, the National Coordinating Council, and the government in order to make it possible for the SDS parliamentary group to exercise full control over the actions of the Council of Ministers.

KNSB Plans Referendum on Property Confiscation

AU1512192191 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 10 Dec 91 p 2

[DUMA PRESS report: "Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria Organizes Trade Union Referendum on Property"]

[Text] At its session on 9 December, the Executive Committee of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] decided to hold a trade union referendum in connection with the action to confiscate the KNSB's property.

In an open letter to KNSB members, Krustyo Petkov described the situation in the country as folly. According to him, lawlessness and force rule the country at present, instead of reason and the law of the land. After describing in detail the present state of the confederation's property, its leader stated that the present hard line on confiscation is inspired by and is being pushed through by the monarchist wing of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation and Dr. Trenchev's obedient deputies in parliament.

The aim is to remove us as the only barrier standing in the way of uncontrolled privatization, the sale of state property that has already begun, full and uncompromising restitution, and illegality in labor relations, Mr. Petkov stated.

In an appeal to the government, the KNSB's Executive Committee accuses it of sluggishness and insists on responsible cabinet action to resolve the economy's deepening problems. A further demand of the confederation is for the restoration of the Social Security Fund money, amounting to at least 20 billion leva, that was seized by previous governments. In conclusion, the KNSB states that it finds the government's tolerance and lack of action shown toward ultimatums and sit ins degrading.

BZNS-United Council Holds Consultative Session

Approves Merger With Petkov BZNS

AU1412165091 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] The Supreme Union Council of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-United [BZNS-United] is holding a session today in the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Memorial Building in Sofia. It is discussing a report on the results of the work of the Commissions on Unification of the BZNS-United and Nikola Petkov BZNS.

It became clear from the concluding protocol, which was read aloud, that a decision has been made for the unification of the two unions to begin at the level of the local agrarian associations, which will jointly determine their memberships and leaderships.

Milan Drenchev, secretary of the Nikola Petkov BZNS, and Tsenko Barev, chief secretary of the BZNS-United, gave their consent for a congress for the unification of the two unions to be convened as soon as possible.

Before it ends, the session will adopt an official position on the law on restitution of the political parties' property and will examine the decision by the BZNS Permanent Board to support Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev's candidature in the upcoming presidential elections.

Rejects Party Property Restitution

AU1412165891 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] The Supreme Union Council of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-United [BZNS-United] ended its session in the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Memorial Building in Sofia. The participants approved by vote the concluding protocol on the work of the two Commissions on Agrarian Unification of the BZNS-United and the Nikola Petkov BZNS. According to the documents, unification is to start at the level of the local agrarian associations, which are to elect new leaderships.

Milan Drenchev and Tsenko Barev, the leaders of the two unions, and most of the members of the two unions' Permanent Boards gave their consent to the holding of the upcoming congress of unification.

The BZNS Supreme Union Council adopted a resolution on the illegality of including the party as being among those affected by the law on the property of the former official organizations, and insists that the disputed property relations in Bulgarian society be decided in a court of law. The Supreme Union Council appeals to President Dr. Zhelev to exercise his constitutional powers in relation to the law. It was confirmed that the BZNS-United endorses Dr. Zhelev's candidature in the presidential elections.

Ivan Glushkov and Boris Spirov were relieved from their respective posts in the Administrative and Control Auditing Councils of the BZNS-United. A recommendation was made to the local associations of which these two gentlemen are members to accede to their requests to leave the Union. (Khristo Damazetov) was also relieved from his post in the Administrative Council.

'Declining Support' at Arsenal Plant Strike

AU1412173391 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] There are some signs of hesitation and declining support in the strike at the Arsenal Company in Kazanluk. However, our correspondent Nayden Rangelov reports that at a rally held this morning, voices were once again raised calling for the resignation of the company management.

During the last two days, no claims have been made for higher pay, and it appears that the strikers are ready to accept the wage rates offered by the management and approved by the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria.

Before the company is transformed into a single-person joint stock company, the Stara Zagora District Court is due to issue a ruling within three days on the legality of the strike, which started with trade union claims but which within the past few days has raised political demands.

Gorbachev Visit, Soviet Treaty Signing Delayed

AU1612115091 Prague CSTK in English 1528 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 12 (CSTK)— Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev will not pay an official visit to Czechoslovakia before the end of the year as announced earlier, the Czechoslovak President's Office said today.

During the visit, President Vaclav Havel and Gorbachev were to sign the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty initialed by the two countries' foreign ministers, Jiri Dienstbier and Boris Pankin, in Prague October 3.

The presidential office said it will be possible to consider signing the treaty only once the future of the Soviet Union is clarified.

Slovak Minister Denies Diversion of Danube

LD1412151191 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] The Slovak minister for the environment has denied that that the Danube has already been diverted so as to put the Bos water barrage into operation. There have been rumors according to which work related to this has already begun. Ivan Tirpak, in a statement to PESTI HIRLAP, said that the Czechoslovak side adheres to the agreement in Budapest according to which, until the end of June 1992, i.e., until the international expert committees complete their work, Czechoslovakia will not divert the Danube

Cheney Meets Ministers; Results Reported

LD1512133791 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 11 Dec 91

[Text] The second and final day of the official visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was taken up by talks with Vaclav Klaus, federal deputy prime minister and minister of finance.

Vaclav Klaus informed the American guest about the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy and the progress of privatization in CSFR. During the talks with Pavol Demes, Slovak minister for international relations, the two ministers tackled the possiblity of American participation in the conversion of the military industry in Slovakia.

In the afternoon, the U.S. secretary was received by CSFR President Vaclav Havel. Cheney and Federal Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky gave a joint briefing prior to Cheney's departure. Lubomir Zumar reports:

[Begin Zumar recording] Richard Cheney said that the objective of his visit was to solidify security relations between CSFR and United States, and to improve the contacts between our country and NATO. He underlined the emphasis of the report, recently signed by President Bush on the possibility of arms trade between the two countries and on the increase of funding involved in the program for training Czechoslovak officers in the United States. He described as important in the development of relations between the two armies the agreement to set up *a joint working party to investigate the possiblities for* specific cooperation.

Asked where he saw the possible risks of nuclear weapons abuse now that the Soviet Union has disintegrated, Cheney said that the United States is concerned about who controls the nuclear arms. The United States trusted central control, but today has no idea as to what will occur in the future. The United States hopes the successor states will honor international treaties on nuclear arms control.

Federal Defence Minister Lubos Dobrovsky emphasized that the Czechoslovak side thinks it is important to quickly make use of American experience in plans to build up the Czechoslovak Army. He expects that the working group will enable Czechoslovak arms equipment to be modernized. [end recording]

Czech Prime Minister Views EC Association Plan

LD1512094691 Prague Federal 1 Television Network in Czech 1850 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Marian Calfa by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Reporter] Mr. Prime Minister, what is the reaction of the Slovak Government on the text of the EC association treaty not containing the demand that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are to implement their agreement in harmony with the Constitution of the CSFR?

[Calfa] Naturally, we have officially put forward this request by the Slovak Government. Unofficially, we have put it forward on various levels. Our EC partners rejected it, not due to us, but because in the EC there are many composite states. This problem could also create a problem there. They simply did not want to bring problems to the European Communities with regard to composite states.

The press has shown that the Slovak Government expressed its agreement with this association agreement, with this European association agreement, as it has been prepared. It does not contain the declaration desired by them but, when this agreement is signed, I will make a statement for the Czechoslovak side in which I will say that, for the implementation of this agreement, the CSFR is responsible in harmony with our Constitution, and the Czech and the Slovak Republics will both take part in its implementation. This statement will also be an official EC document, which will be published jointly with the association agreement. Therefore, together they create a unit guaranting what the Slovak Government wanted to have included: to show that the composition of this state consists of two republics.

[Reporter] Could you explain what is next for Czechoslovakia based on this agreement?

[Calfa] It is extensive. It would take a long time to explain it. I want to emphasize a number of points. First, this is not only an economic agreement, but an agreement opening a political dialogue between the European Communities and Czechoslovakia. In other words, a dialogue between the European Community and Czechoslovakia is now talk between partners. This is a very important shift in the position of Czechoslovakia. This is an acceptance of Czechoslovakia, accepting the correctness of its policy and showing appreciation for the changes that have taken place in our country in the past two years. This shows approval of the development in Czechoslovakia by the democratic circles in Europe.

Second, there is an economic part. To my mind, the adoption of this agreement means that obstacles in the way of Czechoslovakia entering the EC market are being removed with regard to money, to services, and to goods. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia naturally is doing away with some barriers standing in the way of penetration of goods, services, and capital to Czechoslovakia. We are saying that this agreement is asymetrical. I would like to remark that we are keeping the barriers for nine years. This is a very long period. We will be removing them gradually, while the European Communities are doing away with the majority of these barriers immediately after the signing of the treaties. That is 70 to 80 percent. The rest of the barriers will be removed within five years. This means the European Communities give us greater opportunities for our entry, yet are still giving us the opportunity to protect ourselves over a longer period of time against them entering our country. In this way the Czechoslovak producers and structure is being protected—they are now in bad shape. We know that change will take a long time. We are also protecting our citizens and our jobs. This is the second, very important element contained in the treaty.

Third, it contains the basics for conditions for cooperation in other areas on the highest possible level in science, culture, education, health care, banking, finances, and educational opportunities for our people abroad. In other words, this means an enormous opening of opportunities for Czechoslovakia in the European Communities.

[Reporter] It seems that the association agreement is more advantageous than full membership. Will we try to get full membership?

[Calfa] It is advantageous, because it is asymetrical. We are getting a better deal than we are providing. The advantage is provided to us because it is recognized that we are a weaker partner and that we need help and that we are in a position where we need to be protected. It is rather pleasant, but our aim is to become an equal partner. If we become an equal partner, it would mean than that it is recognized that we are equally strong economic partners. Yes, we need the association agreement for the time being, but our aim is to get to an equal level where we will no longer need this protection, and where we feel equal as partners, without any barriers.

[Reporter] Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenko Pirek said after the initialling of the agreement that, in the talks about the export of textile, agricultural, and steel products, we were unable to push through our intentions in full. What can you say about that?

[Calfa] This is a fact. Our idea was to treat them as the rest of the commodities. The EC has a huge production on their own in these areas. It is not that we have problems penetrating their market, since quotas are going up. The problem is that, with regard to textile and steel products, restrictions will be abolished gradually, but much faster than we are abolishing them. This means abolishing them within five years. They will not be abolished right away. With regard to agricultural products, this is based more on the principle of reciprocity. This means that, as much as we permit to be imported to Czechoslovakia, they will allow to be exported to them; after all, their agricultural production is enormous, of high quality, and with a huge surplus. It is understandable that they are protecting themselves. I would say that we secured what we could at the time this European treaty was signed.

[Reporter] Here is my last question: When do you think we will become a full member of the European Community?

[Calfa] This is difficult to answer. Our idea is in about 10 years. This is not a question of time, but of adapting ourselves. We simply have to create the same conditions as those that prevail in the EC, whether legal, economic, financial, working, or social. When we are able to say that it does not make any difference whether or not we are divided by borders, that it does not influence us in any way, that one feels the same way in Czechoslovakia as in France or Germany or the Netherlands, then we can remove the borders, and then we can conclude formally our full membership in the European Community.

[Reporter] Give us your estimate.

[Calfa] If everything goes well, my estimate is 10 years. The views on this are different. You know that in Czechoslovakia we are arguing about the form of our reform, but what we are doing is actually taking the path toward the EC, toward their values and their model of economy. There is no other path.

Foreign Trade Minister on Iranian Contracts

LD1612100691 Prague Federal 1 Television Network in Czech 2130 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Interview with Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—live or recorded; Baksay speaks in Slovak]

[Text] [Correspondent] Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay returned from Iran this afternoon. I am glad you found time to answer our questions. The aim of your trip was no doubt trade. What good news have you brought back?

[Baksay] I think that I have brought rather good news. As compared with last year's volume, which amounted to 150 million dollars, we have brought back trade contracts amounting to about 1 billion dollars. We have entered talks about several big trade contracts—one is a contract on aluminium works, a factory to produce aluminium oxide in [word indistinct] amounting to 328 million dollars. Iran also gave us a contract to build 15 cement works—the overall value of the contract is about 400 million German marks. In this way, we are going to help Eastern Slovakia where the Spisska Nova Ves Geological Research Center offered to send its workers to work. We have also sold 2,120 textile jet looms. We are going to sell—give free in this case—licenses for these jet looms, but at the same time we are going to be involved in building the factory. I think that we achieved quite a lot, and I think that the trip, comprising about 20 managers, directors of enterprises, and deputy general directors did bring its result.

[Correspondent] Not long ago, a question of exporting our weapons to Iran was being discussed. Did you conclude any contracts involving weapons?

[Baksay] No, we did not conclude any contracts involving weapons. In harmony with the government's decision, the weapons are under very thorough control, and we did not conclude any such contracts in Iran.

Havel Views Impact of Legal Change on Communists

LD1512170191 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1315 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Stanislava Dufkova at Havel's Prague apartment on 14 December: "Conversations at Lany"—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

[Dufkova] The amendment of paragraph 260 of the Penal Act, and later the reaction of communist deputies, have caused a great stir in the Federal Assembly and among the public. Can you comment?

[Havel] I certainly can. I have three remarks to make on the matter. The first remark will concern the text of the paragraph as such. In my view, fascism and communism are, to a considerable degree, ideological categories. I am truly not certain to what degree ideological categories belong to the penal law. Fascism has been part of it for some time. This happened after World War II, in the atmosphere of an enormous relief and longing for justice and the just punishment of those who actively supported fascism or Nazism, although the term fascism is once again somewhat imprecise, as is always the case with regard to ideological categories. This is because fascism was, above all, the Italian fascism, while Nazism was national socialism. Nonetheless, all those who shared actively in all those horrors of World War II were dubbed by it. Thus, in the postwar atmosphere, fascism found itself a part of the penal law. This is historically understandable and comprehendable.

Now our Federal Assembly—on the basis of a motion from the plenum—debated the amendment of the penal law that included the word "communism" in it. The paragraph says, in a curious way, that anyone spreading hatred, national, class and religious or any other intolerence is to be punished, which is quite right. Any promotion of violence must be prosecuted. This is a matter of the basic protection of the democratic system. The paragraph, in itself, is good. It, however, cites in brackets, fascism and communism as examples of those movements and ideologies that promote violence. I am not certain to what degree a penal law should give examples in brackets and, moreover, to what degree various ideologies should be cited in those brackets. Moreover, the matter concerning communist ideology is very questionable.

Communism, in many cases, does not even describes itself as communism. There are various types of communism. There is Pol Pot's communism, Stalin's and Gottwald's communism. There is, however, also communism of the Italian Communist Party, which for decades has been for a powerful parliamentary party. There also existed Dubcek's communism, communism with a human face. It was, rather, noncommunists or anticommunists who mostly dubbed a totalitarian regime as communism. Communists themselves used that word in a different context. For them, communism was the final stage of the development of the world.

As we know, and as we have learned at school, after socialism has been built, there will come communism when paradise on earth will prevail. This word, like every ideological category, is rather unclear, and I do not regard it as fortunate that this ideological term found itself in the penal code, and I fear, moreover, that it does not meet the aim that the deputies who had proposed it had pursued.

To a certain extent, I understand these deputies. They, like a large section of our society, and similarly like the Confederation of Political Prisoners whom I recently visited, feel that something has not as yet been said—that there is still something we have to say and evolve from it certain practical steps; that the past has not been sufficiently described, that it has not been sufficiently condemned and that justice has not been allowed to run its full course. Many various nomenclatura cadres who have moved into the economic sphere still continue to control economic life, and various organizations in regions and the like.

In any case, I encountered this during my visit in the Vsetin and Kysuce districts. There is still some unfinished business to be done and certain things still need to be said. This way of dealing with the past and the whole terrible totalitarian system and all its crimes does not, however, seem to be the most fortunate way.

[Dufkova] What way would be the most appropriate in your view, Mr. President?

[Havel] Look, I am not the cleverest man in this country, who has a prescription for everything. At one time, I indicated a way to tackle this matter. I believe it was about six or nine months ago. I believed that the Federal Assembly should adopt a fundamental document of a political and almost historical significance. I do not know whether it should be in the form of a law that would say in a balanced and, as far as possible, accurate manner what happened here, give a name to the historical period in question, and outline directions along which the country should proceed gradually in coming to terms with its past. Various other legal norms might then evolve from this fundamental document. The parliament indeed made various such attempts. It recently adopted, for example, the law on the period of nonfreedom, composed of one sentence. It attempted to deal with the past by way of the screening law. It has now put communism in brackets in the penal law.

The whole restitution legislature is also an attempt to put right the wrongs done in the past. The parliament is, therefore, wrestling with this matter. It seems to me, however, that is being done in a rather unsystematic manner, as if shooting in various directions in the hope that one shot will, in the end, hit the target. It seems to me that the whole matter should have evolved from a fundamental conceptual political document of a supreme significance in which the degree of responsibility for the past would he clearly defined.

In a certain sense, we all have been responsible for it, everyone of us in a somewhat different way. Let us indeed realize that 99 percent of citizens traditionally voted for National Front parties. Let us realize how many millions of people went through the Communist Party. Let us realize how many people went through it in order to be able to accomplish something, save themselves, to study and the like, and they did this with a good intentions. Let us realize the percentage of votes the Communist Party won in our last free elections—how things happened historically. Let us realize that the coup in February was, in a formal sense, a constitutional one, that a freely elected parliament passed a vote of confidence in the new Gottwald government, and so forth. Let us realize the terrible guilt of all those prosecutors, judges who shared in all those persecutions, all those who collectivized the countryside. This is a very complicated matter.

This is a task for the whole society to reflect upon. This is a task for historians, politicians, and naturally it is also the task for everyday political practice. It is a task for the legislature, and there is no single prescription for dealing with it; but a fundamental document that would attempt to put, in a balanced way, a name to everything, in which the spirit of various paragraphs of various laws would be drafted and would set a direction for the legislature, including rehabilitation and restitution and the like, could provide such an option. I am not, however, claiming that this is truly a concrete prescription. This was a general observation that I made and that I hoped the collective wisdom of the parliament would be able to do something like this, to finalize it, so that everything would fall into one piece and complement each other. So far the parliament has not succeeded a great deal in this respect, and such attempts like putting communism in brackets in the penal law seems to me to be a bit desperate, and a belated attempt to do something that should have been done a bit earlier and differently.

[Dufkova] Mr. President. You said that you had three remarks on paragraph 260. We have just heard the first one; what about the two remaining?

[Havel] My second remark concerns the way the communist deputies reacted to this paragraph. I do not like their reaction, I do not consider it a suitable way at all. I perceive it as some sort of a gesture—to stay there in sleeping bags, be on hunger strike at the Federal Assembly, and wear stars. When deputies wear a Jewish star in this way, in protest against a law that was passed by the Federal Assembly in a democratic way, reminds me a little paradoxically, of the case when the tank was painted pink [Soviet tank, as a Prague monument to WWII, that painted pink by a student, and later by a group of parliamentary deputies] that was a desperate act of protest by some deputies close to the the right-wing. Now it is obviously the turn of left-wing deputies to engage in a sort of a protest. I do not like this at all. My view is that this is a problematic attitude and that, in a way, this discredits the parliament itself. This definitively discredits the parliamentary democracy more than when I sometimes appeal to the supreme constitutional entity—the citizens. That was my second remark.

[Dufkova] And your third remark?

[Havel] My third remark is the most important. I would mention again my meeting with deputies and everything before that. In the course of the last year, I addressed our parliament several times—I had not appealed to our citizens for help then—and the common tone of my addresses was a warning. [passage omitted] I pointed out dangers that can emerge, such as a paralysis of the parliament. In the parliament, I was met with doubts, a notion that I am spreading a false alarm about various dangers, even that my alarms are aimed at giving me more power, more powers. The reaction was the same, to a great extent, during my meeting with deputies on Tuesday. [passage omitted] The deputies were a bit surprised by how much I was alarmed, that I was so alarmed that I even tried to get the citizens involved, in a way.

Less than a week has passed since then, and the Federal Assembly is really unable to function, and this, in fact, confirms that my fears are well-founded. At present, the parliament is really unable to function because left-wing deputies do not vote about some laws—namely as an expression of their disapproval of the paragraph on communism. A very important and well-drafted law on the State Bank was not passed. A very important law on banks was not passed—this law is very important for our economy and the everyday running of our enterprises and life of our citizens. [passage omitted]

The fact that these two laws were not passed hit our economy quite hard. Next is the turn of very dramatic and tense deliberations about our budget. Unfortunately, new and very serious complications have emerged in this sphere. Given the present polarization of the parliament, there is again a big danger that the parliament is going to be unable to function. The adoption of a temporary budget would be a very bad thing. [passage omitted] There is another issue linked to this—the postponement of my drafts, my bills, until January. [passage omitted] The postponement of deliberations about them until January is not good though, on the other hand, the arguments for the postponement are logical, in a way.

A few days ago, in the evening, I received the Federal Assembly Chairman Dubcek, with Mr. Jicinsky and Mr. Sokol, who told me that the parliament board had made this decision. They gave as the reason, first, the situation that was created following the adoption of the paragraph on communism—they mentioned the failure of the parliament to function because of which no constitutional law would have a chance to be passed. They also mentioned new complications that have emerged during deliberations about the budget. I do admit that the budget is the priority—it has to be adopted before the end of the year. Nevertheless, their case that the parliament is unable to function seemed a bit absurd to me at a time when I begged the parliament to speedily discuss safety valves to fight the danger of its not be able to function; yet my proposals are postponed because the parliament is unable to function. This situation is a bit absurd, as you can see. [passage omitted]

It was promised to me that the entire complex of laws will be discussed at the beginning of January. I do not know how they will fare—to be honest, I am quite skeptical in this matter. [passage omitted] The situation, as you can see from what I have said, is very serious—perhaps the most serious since our November revolution.

I intend to seek some sort of a refuge during Christmas time and think about all these things, and think through my further course of action concerning various variants of the future development which can emerge. [passage omitted]

Court Official Rejects 'Speculations'

LD1412211591 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 11 Dec 91

[Text] Otakar Motejl, president of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, has rejected speculations that the more precisely defined text of the amended penal law adopted by the Federal Assembly today has put 400,000 members of the communist party outside the law. According to him this would only happen if it was proven on specific acts that these acts led toward the violation of human rights. The retrospective force of this law has been excluded by the list of basic rights and freedoms, and by international conventions, stressed Otakar Motejl.

Havel Remarks Trigger Socialist Parties' Protest

AU1212180191

[Editorial Report] Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech on 11 December on page 3 publishes an 800-word "Open Letter to the President of the Republic," written by Czechoslovak Socialist Party (CSS) Chairman Ladislav Dvorak and CSS Central Secretary Pavel Hirs. In the letter, the CSS officials protest against a statement made by the president at a meeting with members of the Czechoslovak Confederation of Political Prisoners in Prague on 9 December. In this statement, which is said to have been "carried on television and radio," President Havel reportedly described the CSS as "collaborators with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ]" and asked rhetorically whether "Czechoslovak People's Party [CSL] members were any better over those 40 years" than CPCZ members. On the same day, SVOBODNE SLOVO also publishes two items dealing with CSL protests against President Havel's statements of 9 December.

In their "open letter to the president," Dvorak and Hirs express "astonishment and surprise" at the fact that "you put us in the position of collaborators with the CPCZ, simply because we existed under communism." They point out that many other social organizations existed under the communist regime as well, including the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, of which Havel himself had been a member.

"We are surprised by your ignorance," the authors of the letter continue, and recall that "it was precisely our party and the CSL, that bore the whole burden of the struggle against communism after 1945." In the major part of their letter, Dvorak and Hirs recapitulate the history of CSS officials' persecution after the communist putsch of 1948. They emphasize that even those party members who were not imprisoned after 1948 "did not derive any benefit" from their CSS membership but, quite the contrary, were prevented from advancement in their professions and often were unable to send their children to the university. Dvorak and Hirs deplore Havel's statement as "an unfortunate beginning to the election campaign."

In concluding, the CSS officials express the hope that President Havel "will be a democrat and will weigh his words more carefully" and reiterate their "protest" against former dissidents claiming a "monopoly on having been a target of totalitarian oppression."

On the same day, on page 1, SVOBODNE SLOVO carries a 200-word CSTK report on President Havel's meeting with CSL Chairman Josef Lux in Prague on 10 December. During the meeting, Lux reportedly "expressed disagreement with President Vaclav Havel's evaluation of the CSL" in his 9 December speech and "stressed that CSL membership was one of the forms of protest against the CPCZ's rule."

President Havel then "explained that he did not have in mind the party of Monsignor Sramek or the present CSL led by Josef Lux but the collaborating leadership of Messrs. Plojhar and others after 1948." In the end, the president and Lux reportedly agreed that "many" CSL and CSS members tried to prevent communist rule and were "among the most persecuted" victims of the regime after 1948.

On the same day, on page 3, SVOBODNE SLOVO carries a 100-word unattributed report on an "open letter" that was sent to President Vaclav Havel by the CSL Presidium. In the letter the CSL Presidium reportedly expressed "surprise and sadness" at the president's words of 9 December, because they "lumped together the oppressors and the oppressed, murderers and their victims, torturers and martyrs, the robbers and the robbed, the deceivers and those deceived."

President Dismisses Federal Security Director

LD1412063791 Prague CSTK in English 1107 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 13 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today dismissed Jiri Novotny from the post of Federal Security and Information Service (FBIS) director and replaced him by Stefan Bacinsky, a federal parliament deputy for the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence (ODU-VPN). Novotny was temporarily charged with the post five months ago.

Calfa Answers Queries on Slovakia in Karlovy Vary

LD1612135591 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 0830 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Report by correspondent Jaroslav Fikar]

[Text] A two-hour visit to Karlovy Vary by Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa followed a session of the Defense Council attended by the prime minister and the president.

Calfa arrived in Karlovy Vary at the invitation of the first private weekly newspaper in western Bohemia, HLUK [NOISE] and parlimentary deputies representing this region. He attended a meeting held under the slogan: When About Slovakia, Then With Slovaks. [as heard] He was accompanied by representatives of the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence: Fedor Gal, Michal Horsky, Jozef Miklosko, and Chairman Martin Porubjak.

Some 500 citizens from Karlovy Vary and some visitors from Slovakia present at the meeting asked some unpleasant questions: Why is the Public Against Violence popularity in Slovakia decreasing; what obstacles are there hindering the reduction of military production in eastern Slovakia; and how can the demands of 800,000 Hungarians living in Slovakia for autonomy be met? Emerging from a number of replies was the different understanding of the situation in Bohemia, in Moravia, and Slovakia. They all confirmed that, in Slovakia, fears are growing about the possible breakup of the federation and whether democracy can be preserved. Marian Calfa expressed his optimism as captain of the flagship of the Czechoslovak Federation, as he said.

Christian Democratic Union-Public Against Violence presented itself for the first time as a federal party that would like to win the support of voters in western Bohemia. Only one issue was left without a reply: Would it not be better for the tense situation in Slovakia to be explained to people in western Bohemia by Slovaks from Bratislava or Kosice rather than those who have been permanently living and working in Prague for years?

Carnogursky Denies Promising Early Elections

LD1512122191 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1900 GMT 11 Dec 91

[Text] Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, said at a news conference in Bratislava today that Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky came up with the idea of early elections. According to Vladimir Meciar, the society is becoming more radical, and the authority of movements and parties in Slovakia is declining.

Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, refused the Meciar claim that it is he who proposed early elections. Carnogursky said that as far as he remembers, it was a delegation of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia that proposed this idea first. He admitted only that he could accept the idea of elections being held one to two months earlier.

Government Slashes Farm Subsidies by One-Quarter

AU1612121091 Prague CSTK in English 2231 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 12 (CSTK)— Government farm subsidies for 1992 will be cut by about one-quarter, Czechoslovak Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy told journalists after today's federal cabinet session.

Subsidies will amount to 19,500 million crowns (650 million USD), compared with 26,000 million crowns (883 million USD) in 1991, he said.

Dlouhy also said the cabinet approved 5,000 million crowns (167 million USD) for a new Federal Market Regulation Fund. He explained that the country's agricultural sector is not competitive and requires continued state intervention, although Czechoslovakia should avoid the European Community's policy of heavily subsidizing farmers.

Large Decline in Press Circulation Reported

AU1612110591 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 12 Dec 91 p 8

["ECOMA"-signed report: "Changes in Circulation of Daily Press and Magazines in 1990-1991"]

[Text] At the beginning of the year, the publishers of the Daily Press Union estimated that the introduction of the 22 percent tax could result in a decline in newspaper sales by more than one-third. The tax tariff was eventually approved at one-half of the original proposal. The results of continuous monitoring of the dailies' and weeklies' circulation indicate, however, that the actual decline in interest in newspapers and magazines is surpassing the original estimates.

According to a repeated omnibus survey conducted by the Business Research Institute, the decline in circulation of the ten most popular dailies with nationwide distribution in the Czech Republic reached approximately 46 percent in comparison with November 1990. A similar decline in circulation occurred among the seven most widely read regional papers, while the circulation of the five bestselling weeklies declined between November 1990 and October 1991 by approximately 60 percent.

Circulation is not identical to the number of produced or sold copies. It is defined as the number of adult persons who read, perused, or looked through the given copy during the period in which it was the current issue. It is irrelevant here, whether the copy was purchased, borrowed, or otherwise obtained.

The largest drop, relatively speaking, in interest in newspapers occurred this year in the 18 to 24 age group, by readers with grade nine education, in rural areas, and in households with a monthly income below 4,000 korunas.

The reason for the decline in the circulation of the most popular dailies and magazines is manifold—a wider title selection, the higher price of newspapers and magazines, and changes in their format and content. Consumer attitudes in the newspaper market have also significantly changed. While last November political and social developments, and news coverage in general, evoked so much interest that it led to the purchase of several daily titles, and the average number of people who read a particular copy was as high as 2.4, at the end of April, beginning in May 1991, average circulation declined to 1.1, and it approached 1.0 in October.

In November 1990, 48 percent of those polled read two or more dailies every day, and 24 percent three or more. By October 1991 the amount of readers of two or more dailies dropped to 29 percent, and only 8 percent of those polled read three or more dailies.

Thus, the newspaper market is gradually returning to the standard of other countries, and it is going to be lower than what we were used to (the average circulation of dailies in 1986 was 2.1 readers per copy). At the same time, the demand for dailies is shaping and differentiating. Readers increasingly limit themselves to reading a newspaper with an orientation reflecting their own opinions or satisfying their demands regarding content and form. The need has been eliminated for "reading between the lines" or making up for the insufficient scope of the dailies by reading additional titles.

ECOMA [expansion unknown] conducts its monitoring of the dailies' circulation on a standard representative sample of 1,500 adult inhabitants of the CSFR, chosen by a quota selection. In comparison with specific circulation surveys, the monitoring is conducted using simplified methods and includes surveys of other thematic areas in the sphere of mass communication media.

Antall Comments on 'Community of Nations'

LD1312232391 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 2015 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] What does the newly forming community of nations in place of the former Soviet Union mean for us? Why are the now established European Union and EC which we will join as an associate member next Monday important for us? I asked the Hungarian prime minister about these.

[Correspondent] You were the last Hungarian politician to meet Gorbachev. What do you think will happen to Gorbachev? What will happen after Gorbachev?

[Antall] This is very difficult to predict. Nobody can doubt the role of Gorbachev, his historical role. The fact that Gorbachev during the past period, after 1985, constantly promoted accord in international relations, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and we could list the various factors linked to his name, Gorbachev has a role in world history that cannot be questioned.

The other issue, since the coup, is perfectly clear. I would say it was clear even before the coup, that the influence of Gorbachev has been reduced. Gorbachev tried to balance this with compromises. This process, this power struggle, led to the coup in the end. The coup and the fact that Yeltsin saved the situation, made it clear that—as he at the time expressed in his letter—Russia had taken over the main power in the Soviet Union. With this the question was decided.

Now a new period begins in the place of the Soviet Union. We want to act simultaneously and this is why we insisted on doing this on the same day, for there had not yet been a diplomatic precedent, and certainly not on the territory of Russia. [sentence as heard] We saw that this period was ending and we wanted immediately to open a new one, to accommodate the new situation.

It can hardly be said that the Soviet-Hungarian treaty should not have been signed, because if the Soviet Union as a partner in the treaty disappears the treaty will automatically come to an end, and will be tranferred to the legal successor, which is none other than Russia or the Ukraine and possible other member republics. So we legally had to settle this in any case.

The other matter, the Russian and Ukrainian treaties, was indeed a rapid forward march and attack which we carried out. [passage omitted]

Concerning the future, I am confident. Of course I am a skeptic, but I trust that the world will realize that a civil war on the territory of the Soviet Union, like the one regrettably allowed to develop in Yugoslavia, which was not prevented when this could still have been done, that such a civil war would shake the world, would be tragic for West Europe just as for the world, not to mention eastern-central Europe.

[Correspondent] Is there a realistic possibility of this?

[Antall] There is a realistic possibility for everything, but Yeltsin and I think Kravchuk as well, both, and obviously there are others as well, are very experienced, if you like, crafty politicians, well trained in political power struggles, who are aware of the dangers of the situation which has developed.

Whether history still holds possibilities for Gorbachev personally or whether he would indeed accept any, is a different question.

If what happens is what Yeltsin, Kravchuk and the Belarussian leaders and others wish, a community of nation—we talked about this after our arrival with the Russian leaders—the British type community of nations is one possibility.

[Correspondent] What will a commonwealth being formed on the territory of today's Soviet Union mean for Hungary?

[Antall] Well, the new commonwealth of nations means under any circumstances that these would be sovereign states. [passage omitted]

Looking from a Hungarian viewpoint we have to take into account that Russia and Ukraine had a 90 percent share of Hungary's total foreign trade with the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]. This has declined to 60 percent recently because of Soviet inability to pay. They owe two billion dollars. It is very important that Russia will accept 65 percent, and Ukraine 16 percent, of the Soviet debt.

[Correspondent] What profit can Hungary's EC associate membership bring?

[Antall] The question is not if our joining a united Europe will simply bring something better. I can say with assurance that Hungary had no other choice. We must be glad that we can solve all this. In other words, there is no solution outside the EC. It is enough to say that already almost half of Hungary's exports—and soon more than half—go to EC countries. In other words, simply, if we do not form a link with the EC we will be forced out of European markets. The fact that we have been able to increase our exports to the West by 30 percent allowed us, in effect, to balance out somewhat the collapse of the Eastern market. [passage omitted]

In Maastricht, the new picture of Europe has been shaped, the one to which we must join, which we must catch up with. Hungary, in my judgment, has a chance to join somewhere around 1996-99.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] a civil war rages on our southern border, the ghost of a civil war threatens in the Soviet Union while at the same time NATO is silent, it is unwilling to hold any kind of defense umbrella above our head.

[Antall] Well, this is not so simple really, I think. One thing is that a border has not yet been crossed, no attack whatsoever has taken place. Thus, I think that NATO is aware, and it also has made certain gestures in this respect, something which we could put in the language of diplomacy like this: It would not remain indifferent, should such events occur. What can be said is that NATO has not introduced such preventive steps, such steps with which it would have extended the radius of its defensive power to this region.

This is never such a simple issue. In any case, the fact that we have been able to strengthen our links with NATO and the EC already presents steps in this direction. I do not hide, nor can I, that regarding Yugoslavia we are not satisfied with the way they handle the Yugoslav issue, that the Western world has not been able to take a common stance, that the joint steps have not been sufficient, that they did not consider just how important Yugoslavia's problem is and that the impotence displayed over Yugoslavia sends a very negative message to the region and that regarding the Soviet Union the recognition of events of the Soviet Union, the handling of the processes of events, did not display speediness.

However, he who has been a supporter of the Western world for a long time like myself and he who has been a supporter of democracy for a very long time is aware that had they been able to prepare for World War II it would not have lasted for six years, then they would not have been able to sign Yalta and Potsdam and then they would not have been impotent in 1953 in Berlin, in 1956 in Hungary, or in 1968. [passage omitted] However, it must be recognized that democracy and the Western world, precisely because of its lesser knowledge of this region, from a strategic point of view, from its raw material base, from many other viewpoints, it has always had a wrong policy, really. What is at issue here however, is that those who knew this region well and had an active policy really—like Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, this interest was always still worse than the Western lack of interest or impotence.

Kadar, Ukraine Counterpart Discuss Cooperation

LD1412062191 Budapest MTI in English 1912 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 13 (MTI)—Hungarian Minister of International Economic Relations Bela Kadar today held talks with Valeriy Kravchenko, minister of external economic relations of the Ukraine.

The sides reviewed tasks related to concluding the 1992 economic and commercial agreement. They agreed to continue talks after reviewing the list of goods presented by the Ukraine. The ministers decided to speed up the bank technology negotiations, to be able to sign the agreement this month. Discussions were also held about major areas of cooperation such as the delivery of Ukrainian electric energy, and the long-term settlement of Hungarian agricultural and food industry deliveries.

The ministers agreed that the creation of a Carpathian Ukraine economic zone is useful for both sides, and also contributes to the integration of the Ukraine to Europe.

Croatia's Separovic Signs Minority Rights Accord

LD1512235291 Budapest MTI in English 2200 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 15 (MTI)—Croatia joins a Hungarian-Ukrainian statement expressing commitment for minority rights, Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic said during his official visit here today.

In an earlier letter addressed to his Hungarian counterpart Geza Jeszenszky, Separovic already expressed Croatia's intention to join the statement. During the current visit, he signed a document on the enactment of the agreement. Hungary and the Ukraine signed the original document this past May. The agreement is a general statement having a positive effect on minorities in other countries as well, Jeszenszky said at a press briefing after the signing.

The statement does not mean a recognition of Croatia, Jeszenszky said, adding Hungary is ready to sign similar agreements with other countries. It is of symbolic significance that Croatia and Hungary speak out for minority rights, backing forces striving for peace and a just settlement of conflicts in the region, Jeszenszky said.

Croatia is joining the document in the most critical period of its history, and regards it as of utmost importance, Separovic said. Western countries will only recognize states that are ready to respect international legal norms, he said, adding Croatia will meet these requirements as it has already proved its commitment for minorities.

Separovic expressed hope that Hungary will be among the first to recognize Croatia's sovereignty. Separovic said the statement is the first international agreement he has signed as a member of the Croatian Government.

Keleti Claims No Croatian Bases in Country

LD1512045191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1837 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, Dec 14 (TANJUG)—Hungarian Defence Ministry spokesman Gyoergy Keleti has not ruled out the possibility of Croatian armed groups having used Hungarian territory to attack the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), but he has turned down all allegations that they might have done this with the knowledge of the Hungarian authorities.

Keleti, quoted in today's MAGYAR HIRLAP, stated that Croatian guardsmen do not have in Hungary their training camps from which they would carry out attacks on Yugoslav territory. Keleti reacted to the news that the Hungarian military attache in Belgrade was summoned to the Yugoslav Defence Ministry where he had been told that such a case did happen towards the end of last November.

According to information by the JNA, on November 30, a group of 50 Croatian guards crossed the Drava River from the Hungarian territory and attacked Yugoslav border guards near the village of Torjanci in the Baranja region.

Spokesman on Agreed Talks With SFRY States

LD1312151691 Budapest MTI in English 1124 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 13 (MTI)—"In its Thursday [12 December] session the Hungarian Government authorized the foreign minister to make preparations for establishing diplomatic relations with the Yugoslavian member states wishing to do so," Friday's NEPSZABADSAG says.

On this score, government spokesman Balazs Laszlo told the paper:

"The government authorized the foreign minister that—in due time and according to the situation, considering the behaviour of all the essential conditions including the attitude of other countries—he should take the appropriate measures necessary to sign agreements on the establishment of diplomatic relations with some Yugoslavian member republics. This resolution does not include any date for making concrete steps."

In the absence of Geza Jeszenszky, the ministry was represented by Political State Secretary Tamas Katona. The state secretary told NEPSZABADSAG:

"The decision and the intention are nothing else than what is included in the brief statement. If there is an appropriate moment, the Foreign Ministry should have government authorization. The statement does not include any other concrete facts or dates. Were a decision to be made on the recognition of diplomatic relations, the foreign minister would be authorized to act and turn to the president of the republic."

Asked whether Hungary was continuously consulting with other countries and the European Community, Katona said:

"Of course, there are such consultations. We have always emphasized that we are not prepared to take a unilateral step."

Asked whether Hungary was considering the recognition of Yugoslavian republics other than Slovenia and Croatia, Katona says:

"From this aspect, the Hungarian position is unchanged. We consider all countries that have declared their sovereignty as being eligible for the establishment of diplomatic relations. It would be more desirable for all member states to be recognized since it would imply a certain obligation for settlement. By that time, we should have been able to decide who will assume the heritage of Yugoslavia, both its favourable and unfavourable features and its commitments, and to what extent."

In reply to another question, Katona said, "we would obviously like to maintain acceptable or even good relations with Serbia. This is an added reason why we advocate recognition."

Woerner on Hungarian Support for WEU, NATO

LD1312211191 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by correspondent Laszlo Mecs on 13 December; place not given; recorded—Woerner speaks in German with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[Excerpt] The traditional year-end consultation of NATO defense ministers ended today. They discussed the kind of relations which should exist between NATO and the eastern European countries, and NATO's plans regarding the supervision of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. Laszlo Mecs asked NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner about the correct orientation for Hungary with regard to the formation of the WEU.

[Woerner] The decision must be made by Hungary, but I do not believe that the two organizations should be seen as different organizations offering a choice. What has been voiced at the Maastricht Summit clearly promulgated that NATO and the WEU complement each other. NATO will support the WEU, thus if Hungary should turn toward the WEU, NATO will not consider your decision as a hostile step, and I think that this definition is valid vice versa too.

It must be acknowledged that two military organizations exist in Europe which, following the spirit of Rome and Maastricht, mutually complement each other. [passage omitted]

Hungary Signs European Social Charter

LD1612104491 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] In Strasbourg, in the presence of the secretary general of the Council of Europe, Minister for Social Welfare Laszlo Surjan signed the European Social Charter, which sets out 45 rights for members of the charter.

Nothing demonstrates the weight and the strict requirements demanded by the charter more than that it took three and one-half years before the first five countries ratified it. The reason for this is that the agreement is not only of ideological and political significance, but sets out very specific, tangible measures in the field of social policy, which the countries concerned are only able to undertake in line with their economic strength. This is supported by the fact that no European country has yet completed signing every paragraph of the charter.

Now that Hungary has signed, it could take three to five years before the Hungarian legislature ratifies it. Since our country is the first from central-eastern Europe to join the agreement, its implementation could set an example in the region. It could prove that the transition from a planned economy to a market economy can be carried out while undertaking the maintenance of security in social affairs.

Bank Vice President Assures Japan of Policy

LD1612105391 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] One of the National Bank of Hungary vice presidents has reassured Japanese bank leaders that Hungary does not wish to change its current finance policy. Imre Parafas pointed out at a Tokyo conference on investment, organized by a Japanese bank, that there are only eight enterprises in the privatization which the Hungarian Government does not want to involve foreign investors. He referred to the firms dealing with arms as an example. The number of those enterprises, in the case of it wanting to stipulate a majority Hungarian share, is only 90. The bank leader added that the value of this year's foreign capital investments in Hungary is some 1.5 billion dollars. This means that our country received some 60 percent of the total Western investments destined for central-eastern Europe this year.

Bank Vice President on Forint Convertibility Plans

LD1612104591 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] The forint will become convertible officially within 18 months. This was said by National Bank Vice President Frigyes Harshegyi when he gave a briefing on the initial functioning of the new exchange rate system. Since Monday , the commercial banks have been able to register independently the exchange rates of banknotes and checks. The Hungarian National Bank vice president said that further concessions would be introduced for foreigners; thus, it will become possible for them to accept or pay in forints. As from the beginning of 1993, after the announcement of convertibility, the population probably will be able to purchase more freely foreign currencies at official places; thus, in 18 months time, the 50 dollar limit is expected to cease.

National Bank Changes Fixing of Currency Rates

LD1412061291 Budapest MTI in English 1221 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 13 (MTI-ECONEWS)—The National Bank of Hungary (NBH) encountered no major hitches in switching to a new method of quoting forint rates on December 9, Vice-President Frigyes Harshegyi told ECONEWS today. Under the new system, the central bank publishes medium forint exchange rates for foreign banknotes and cheques on the morning of each day rather than in the afternoon of the preceding day. The only restriction in the new system is that the commercial banks may not set buying rates in excess and selling rates under the central bank medium rate.

Mr Harshegyi said that the central bank margin, the difference between buying and selling rates, is 1 per cent either way, while the commercial banks use a 2-3 per cent margin on average. Some 20 commercial banks buy and sell foreign currency. Mr Harshegyi said the new forint rate fixing method was considered as a technical step towards the full convertibility of the forint. But he pointed out that high inflation was a powerful obstacle to extending the convertibility of the forint to all areas.

Although this year's 34-35 per cent inflation figure is expected to fall to 20-25 per cent next year, the NBH is of the view that it should sink below 20 per cent for the country to be able to have across-the-board convertibility, the NBH official said. This will probably come about by the end of 1992 or the beginning of 1993 and will enable the forint to become convertible for individuals, who will have easier access to the foreign currency of their choice at the market rates.

An inter-bank foreign exchange market is to be established by the middle of next year, while in a further step towards full convertibility, foreign companies will be given the opportunity to pay for goods and services in Hungary and have bank accounts in forints.

Fluctuations Noted in Repayable Foreign Debt

AU1612085891 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Dec 91 p 1

["Cs.K.K."-signed report: "What Do We Repay?"]

[Text] In 1991, Hungary spent $2.6 billion on repaying debts. Some $1.4 billion interest has to be paid on the loans, the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] informed us. They also told us that the amount of capital and interest to be repaid in 1992 is exactly the same as in 1991.

As is known, in the last few years, the MNB borrowed money on various terms from foreign institutions and other organizations. These loans have to be repaid at different points in time. Accordingly, the annual debt burden can vary significantly. As is shown in the table below, after the balances of 1991 and 1992, Hungary will "only" have to spend $2 billion on repaying capital in 1993. However, the amount of the "bill" will increase in the following three years, and $3 billion will have to be repaid in 1996. In addition, interest on the various loans has to be added to the amounts in the table. The amount of interest is only known for 1991 and 1992. It is not possible to say what size the amount of interest due later will be.

**Hungary's Foreign Debts
(Excluding Interest) 1991-1996
in Billions of U.S. Dollars**

Year	Amount
1991	2.6
1992	2.6
1993	2.0
1994	2.2
1995	2.9
1996	3.0

Assembly Proposes Increased Defense Expenditures

AU1612094691 Budapest MTI in English 1441 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, 13 December (MTI)—"In view of the Yugoslavian events, the Defense Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly on Friday [13 December] decided to submit a proposed amendment to increase the planned defence expenditure of 60 billion forints to 62 billion," Committee Secretary Jeno Poda (Hungarian Democratic Forum) told MTI. The sum could be set aside from the budgetary reserve fund, he added.

Plans include the regrouping of 800 million forints, with 480 million going to air defence, which would enable pilots to spend 80 hours in the air a year, instead of 60. The ground force allocation would go up by 320 million forints allowing the holding of 12-15 exercises, instead of 3-5 as planned.

Antal Annus, administrative secretary of state at the Ministry of Defense, reported to the session on U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's visit to Hungary. Cheney supports the Hungarian intention to buy weapons from the former GDR arsenal, Annus said.

To MTI's question whether Defence Minister Lajos Fur's election as acting vice-president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum will not distract the minister's attention from national defense, Jeno Poda said that as Lajos Fur had acquired adequate experience at the head of the ministry and his work is assisted by the new deputy secretaries of state, the double function will not cause any problems. Political Secretary of State Erno Raffay will in all likelihood also play a more active role in management.

Reshuffle in Ministries, Biographies Reported

LD1512184291 Budapest MTI in English 1737 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 15 (MTI)—Hungarian International Economic Relations Ministry State Secretary Janos Martonyi was relieved of his post by the Hungarian president at the prime minister's proposal, and appointed Foreign Ministry state secretary.

Industry and Trade Ministry State Secretary Jeno Laszlo was relieved of his post and appointed titular state secretary in charge of coordinating defence industry, trade and development.

The prime minister also appointed Laszlo president of the Defence Industry Office. The Defence Industry Office will start operating on 1 January, 1992, under the supervision of the Hungarian minister of defence. The Hungarian president, at the prime minister's proposal, appointed Ivan Szabo minister of industry and trade as from 17 December, 1991.

According to a government decision, the National Office for Physical Education and Sports will operate under direct government supervision as from 1 January, 1992. Minister without portfolio Balazs Horvath was appointed to be in charge of supervising the office, while State Secretary Rezso Gallov is to remain in his post as head of the institution.

x x x

Janos Martonyi was born in Cluj (Romania) in 1944. He graduated from the Szeged (Hungary) Faculty of Law. From 1979, he worked as a representative of the Hungarian Foreign Trade Ministry in Brussels. Later, he became head of the international law department of the Ministry of Trade. Between 1989 and 1990, he was government commissioner in charge of privatization.

Martonyi filled the post of international economic relations state secretary from 6 June, 1990.

Jeno Laszlo was born in Budapest in 1939. He received a mechanical engineer's degree and took a Ph.D. in agricultural technical sciences in 1976. Laszlo was Industry and Trade Ministry state secretary from 20 December, 1990.

Ivan Szabo was born in Budapest in 1934. He received his degrees from the Budapest Technical University and the Budapest University of Economics. In 1969, he took a Ph.D. in economics. He is a founder of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and an MP [member of parliament], a parliament economic committee member. He has been economic committe chairman since 13 June, 1990.

New Democratic Forum Presidium Member Elected

LD1612115591 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] In Budapest, Zoltan Bogardi has been elected into the national presidium of the Hungarian Democratic Forum to the post which has become vacant due to the death of Denes Csengey. At the national rally, the deputies also decided that if another new member has to be chosen to the presidium then it should be Mrs. Balsi, nee Etelka Pataki, who received the highest number of votes after Bogardi at the present election.

Industry Minister Szabo Interviewed on Plans

AU1612120791 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 12 Dec 91 p 1

[Interview with Ivan Szabo, chairman of the National Assembly's Economic Committee and deputy of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Zsuzsa Regos on 11 December; place not given: "Ivan Szabo Minister-Designate: We Are Stumbling From One Crisis to Another"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] I am always ready to salvage intellectual and material capacities, but I will not support the survival of outdated structures and institutions, Ivan Szabo, the future leader of the Ministry for Industry and Trade, stated at the third general meeting of the Hungarian Innovation Chamber. Ivan Szabo made his acceptance of the ministerial position dependent on the establishment of some basic conditions. Among other things, he said that, along with domestic trade, the Ministry of International Economic Relations [NGKM] responsible for foreign economic affairs should also be merged with the Ministry for Industry.

[Szabo] We definitely need the NGKM in the transitional period while Hungary is joining various European integrated systems and while it is trying to recover from the collapse of the CEMA. However, it is an undoubted fact that the separation of the two ministries will lose its meaning on the long run, especially after the forint becomes convertible, because domestic and foreign trade are the last phases of production. In other words, I cannot imagine an industrial structure that cannot adequately implement its own market strategy.

[Regos] What kind of short-term strategy do you intend to implement in your new position?

[Szabo] We will be stumbling from one crisis to another for some time to come. We are facing restructuring in the electrical and the energy industries, including settling the affairs of coal mining. We should also start doing something with vehicle manufacturing and should reconsider the aluminum metallurgy sector. The law on bankruptcies will soon affect us, and we will have to establish the necessary economic environment to handle the probably very large number of bankruptcies. In addition, 1992 will be the year when enterprises will be transformed and will turn into corporations and we will have to recover from that somehow.

[Regos] Are you planning to introduce structural and personal changes in the ministry?

[Szabo] There will probably be some movements. New organizations will emerge, and new people will come. At the moment though, I am not planning any such measures. The forthcoming changes relating to the political and administrative state secretaries were not originated by me, but they are unavoidable for various reasons. The position of political state secretary belongs to the Independent Smallholders Party, and this issue will be solved once their internal debate is settled. There are structural reasons for making a change at the administrative state secretary's post. As for me, I will only remove people from their positions if serious technical or economic reasons make this necessary.

[Regos] Who will replace you in the parliament's Economic Committee?

[Szabo] Parliamentary Deputy Gyula Takacsy, director of the FOSZER, was nominated at the last session of the Hungarian Democratic Forum's parliamentary faction.

'Openness Club' Rejects Compaign To Control Media

LD1412190491 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] The government has launched a battle to gain control of the media. This was said at the general assembly of the Openness Club, which will elect new officials. The organization is trying to stop the public service Hungarian radio and television from becoming mouthpieces of the government. The Openness Club wishes to take a stance against the intimidation of journalists, and would also like to prevent the concealing of information of public interest. At the general assembly attention was also drawn to the fact that Hungarian society today is increasingly less tolerant of people with differing opinions.

Soldiers' TU Official on Living Conditions

AU1312133991 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 11 Dec 91 p 5

[Interview with Colonel Ferenc Horovitz, commander of a military unit in Pusztavacs and elected chairman of the Soldiers' Interest Protection Union, by Irene Szabo; place and date not given: "Officers Are Leaving the Army on Their Own"]

[Excerpts] According to the plans, next year's budget will allocate about 60 billion forints for the Hungarian Army. As it also transpired at the meeting of our parliament's Defense Committee, this money is not sufficient for technological development, and one can even expect a further deterioration in the living conditions of the professional and regular army staff. At a recent news conference, Lt. General Antal Annus also admitted that the deterioration in its financial conditions was damaging the Army's morale. We asked Ferenc Horovitz about his opinion regarding the current situation in the Army.

[Horovitz] In short, I can say that the situation is very bad. The figures published about the departure of professional soldiers during the last two years do not reflect reality. There has been an increase in the number of less qualified staff who left the Army, and one cannot welcome this because the most qualified personnel are also leaving the Army en masse. Therefore, when we say that we cannot replace our staff of officers because there are no other candidates, we can see that this staff is "changing by itself." All this is closely connected to the fact that the promises made by the defense minister and other responsible figures in the Army are not in harmony with the actual measures. Patriotic slogans will not solve the problem of three-quarters of the professional staff who are living below the subsistence level; if this situation continues, these people will become miserable.

[Szabo] There is a ministry leadership strongly affiliated to the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], a theoretically depoliticized army, and an army leadership whose party affiliation is not clear. Naturally, a large-scale restructuring is also currently under way in the Hungarian Army. How can the professional soldiers cope with all this?

[Horovitz] In my opinion, the defense of our homeland is not connected to any party. Parliamentary parties should debate on their political principles, but they should decide on what type of armed forces we need as soon as possible. Once this decision is made, the conditions for this army's functioning must be guaranteed, and this cannot be a matter of debate. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] Whom does the existence of the soldiers' union disturb and why?

[Horovitz] Some of the Army leaders and commanders are afraid that our union is threatening their God-given power. Many people are also trying to protect the Army's sham-order, and this is part of our heritage because, if an interest protection body had to be taken into consideration, our staff of officers would be divided along the divided interests, and this would be an alarming situation. However, in my opinion, the alarming thing is the possibility for a comprehensive interest protection to function under the auspices of the Soldiers' Association [BAJTARSI EGYESULET] presided by Major General Jozsef Kelemen. There is one problem with this, namely that Mr Kelemen is the deputy chief of staff. If the Defense Ministry and the military leadership continue to neglect us, our lawyers see no other choice but to appeal to the Labor Affairs Court.

[Szabo] This would not lead to an increase in your union's membership.

[Horovitz] That is true. Moreover, the officers' helplessness will further increase as a result of the leaders' opposition and, in my opinion, this will also hinder the development of a new type of army that increases the prestige of the staff of officers.

Olszewski Announces Delay in Naming Cabinet

LD1312215191 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Prime Minister Jan Olszewski has postponed until Monday the presentation of the composition of the government to the president. It follows from a statement by the prime minister that Krzysztof Skubiszewski has declined to take part in his government.

Yesterday, Jan Olszewski was still hoping to present the composition of the government to the president today:

[Begin Olszewski recording] Yesterday there surfaced certain complications, with the result that the constitutional requirement that the prime minister designate should consult with the president about the candidacies for the members of the future cabinet will most probably only be carried out early on Monday. [end recording]

The complications include the Liberal Democratic Congress's split from the Five. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki was to be a deputy prime minister in Jan Olszewski's government. Several other portfolios, including the Finance Ministry, were to go to the Liberals. Prime Minister Olszewski also conceded that he was not able to respond positively to Donald Tusk's suggestion that the composition of the government be agreed upon between the president, the prime minister, and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki:

[Begin Olszewski recording] Mr. Donald Tusk's suggestion is unacceptable. It was unacceptable to me also because it would create at the outset, as it were, of new parliamentary practice the principle of acting outside and above the Sejm. [end recording]

From yesterday's talks between Leszek Moczulski and Secretary of State Mieczyslaw Wachowski, it followed that the president had no reservations against the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] leader getting the portfolio of the defense ministry. A different conclusion from Tuesday's talks with the President was drawn by Prime Minister Olszewski.

[Begin Olszewski recording] I was getting my impressions from talks with the president, while Mr. Leszek Moczulski was getting his impressions from talks with Minister Wachowski. These are two different persons. [end recording]

On Monday, the prime minister intends to meet with many parliamentary floor groups, including most probably the group of the Polish Peasants Party. Jan Olszewski believes that his government has to get parliamentary support from groups outside the Four.

The clarification of the differences that appear between the prime minister and Leszek Moczulski in appraising the Belvedere [presidential seat] attitude to the KPN head's candidacy for the defense ministry has also been postponed until Monday.

Olszewski Meets Twice With Coalition Parties

LD1412203991 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Twice today Prime Minister Jan Olszewski consulted the chairmen of the four parties that form the government coalition. Andrzej Jelenski will tell us about these meetings:

[Jelenski] The subject of the talks, which altogether lasted several hours, was the composition of the government, which we are going to learn in the next few days. The prime minister presented the composition to the leaders of the four, maintaining the position that a breakthrough government would be created, in which the distribution of seats will not result from the relative positions of the parties. In a word, it is to be a government that would guarantee reform of the state, made up of personalities and experts.

According to information conveyed after the meeting by Leszek Moczulski, chairman of the Confederation for Independent Poland [KPN], KPN will not be represented in Prime Minister Olszewski's government, although it is not leaving the coalition and will enter the so called Political Council.

By contrast, Center Alliance leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski was very reluctant to comment, emphasizing that his party had three guaranteed portfolios, while the composition of the government mostly consisted of experts and will really surprise many people.

So, we await a government of experts and personalities.

No political meetings by the prime minister are expected tomorrow. On Monday, Prime Minister Olszewski is expected to meet President Lech Walesa. That is when we should learn the composition of the breakthrough cabinet. Early Monday afternoon, the prime minister plans to meet at the Parliament with representatives of floor groups representing the Democratic Union, seeking support for the composition of the government. The prime minister will present the composition of the cabinet at the Sejm forum next week.

Democratic Union Declares Voting Intentions

LD1512193991 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] The Council of the Democratic Union has decided that it will not enter the government of Jan Olszewski. However, in the course of voting in the Sejm, it will not create a coalition that would hinder the formation of a Council of Ministers.

UD's Hall Views Prospects, Coalition Options

AU1512212091 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Dec 91 p 2

[Interview with Aleksander Hall, deputy chairman of the Democratic Union, by Tomasz Roguski; place and date not given: "The Divisions Will Change"]

[Text] [Roguski] A month before the elections and a month after the elections, public opinion polls showed that the Democratic Union [UD] had the support of more than 20 percent of the electorate, but on the actual day of the elections, only 12 percent voted for the UD. How is that possible?

[Hall] It plainly shows that the UD is a party that tends to elicit support and trust, but that—when a choice has to be made—it is not clear enough to all those who feel drawn to the party that it represents them. That is, of course, one possible explanation.

[Roguski] What will the UD do to alter this situation?

[Hall] Now is the time to consider our future political strategy, to work on what could be called the party's image, and provide a precise definition of certain aspects of our program.

[Roguski] Would you not agree that the UD has found itself isolated in Parliament. Bronislaw Geremek failed to create a government based on an agreement between the Liberal Democratic Congress, the UD, and the Center Accord. Later, the "group of five" defeated UD candidates to take the main posts in the Sejm, despite the fact that you have the largest parliamentary club and a large number of experienced parliamentarians .

[Hall] The "group of five" demonstrated how effective it was by filling the Sejm and Senate presidium posts, and it proposed the prime minister. However, effectiveness has to be measured over a longer period of time, when a consistent policy comes to be realized. Without those circles and people who are in the UD and without the UD Parliamentary Club, it will be difficult to realize an economic reform program and a responsible state program.

[Roguski] For the time being, the "group of five" is working alone, without the UD. Are you not afraid that the UD will find itself left standing somewhere between the "group of five," which does not want to cooperate with you, and the Alliance of the Democratic Left, with which you do not want to cooperate?

[Hall] One cannot take a static view. If the UD, which is a formation that supports the state and reform, were to find itself constantly in opposition in the longer term that would be an unsatisfactory situation. However, I think that the Sejm political landscape will change, the true lines along which alliances and divisions will run will change depending on the economic program, the budget, and institutional questions. That description may be accurate today, but whether the "group of five" is stable and whether it can maintain a lasting working majority in Parliament are matters that will only now be put to the test.

[Roguski] Are you still counting on forming the coalition that Bronislaw Geremek proposed?

[Hall] At the moment, Jan Olszewski is forming a government that is based around a coalition of five groupings. However, the situation may change in the future and, in my opinion, it should change in the interest of Poland. What is needed is openness on both sides. The UD cannot be guided by feelings of regret concerning the past and ideological prejudices.

What we can say about the formations that make up the "group of five" is based on what they said in their election programs. In this respect, there is no doubt that we are closer to the Liberal Democratic Congress and the Center Accord than to, for example, the Confederation for an Independent Poland. However, what matters more is actual political behavior in Parliament, and that will reveal who in the "group of five" is closest to us. I would point out that the UD is not seeking to provoke splits, and it does not intend to join and become yet another element in the governing coalition. Program content is what matters most to the UD.

[Roguski] Some "group of five" politicians have clearly said that they view the various UD factions differently. Although formed with the support of five center-right groupings, the Jan Olszewski government may also include some politicians from other groupings. Could UD politicians be included?

[Hall] That could not be a decision made by an individual, but only a political decision made by the party. It is not a prospect that we are currently preparing ourselves for. We could only adopt a position if a concrete proposal were made, and that would have to pertain to the whole range of national issues, that is to say, with the general directions of the new government's program. In any case, there is definitely no question of endorsing or signing any kind of agreement in the dark.

Olszewski Views Coalition, Government Issues

LD1512222791 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Interview with Prime Minister Jan Olszewski by Andrzej Jelenski in the studio in Warsaw; from the "High Noon" program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Jelenski] Prime Minister, you have been entrusted by the Sejm with forming a government. Certain complications have arisen after the Liberals' recent pull-out. Is there a chance that a government will be created, and what kind of government should it be? Should it still be a government of personalities?

[Olszewski] I think it should be a government of men of authority, that is, an above-party government—in a sense, a government representing at this time all-national interests, a government close to the idea that we frequently hear about, the idea being put forward—a government of national confidence. I am aware that this is a very ambitious task, but it seems to me that, at this moment, bearing in mind the enormous difficulty of the tasks that this government is going to face, that we have to seek this widest possible moral and political base for this government.

[Jelenski] Despite these specific difficulties, is there a chance of this being a breakthrough government?

[Olszewski] There are no easy breakthroughs in the economy. In the economy, especially in the state of the economy today, one, first of all, has to take steps that are very urgent but also very cautious. And one could hardly expect a breakthrough during the next few months, perhaps even a year or so. But a breakthrough will be expressed through us undertaking such actions, adopting methods of action that would create possibilities for moving toward economic development within a certain time frame. And, in that sense, I think it will be possible to speak of a breakthrough.

[Jelenski] A condition for good work—no one needs convincing of this—and especially cabinet work is a well-matched team. What is the chance of the team members being appropriate?

[Olszewski] I have tried not to be guided here by party criteria, and I have to say here that the representatives of the coalition that supports me have made it very much easier for me. They did not, perhaps with minor exceptions, make categorical personnel proposals, leaving in my hands, in effect, the right to choose and select the composition of this cabinet. I have tried, to the best of my ability, to put together a team that, to my mind, is capable of working effectively, competently, and loyally. As far as its composition is concerned, I will be presenting it to the Sejm on Wednesday.

[Jelenski] Every successive government of the Third Republic has a more difficult task.

[Olszewski] Indeed, because time simply goes by, while some things that should have been done, and could easily have been done at the outset of the reform process, became, when postponed and shifted in time, more and more difficult in the process of transformation. And I think that, in a certain sense, the possibility of this start at this moment is perhaps the last opportunity.

[Jelenski] Prime Minister, a great proportion of our society can expect even greater poverty and more drastic self-denials, but some people are going to be well-off and even grow rich, and that's a good thing. Will the people accept this model?

[Olszewski] Will the people accept this model? I myself would have difficulty accepting it. Yes, you are right. That is how it will happen, that is how the process of transformation will run. But I should like us to be aware, from the first moment of this government's work, that in one matter a plane of certain equality will be created, social equality, equality in the right to initiative, in the right to take things into your own hands, to self-dependence in life and to opportunities to use that which is borne by this self-dependence. That is precisely a characteristic of a democratic system, a system of political and economic freedom, that it creates such opportunities. We want to build this system, build it as quickly as possible. In that sense, it brings some chance for the future to all social groups, to all people.

It cannot be the case that inevitably, at one extreme, an enormous potential of poverty is created and, at the other, a narrow layer of wealth. I think that this model—and I do not conceal that it may even be attractive to some people, to those who a priori come within this narrow privileged group—this is not my model, and I do not think it could gain acceptance in Poland.

[Jelenski] Too many people maintain that Counsellor Olszewski will not cope with a cabinet because he is not an economist. But a great many well-known politicians, especially in Europe, are not economists, and they cope perfectly well with leading a government.

[Olszewski] Well, you have said it. There is nothing I could add.

[Jelenski] Prime Minister, apparently the key element in your friendships—because I would like to raise certain private matters in this interview—is loyalty and, only after that, come such characteristics as a person's background or whether he holds left-wing or right-wing views.

[Olszewski] The word loyalty has various meanings. In certain senses, in our country, it does not necessarily have the most positive connotations. Sometimes it is perceived as a negative. Well, I believe that it is necessary to restore to this word its initial, normal sense. But I do not select people on the basis of some, let us say, a priori criterion that they should be loyal to me. I select them on the basis of a certain—perhaps somewhat different—criterion: an appraisal of the type of man, an appraisal of his way of reacting, thinking, his behavior—which, I do not conceal, for me result from experiences in the war. When I meet someone, and I start thinking about, say, what he represents, I ask myself one question, whether I would like to find myself together with him, just the two of us, in a situation that would directly threaten us, threaten our lives, and how he would then behave. And that is the main criterion by which I form my friendships.

[Jelenski] And what about left-wing or right-wing views?

[Olszewski] Views are always important of course. People change their views, sometimes even extreme views. I do not hide the fact that I do not like extremists. I am more a man of moderation, but I am also aware that in our country, in Poland, of the four classical Roman virtues, the virtue of moderation is the least frequent.

[Jelenski] Prime Minister, in an interview for ZYCIE WARSZAWY, you said that a politician should know prices and be aware of social moods, and that is why twice or three times a week you go shopping at the Hala Mirowska [indoor market] in the capital.

[Olszewski] It was easy for me then, because I lived right next door to Hala Mirowska—so, in a way, it was automatic. And furthermore, going shopping was not, let us say, an activity of public nature; I was just helping my wife with running the household, and I shared duties with her in that respect. But I do not conceal that it also has certain benefits in public activity. It allows you to get an idea of the state of the market, as well as the consumers' moods. Unfortunately, I have to say that the prime minister's duties remove this opportunity. I will have to rely here only, let us say, on indirect reports.

[Jelenski] How can Polish law be put in order to efficiently counteract cases of corruption and swindling?

[Olszewski] One has to strive and one has to have a resolute political will. I am aware that there is much demoralization, especially among some social groups, and that there is a considerable degree of disintegration in the state apparatus. These are the main sources of the spread of demoralization. The attention of a future government has to focus on this issue, and resolute remedial measures have to be taken—not only repressive measures, but also, and above all, measures of reorganization, and some financial resources that would guard the apparatus against this kind of temptation.

[Jelenski] Mr. Prime Minister, you have announced that on Monday you are going to expand the political base of the future government; hence, you are planning meetings with parliamentary floor groups that have a democratic option.

[Olszewski] It is not a matter of expanding the party base. What matters is to appeal directly to the Sejm as a whole, to all democratic groups in the Sejm and to all deputies from these groups for support for the program I am going to present and for the government that is going to implement the program. I should like to get support going beyond, let us say, a formal base of the government that, at this moment, might become insufficient.

[Jelenzki] Thank you very much on behalf of our listeners.

Walesa Receives Olszewski; 'Breakthrough' Noted

AU1512161591 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 11 Dec 91 pp 1-2

['AR, PS' signed report: "President Receives Prime Minister Olszewski: Breakthrough in Formation of Government"]

[Text] President Lech Walesa twice received Prime Minister Jan Olszewski on 10 December. They held their first 50-minute meeting over breakfast. The prime minister returned for a second meeting at midday.

Jan Olszewski briefed the president on the current stage of work on forming the new government. They discussed who should occupy key ministerial posts in which the president is particularly interested on account of his constitutional prerogatives, in other words the posts of defense, interior, and foreign minister. The president was also interested in the composition of the government Presidium, which is meant to be a political supervisory body of the Council of Ministers.

"Generally speaking, the president and I achieved a consensus, which does not mean we resolved every single issue," said Olszewski after the meetings, which he described as a breakthrough in the work on forming the new government. Without consultations with the president, any decisions on ministerial posts are merely preliminary, he said.

The president and prime minister agreed on a 10-day time limit for forming the new government. Government Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski told ZYCIE that if the government is not formed within that time, "The president will undertake action to safeguard the functioning of the state in accordance with his constitutional duty;" in other words, he will "seek a new prime minister."

Prime Minister Olszewski told the press that he thinks the work on forming the new government should be finished by the end of the week. "Although the five center-right wing parties are supposed to form the political basis of the government, the final shape of this base is not yet certain," he said. Certain talks on this subject have also been held with the Democratic Union. The prime minister said he cannot reveal the results of these talks, nor any personal details, until the full composition of the government has been decided and submitted to the president.

Another meeting between the president and prime minister is expected to take place in two or three days' time.

Walesa Meets Workers at Gdansk Shipyard

LD1512125291 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1858 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Question and answer session with President Lech Walesa and unidentified workers at the Gdansk shipyard—live]

[Text] [Worker] I would like to ask Mr. President to take the floor and to say a few words to the people who are gathered here.

[Walesa] In 1980, we told ourselves that every year on 16 December we would talk about what we had done and where we were. I asked for a meeting with you a day earlier, so that we could talk about it all in the cradle of Solidarity, in front of Poland.

[Worker] Mr. President, I have a specific question for you. As long-standing activists we have fought for a free and independent Poland. For many years we were building Poland. Today, my doors are permanently open—elderly ladies are coming, mothers of numerous families, and they are crying. What have you done? What have you done?

[Walesa] I said it many times—you have been treating the president, in spite of his working with you for many years, and treating all of us as commies. You simply think that we do not want to, that we plunder, that we do not feel how awful it is that people cannot live on pensions and have a decent life. This is all true. Of course, I have repeated it many times, and I want to repeat it here again—we have communist laws. We have won with precision the struggle for democracy and for our right to determine the fate of Poland. Yes. But our struggle has ended, as a matter of fact, with the parliamentary elections. Until then, it was of utmost importance to get us to our free Poland. We achieved that. But there is nothing free in this world. This is a revolution, this is the takeover of power by a legal society.

All this costs a lot. You remember, as hard it used to be to do anything, even with you—when I was saying: Gentlemen, I have a big nose, and I can smell victory. Listen to me, listen to me. What happened, what happened? Hardly anybody listened, hardly anybody gave me a chance to carry out my job. Now I wriggle like an eel, I apply pressure, I phone everywhere to prosecutors, to militia ... folks, the people are crying, folks. Poland is being robbed! Let me do something, or do something yourselves. Your reply is: You are to blame. That is why an answer is different. One cannot achieve everything; you cannot order me to drive a small Fiat in pursuit of a Mercedes, when it is doing 200, and we are doing 30 kilometers per hour.

When we have all possibilities, without Muscovy, without security men, when we can elect, arrange, and dismiss. Are we able to do it? If not, let us replace the president and everybody. But when a period of change has come, when there are unsuitable people, maybe even the president, what is Poland's reply to me? We are not going to the ballot box. You have given me the people you have. Now, in spite of many feeling offended, I have to create the government and to resolve all problems. Should it be like that? Can one man do anything democratically in the present structure of power, when he has no possibilities whatsoever. He cannot even stage a coup, as the Army and everything is from the old times.

That is why I tell Poland and the Poles that the situation is bad, but everyone should know that we have taken over ill-treated Poland, a Poland full of debts and devastated. Now one has to lift it up. Let us select the people to carry this job. In this moment, when the law is old and Poland new, in the moment of anarchy and mess, artful people without ideals, people that provoked crimes, that cooperated in crimes continue to laugh in our face. Why are they doing it? Because they want all sanctities, all ideals, and all leadership to fall, and then time will come again for all those old vultures. Unpunished crime encourages. The thick line encouraged crime. We, romantic heroes, thought that those people without ideals, when offered a chance, would join work. We were wrong. That is why I demand decrees to end reprivatization and to begin a true privatization, and to use a decree to bring people who were murdering Poland to accounts. But as you see, I am not going to get it all, because what we are building has been restricted by those people who favored bringing the guilty to accounts, but today they think that everything can be done by 460 Sejm deputies.

I will tell you more. I said one year, sirs, one year, and by that time I would not like to lose everything we achieved together. After that year, I'll come back to you, if the effectiveness doesn't get any better, if there is no progress in settling of accounts, if this is how things are going to go on dishonestly, then once again, but not according to the book, we'll go forward as the shipyard, as the cradle of Solidarity. But we'll go the short way, the way the peasants do, the way the workers do. You know how it should be done, and so do I. That's why I want you to oppose but understand at the same time. I went as your delegate, not because I liked the Belvedere; that wasn't why I left my wife and children. No, I went so as to be faithful to that which we promised ourselves, so as to finish this work. I overthrew this system with you, here from this place. It was very difficult, and now we won't allow our victory to be squandered; we won't allow Poland to be squandered. Let no one count on that. But I am counting on you and on people who see all this. They see how beautifully, how beautifully much was said, and how beautifully it was forgotten. However, our elites are mistaken. Perhaps it's not their fault; that is 50 years of the system.

[Worker] Mr. President, the government that is being formed at the moment, the coalition of the five, four, six—we're not interested in how many; however, it says a great deal about how they want to form but doesn't say anything about its program, and we're waiting for that.

[Walesa] I don't interfere in the formation because I do not have the right. I want, in spite of everything, to improve the bad law, but again, not me but our lawyers. As the government is being formed, on 16 December, the prime minister will probably come and see me. He'll present the government and will demand a reply from me, and I shall reply unabashedly, depending on the program and membership proposals. It is a much better situation for me, in so far that this government is now one of democracy, and not of Lech Walesa, as the last one was. I am going to be in a better situation, in so far as I am going to say, sirs, the shipyard workers are demanding the immediate settling of accounts of this, that, and the other.

I demand on behalf of the masses who elected me, from the government, from the Prosecutor's Office, from the militia, and such things. I am going to shout with you because I have the right. Until the victory of democracy, I didn't have such a chance. My main aim was to achieve normality. Today, now there is normality, and I am returning to the masses who elected me. It is a better situation for you and for me in so far as, in this state of affairs, I am not going to have to be responsibe for what the government does, but I am going to be obliged to be with you and help you. I am quite simply going to be able to be with you. Up to now, I've had to be a substitute player that tried, struggled, tousled, and, however, one more thing I couldn't do, I couldn't authorize the old system.

I was not able to talk to the Parliament. I could not create with it, because we'd get—What are you changing this for, and why when it's working fine? So I had to pretend that I was working while, at the same time, I had to reach the main objective of free and democratic elections.

[Worker] I liked what the president said about the communists. It's high time to settle the scores with them, high time. But it is also high time not to authenticate them. You meet the communist parliamentary floor group, you sit next to Miller or Kwasniewski, who also had their hands tied, who also were tied to the coup.

[Walesa] In Poland, in normal Poland, there is, has been, is, and will be a left wing. This is not to be confused with criminals, with those with whom we have to settle accounts. At the time when this resulted, nevertheless, from the roundtable agreement, I did not meet in that setup. But today, today, I have the right and moral duty as president to remember that it was the public that gave mandates to those people, not I who gave them mandates but the public, and in this state of affairs, after free elections, I have to treat everyone in the way Poland has delegated them. I say again: not with criminals. But there will be a left wing in Poland, because there is a left wing in the world. I am not changing my point of view, and I cannot act differently. So forgive me, I have to honor democracy, and I will do so.

[Worker] At the moment, what we have, as far as universal privatization is concerned, there is no such thing as universal privatization. There indeed is privatization for some, who lined their pockets in the good communist days, and they are privatizing, while we at this time get kicked in the back.

[Walesa] Privatization. I am going to [words indistinct]. When they take away from me all powers on this subject, and they are trying, from this small constitution, I'll be fighting to get back to my idea. The poor Pole has to have Poland; we have to create conditions for him. That billion of mine—today that wouldn't be enough—went in that direction. I wanted everyone to have the chance of a 20-year, interest-free loan, frozen, for which he could buy some department, I don't know, of a shipyard or other things. That was a clumsy idea of mine, well, a difficult idea, but it was the only one and it should have been done. Like other ideas, all of them, had they not been wrecked, had they thought about how to do them, we would have been in a different place.

I don't want us to be angry with each other but to recall our last anniversaries where I alone, with a bunch of flowers, went across the whole shipyard, where my colleagues turned away. I hold no resentment about that. Everyone places risks for themselves. There are madmen, among whom I was included. I audaciously went across and all right. But do not tell me today that you would have done this better, that you would have done this more strongly, that you would have straight away settled scores with the commies. If only I had said something unpleasant at the time, it's hard to say what would have happened. Today we have to settle scores. Today I am demanding decrees for settling scores, but I won't get them, because your people, your people, union delegates will not give them to me, will not give them to the government, they will not give them to that criminal who encouraged murder, who caused murder. Today he is laughing. Today I have told you. You know these faces. He should immediately be where the place is, for destroying Poland, for destroying now. But under our conditions, this can only be done through organized legal conditions and not any other way. So understand me, I am fighting for this.

I want to achieve this with you, but give me, through your delegates, not me, as that's a dictatorship again, give the government the opportunity to implement the president's program. I am not angry; let them implement the president's program as it was a victorious one.

[Worker] The people sitting here, I think they expect, however, some specific advise, some specific guidelines for our future action. We haven't [word indistinct] received that. They'll go to their departments now and won't really have anything to report. (?Decommunization) was a slogan, and it hasn't really yielded anything. I think [word indistinct] such a question to you: Aren't you afraid that all your arguments, explanations, don't get through now to most of the people gathered here—don't get through to most of Poland's society, quite simply, don't get through to the mass of Poles.

[Walesa] I have an awful dilemma. If this person is right, and he could be, then something really bad is happening, the president and you are living in an amok. We don't know what it's all about, to such an extent, and so we want to say with which foot each of us is to walk with. We badly want instructions that can't be ... we've failed to mature so much, even to democracy. Let's be honest, we haven't matured to anything. We're from another planet. We must give up authority to the communists or to a dictactorship as otherwise by democratic principles, as by all these examples, we're not interested in participation, we are not able, that person said that. [sentence as heard]

He forces me to solve all the problems, to give him guidelines as to what he is to tell the electrician, in which hand he should hold the screwdriver, what he's supposed to say when he buys butter or something. Come on folks, we are probably not at an intellectual level in this place in the world, of Europe. We meet too little, we explain too little. The press, radio, and television speak too little about these specifics that would explain on what government is based, what governing is based on, what the president ought to do, what questions he should even give an answer to, and which questions shouldn't even be here, so we don't make mistakes, so that we don't ask a surgeon about a recipe for sweets, that we don't ask the president how to solve the problem of the shipyard, as it quite simply isn't his subject. Naturally, generally yes, but not specifically. We don't ask about pensions. We've got no axe to grind about the militia, because that belongs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We've got no axe to grind about the banks as democracy, and our agreed principles recommended someone else. We must provide all this for the public after the communist dictorship, because otherwise they are not going to hang the right people.

[Worker] People say to me: President Walesa let us down. Excuse me.

[Walesa] Please.

[Worker] And I say, he didn't let you down, he hasn't got the executive possibilities, he hasn't got the possibilities. Create for him the executive possibilities, executive power, even in the form of decrees or other powers, but executive.

[Walesa] The cradle of Solidarity arranges your activists to [word indistinct] what the president needs and not only, Poland altogether, effective government, effective in settling accounts, effective in economic decisions, effective in the law, and that is what I applied for from our colleagues, who were victorious on our backs in 1980.

What are they going to reply to me? You'll hear in a few minutes. No—that's dictatorship. No—you can't do that. No—let him only be a mediator, let him smile when he's tickled. We'll sort out the rest. They'll sort it out like they have so far, and they will be telling me that's it's my fault, that you can't get it because of me, that I am guilty. I want to change this. I could surrender. Of course, at some point, I might surrender. Only if again, if cases start going again—and they will—we might suppose, then you'll say, right, he went there, lined his pockets, took everything and left, and we have what's left. I am again going to get it from you because you trusted me, you pushed me up, invested in me, and I did what I did.

So my road is difficult. That's why I went into a different service. Every day, 24 hours a day, I have the moral and spiritual hygiene of a priest, non-stop. Not because I am, as they say, a bigot or something, but because it is so hard that without moral and spiritual hygiene I would topple over. I would start making shortcuts. I need superhuman strength, and I have it. I have it, not that I believe in some sort of mission of mine, but I have it. I approach things cleanly. I don't manage everything. I fail at many things, but I do everything the way I can, including spiritual hygiene, in order to serve well.

Sejm Committee's Constitutional Talks Viewed

LD1312212891 Warsaw PAP in English 1842 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 13—The Sejm (lower house) extraordinary committee for the "small constitution" rejected Friday the clause proposed by Lech Walesa according to which the president of the republic could dismiss the government at his own initiative.

The presidential proposal was replaced by a much less stringent clause proposed by the Democratic Union (UD) and stating that the president recalls the Council of Ministers if the prime minister comes out with such a motion at his own initiative.

The committee also accepted the Democratic Union Parliamentary Caucus's (KPUD) motion concerning the so called constructive vote of no-confidence. It is proposed that the vote of no-confidence in the government may be adopted by the Sejm with an absolute majority of vote in the presence of at least half of the total number of deputies to the 460-seat house.

If the Sejm votes its no-confidence and names its candidate for a new prime minister, the president would dismiss the Council of Ministers and appoint the person indicated by the parliament. If the Sejm fails to name its candidate for premiership, the president would recall the government or dismiss the Sejm.

The committee also decided that the Sejm may vote its no-confidence in individual ministers, while the president, acting on the motion of the prime minister, may replace one minister with another.

Government Adopts 1992 Provisional Budget Bill

AU1612133991 Warsaw PAP in English 2249 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 12—The outgoing government headed by Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz adopted on Thursday a provisional budget bill for 1992 which envisages a budgetary deficit in the first quarter of 1992 at the level of 17.6 trillion zlotys (1.5 billion dollars) while the maximum deficit over the whole year should not exceed 48 trillion zlotys. (4.2 billion dollars).

In view of the great gap between budgetary spending and income, the government is to propose a programme of austerity measures to curb the deficit and activities aimed at increasing receipts to the budget, their major sources to be income and turnover taxes and duties.

The greatest resources from the next year budget will go for increased pensions, the servicing of internal and foreign debts, and subsidies to housing credits. The accumulation of such obligations in the 1992 budget will entail a reduced spending on other subsidies, the budget-financed units, and investments.

According to Deputy Finance Minister Wojciech Misiag the 17.6 trillion deficit in the first quarter of 1992 did not mean it would grow to 70 trillion (6.1 billion dollars) throughout the year. "The whole policy should aim at starting to curb the deficit as of the second quarter," he said.

Also on Thursday the Council of Ministers decided to lift import duties on crude oil and gas, to introduce a

35 percent duty on imports of passenger cars and trucks, and to maintain the ban on imports of spirits.

In tune with the UN Security Council resolution, the government lifted the ban on imports of crude oil and its products from Iraq but resolved to supervise it by means of import licenses.

The cabinet also decided to use the 81 billion zlotys (7 million dollars) gained from the sales of foodstuffs granted to Poland by the European Communities for the implementation of projects supporting the process of market-oriented and democratic reforms.

Senate Committee Approves Budget Amendments

LD1412033991 Warsaw PAP in English 2327 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 13—The Senate committee for national economy decided on Friday to approve with some reservations the government amendments to the budget law for 1991 providing for a greater than expected budget deficit.

In discussion senators pondered on the reasons for the significant drop in budgetary revenues which resulted in the deficit of 31.5 trillion zlotys (2.7 billion dollars) and wondered who was responsible for that.

As independent Senator Janusz Baranowski charged the budget was worked out badly due to the incompetence of the government, Henryk Czarnecki (Peasant Agreement) put forward a motion to bring the cabinet to the tribunal of state. However, other senators considered the motion premature.

The parliamentary approval of the amendments is indispensable for further work on a provisional budget for the first quarter of 1992 and a budget bill for 1992.

Aspects, Problems of Privatization Discussed

PM1312122291 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 4 Dec 91 p 3

[J. Zarzycki article: "First the Rubber Stamp! Assets for 27 Million Poles"]

[Text] Privatization of state enterprises takes many different forms in Poland. To date, the methods that have been tried and tested are the so-called "small capital privatization" carried out with several larger companies, including Exbud, Zywiec, Swarzedz and, most recently, the E. Wedel joint venture. Another method of privatization is to liquidate a small or medium-size state enterprise and then to lease it out to a joint venture company formed, say, by its former employees. Yet another way is to sell the enterprise through tender.

On the other hand, one problem that still remains unsolved is that of the so-called general privatization, devised to involve a select group of enterprises and based on the principle of a free transfer of a proportion of the national assets to some 27 million Poles. In the past, there were many proposals for how to do this. On of them envisaged a scheme whereby every adult citizen of the Polish Republic would be presented with a national bond to the value of 100 million zlotys [Z]. This was the scheme that Lech Walesa proposed during last year's presidential campaign.

The next concept was submitted several months ago by Ownership Transformations Minister Janusz Lewandowski and Jan Szomburg, the project's co-author. According to their project, every adult Polish citizen should be given a set number of privatization bonds to a value determined by the ministry. With these bonds, he could buy shares in enterprises involved in the privatization scheme. This could be done in a direct purchase operation or through investment fund companies, whose role is to provide investment services for shareholders.

For the past couple of months or so, increasing prominence has been given to a project prepared in cooperation with a British bank. The project differs from the earlier ones in that it eliminates the national bonds and places the distribution of shares at a later date in its timetable of operations. Moreover, it is so complex that even parliamentary deputies of the previous Sejm had much difficulty in understanding it. This decided its fate at the time, because who can be expected to approve what he does not understand? However, its authors—that is, officials at the Ownership Transformation Ministry's general privatization department, including the minister, Janusz Lewandowski—are currently full of new hope. According to them, it is a sensible project that has "received good reviews from Western economists and attracted the attention of foreign banks and financial institutions." These points were repeatedly stressed during a recent press conference called to advertise and popularize the project.

What should be the course of the general privatization scheme, according to the tenets of Minister Lewandowski's project?

To begin with, several hundred state enterprises will switch to operating on free market principles (in the first stage of the project this will affect half of the 400 specially selected enterprises); later, they will be privatized, albeit without the long-lasting and costly valuation of assets. The operations of restructuring the enterprises and restoring them to sound economic health will be carried out under the supervision of National Investment Foundations, which will be set up as joint stock companies. These financial institutions will be entrusted with the task of managing capital investments. They will be run by foreign firms specialized in financial management. To begin with, there will be 12 such institutions. Between them, they will manage the shares of the 200 state treasury companies.

The principles of the distribution of the shares will be as follows: 33 percent of the companies' joint stock will be the property of the leading National Investment Foundation; 27 percent of shares will be distributed among the remaining National Investment Foundations; up to 10 percent of shares will be distributed without charge among employees of the enterprises being privatized; last, 30 percent will be retained by the State Treasury or the Social Security Agency.

To begin with, that is, in the coming year 1992, no one will actually get anything except for a registration stamp on their identity document. A year later, after the 1992 accounts of the privatized ventures have been balanced, all the interested parties will be given certificates of ownership of shares in the investment funds. The certificates, which will have the status of securities, will be transferable and can be inherited without restrictions. At a later date it will be possible to exchange them for shares issued by the investment foundations.

Now for some information on the investment foundations themselves.

Broadly speaking, these will constitute the intermediate links between enterprises and individual share owners. In the West, they have operated for about 100 years already and are one of the most popular forms of financial investment. In the United States alone, there are more than 50 million shareholders, and the capital they have invested in their shares has reached the astronomical sum of $3 trillion. Their positions in the shares market are followed and published by the press every day, and the best managers of leading investment companies enjoy almost the same sort of popularity as top politicians and film stars. The advantage of the investment companies is the ease with which shareholders can buy and sell their shares, and also the fact that the risks are largely reduced.

The authors of the general privatization program emphasize that it is imperative, in order to discharge their task of managing the financial assets of millions of Polish citizens, that the National Investment Foundations must be solidly reliable. This is why the proposed legislative statute for any National Investment Foundation categorically precludes the possibility of certain financial operations that would run contrary to the idea of general privatization or which could simply be tantamount to speculation.

For the time being, while we can at least have some idea of what the whole project amounts to, we have no choice but to await further developments of the project—or else to oppose it. Already you can hear its critics claiming that the institution of investment foundations will, when transplanted to Polish soil, eventually lead to a secondary monopolization of the Polish economy.

Official Rejects Reports of Croatian Arms Sales

LD1412055791 Warsaw PAP in English 1920 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 13—The Office for the Protection of the State (UOP) notes "various attempts to buy arms in Poland, but all offers are carefully checked by the Polish Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations responsible for the sales of Polish arms abroad," UOP spokeswoman Irena Popoff declared Friday.

She was referring to reports by some news agencies about alleged smuggling of Polish arms to Croatia. The national Interpol office has no information whatsoever about any attempt to smuggle Polish-made arms to Croatia by two Germans recently arrested in Munich. Another such attempt reported by world agencies last November concerned a resident of Hong Kong.

Poland does not sell weapons to the areas that are hotbeds of tension, and all contracts on arms sales stipulate that the Polish arms cannot be re-exported without the consent of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the ministry's spokesman Ryszard Tutak said. He could not say, however, whether a contract was signed recently with two German citizens for the sale of 3,000 kalashnikovs and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, as reported by REUTERS on December 12.

A high-ranking official from one of Polish ministries said the reports on alleged smuggling of Polish arms and military equipment to Croatia are designed to harm Poland's interests in the international arena.

Poland introduced embargo on arms supplies to Yugoslavia last August.

Government Studying Buying Soviet NKVD Files

LD1412055991 Warsaw PAP in English 1728 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 12—Poland is interested in purchasing some documents from the archives of the Soviet NKVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], head of the main commission for the investigation of crimes against the Polish nation, Senator Ryszard Juszkiewicz said Thursday.

It is poor financial condition of the Soviet Union that has forced the Soviet authorities to sell contents of the NKVD archives. Prices for the documents are not very high, so the commission will send its delegation to Moscow shortly. The archives on sale cover the period past 1945.

"These documents, never made accessible before, are now being bought mainly by Germans and Americans who thus may expand their collections. Apart from that, Germans hope to reconstruct the fates of German prisoners of war kept in the Soviet Union during World War Two," Juszkiewicz commented.

Nastase Returns From SFRY, Makes Statement

AU1412161991 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Romania's foreign minister, Mr. Adrian Nastase, returned to Bucharest last night after a visit to Belgrade and Skopje.

Upon arrival in Bucharest, after a short tour that included the capitals of the Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Macedonia, the head of Romanian diplomacy, Mr. Adrian Nastase, stressed in a declaration to our radio station that Romania's position in connection with the situation in Yugoslavia is based on respect for the right to self-determination of all Yugoslav nations, as well as on keeping an equal distance from all the republics. The aim of this visit, just like the aim of the visit that a Foreign Ministry delegation is going to pay to the other Yugoslav republics in the coming days, is to better understand the internal situation in that country.

Taking into account the fact that the situation in Yugoslavia is unfortunately a dramatic one, said Mr. Nastase, at the moment the essential goals are to halt hostilities and to establish appropriate conditions for the activity of the peacekeeping forces aimed at resuming the political dialogue. The solution for Yugoslavia should come from the inside, stressed the Romanian foreign minister, but, at the same time, our country, together with the international community, must help actions aimed at halting hostilities to a greater extent. At present there are no conditions for the deployment of peacekeeping forces, Mr. Nastase added.

Referring to the meetings he held with government officials in Serbia and Macedonia, the Romanian foreign minister stressed the need to develop bilateral economic and trade relations with these Yugoslav republics.

Foreign Ministry Denies Secret Pact With Serbia

AU1412204391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1946 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 14/12/1991—The Romanian Foreign Ministry considers that the publication on December 13 by the Hungarian daily "PESTI HIRLAP" of the article "Obliging Military Relations" has no real basis. As a matter of fact, the Romanian Embassy in Budapest received instructions to inform the editorial staff about "our astonishment at and protest against the publication of such materials."

The incriminated article vehiculates "so-called information about the existence of secret Romanian-Serbian understandings" which stipulate, among other things, the adoption of measures if "incidents are caused by minorities" and granting of assistance to "the country that is engaged in war", the communique shows.

The publication of such articles evinces the tendency toward fabricating subjects and information meant to slander Romania at a time when the Romanian Government has committed itself to making efforts to back the EEC's action for a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

The Romanian Government has constantly been against the idea of twofold politics in international issues: a public one, through statements, and an occult one, considering that occult diplomacy is obsolete in the current European and international practice", the communique specifies. The circulation of such information "can but be interpreted as an attempt at fulfilling mean interests apt to influence the adoption, in the days to come, of decisions that concern Romania at European institutions," the press release shows in conclusion.

Iliescu on Dubossary Situation, Moldova Ties

AU1412180891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1657 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 14/12/1991—In an interview he granted on December 14 to Mr. Alexandru Dorogan, director of the National Radio and Television Stations of the Republic of Moldova, Romania's President Ion Iliescu characterized the current situation in the town of Dubossary and nearby as "delicate and difficult". "It is regrettable that there still are actions which continue to stimulate states of tension against the aspirations of the Republic of Moldova after asserting its independence" he said. In the context, the president assessed as illegal the presence of the troops belonging to the Odessa military region in the rayons of the Republic of Moldova on the Left bank of the Dniester.

Referring to the programmes of collaboration between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, Mr. Ion Iliescu mentioned that "new steps should be taken along this line determined, first of all, by the possibility of the Republic of Moldova to control its own economic levers, going beyond the still existing dependencies on the central bodies." "In the context of consolidating its own institutions, the relations of the Republic of Moldova with Romania can expand still more, and we shall also see a sustained process of integration on all planes, more particularly on the economic one," President Ion Iliescu said.

At the end of the interview Romania's president addressed the listeners of the National Radio Station in the Republic of Moldova a congratulatory message on season celebrations and expressed his hope that 1992 would bring our people still more satisfactions on consolidating its national being and the unity of all Romanians.

Government Views Results of Maastricht Summit

AU1412190391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1719 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 14/12/1991—Romania's Government followed most attentively the European

Council's summit at Maastricht on December 9 and 10, considered as the most important event since the setting up of European Communities under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, and learned with great interest about its results, especially about the accord on the draft treaty regarding the political union, the economic and currency union, which paves the way for a European union.

The special importance of the openings the EEC countries covenanted at a high level also resides in the gradual transition to a common foreign and defense policy with significant consequences on the ensurance of cooperation and security of all European states.

The Romanian Government appreciates particularly the decisions of the Maastricht summit referring to the EEC's relations with the East European countries with a view to their coming closer to the European communities, which also corresponds to the fundamental options of our country irreversibly committed on the way of pluralist democracy, the state of law, the observance of human rights and transition to a market economy, goals sanctioned by the new, recently approved constitution of Romania.

In this framework, the Romanian Government expresses its confidence that the future negotiations regarding its country's joining the EEC, as a preparatory stage in its adherence with full rights to the European Economic Communities, will proceed successfully.

As far as it is concerned, Romania shows its wish that the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty regarding the admission to the EEC should be held in best conditions and end with positive results in the shortest possible time.

The attainment of this goal would go down as a major support the community and its member countries would grant to our country while making deep-going changes, implementing the economic reform and solving the social problems it implies, being at the same time a significant contribution to consolidating stability on a regional and European plane.

Romania's government hails with special satisfaction the fact that the Maastricht accord stipulates that the future European union should be open to the adherence with full rights, of any state on this continent, provided that its ruling system is based on the principle of democracy and the market economy.

Romania, which shares the same democratic and human values with the community's member countries, expressed its hope to become an integral part of the European union the foundations of which were laid at Maastricht.

Stolojan Receives World Bank Delegation 13 Dec

*AU1312195891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1657 GMT 13 Dec 91*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 13/12/1991—As part of the negotiations with the World Bank mission under way in Bucharest, Mr. Theodor Stolojan, prime minister of Romania, met on Friday at noon with Mr. Michael Wiehen, head of the directorate in charge of the loan programme of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

On the occasion, the terms of the loan for structural adjustment which the World Bank is to grant Romania were discussed.

After the interview Mr. Wiehen told journalists that the Romanian Government's reform programme was very brave and efficient although it brought much suffering to the people and that it was worthy of full support. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, he said, can help Romania in that process, a team of the World Bank negotiating one of the actions to support this country these days. [sentence as received] Mr. Wiehen also said that there was fine understanding and cooperation between the World Bank and the Romanian Government and expressed his hope that other international bodies would help Romania in the difficult process it goes through.

Major Papers To End Three-Day Strike 16 Dec

*AU1312195091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1910 GMT 13 Dec 91*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 13/12/1991—The three-day warning strike of three national and independent newspapers—"ADEVARUL," "ROMANIA LIBERA" and "TINERETUL LIBER"—will end on Monday, December 16, reads a communique of the Information Department of Romania's Government and of the aforementioned newspapers sent to the ROMPRES NEWS AGENCY to be released.

The decision follows the new round of talks held Thursday evening between the representatives of the executive and of the newspapers on strike as well as of the Romanian journalists' organisations. Starting from the serious dangers for the entire Romanian press, for the local press especially because of its reduced financial possibilities, the government decided—the communique reads—that starting December 13 the paper price for newspapers be 108.35 lei/kg. A lower price could be obtained by importing paper—the granting of the necessary licences and the access to currency will be sped up to this end.

The pay system for the newspapers distribution will be also changed, fixed quotas percentages being given for each sold newspaper, and the only company in that field—RODIPET [expansion unknown]—will be privatised as soon as possible. To this end that company will be written down on the list of the thirty companies to be privatised. Until that document is issued new state commissioners from among journalists will be designated. It was also decided that the reequipment of the Letea paper factory in Bacau be sped up and conditions be created for a real competition among the producers in the country.

The communique specifies that the press representatives are to decide upon the measures to be taken for the protection of the printed word.

Timisoara Marks 2nd Anniversary of '89 Revolution

AU1512184591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1808 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 15/12/1991—Upon the initiative of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) and sponsored by the Reformed Diocese in Oradea and the Reformed Parish in Timisoara, several events were arranged in Timisoara on December 14 and 15 to mark two years since the Romanian revolution of December 1989.

The events were supported by senior servants of the Orthodox, Roman-Catholic and Mosaic churches, by scientists and men of letters from the country and abroad.

At a round table conference, an appeal was read which called to "national and social reconciliation in the spirit of responsibility for our present and future."

As part of the same events an intimation was addressed to Romania's prosecutor-general whereby several participants requested the bringing to court of all those who are guilty of Pastor Laszlo Tokes's arrest in December 1989 and of his expulsion from Timisoara to the locality of Mineu, Salaj County.

During a press conference Bishop Laszlo Tokes asserted, among other things, that "today's regime can be held responsible for the country's bad image abroad." Referring to the country's Constitution, he said he had "a generally negative opinion as well as personal discontents common with the UDMR's." In connection with the acquittance of the 16 defendants, members of the former Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, he stated that was "a cynical act of power against the victims of the revolution and against himself." "We still have no guarantee that persecutions will not continue like before," Mr. Tokes assessed.

Discrepancy in Number of Eligible Voters Examined

AU1512205091 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 11 Dec 91 p 1

[Ion M. Ionita note: "Have a Million and a Half Romanians Disappeared?"]

[Text] Indeed, comparing the released figures on the number of Romanian citizens eligible to vote who were registered on 20 May 1990 [the last general elections]—17.2 million—and those who were registered on 8 December 1991 [the referendum on the Constitution]—15.8 million (the last figure released by the Central Electoral Bureau on a handwritten piece of paper) the difference is striking. Our thoughts, if we want them to or not, immediately go toward the notion of fraud, an idea that has already begun to be aired.

Being quite skeptical, we decided to go to the root of the matter. The total number of citizens eligible to vote—resulting from the summing up of figures coming from the counties—is higher than the one mentioned on that piece of paper: 16,124,377 instead of 15,824,374. Thus, with a simple stroke of the pen, we were able to account for 300,000 Romanians. Nevertheless, there is still a discrepancy of 1 million Romanians still missing. This may sound strange, but that is what the figures say. There is no doubt that an important percentage of the missing voters was simply omitted when the city halls drew up their electoral lists. An administrative vice. Those who came to the polls and did not find themselves on the electoral lists were registered on annex lists. They will be quantitatively included in the final referendum results. However, this should not excuse the faulty way in which the electoral lists were drawn up. The real figure of Romanian citizens eligible to vote is about 17 million, according to yearly statistics released; therefore, one can say that the civic awareness of those in charge of drawing up the lists of voters was higher a year ago.

Article: FSN Goal 'To Seize Political Power'

AU1212144291 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 10 Dec 91 p 4

[Bogdan Tanasescu article "FSN: Which Way?"]

[Text] During the first few months after the revolution [December 1989], while we still harbored hopes, the nomenklatura closed its ranks around the sole political formation able and prepared to protect its interests. The symbiosis between "Dej's" [Ceausescu's predecessor] nomenklatura and Ceausescu's nomenklatura, which were joined by numerous credulous people, gave birth to a new party: The National Salvation Front [FSN].

Without its own ideology, without a coherent political program, and without a clear economic program, the FSN has pursued just one goal: to seize political power, so that—from this position—the nomenklatura may be propelled into the economy. Being in the possession of important material resources since the times of the "odious" leader, the communist nomenklatura needed time to find the most efficient methods to preserve and increase its capital. The Roman-type privatization process exclusively favors this veritable clan. As a matter of fact, the pauperization policy practiced by the FSN government has spared it any potential competition. The little money in the hands of the population is losing its value with each passing day. The way is paved for the former nomenklatura to take hold of the Romanian economy....

By preserving the former communist structures, the Roman government has exclusively favored certain individuals. The communist mafia has begun to take action. While all doors were open to those who aspired to power and who took advantage of the opportunities offered by money and connections, obstacles were put in the way of other enterprising people: delays in issuing their documents, postponements, hold-ups, and violations. Mr. Roman now puts the blame on the former communist structures. Who was it who preserved and encouraged them for more than a year and a half of FSN rule? As on other occasions, Mr. Petre Roman proves to be a master of diversion. Small wonder that under such circumstances the former party secretaries turned into owners of stores, businesses, and so forth overnight. And poor employees whose owners are former party secretaries!

The habit of shouting and pounding your fist is difficult to give up....

However, we would be mistaken to believe that all former nomenklatura members have succeeded in opening their businesses. Part of them are still yearning for orthodox communism. They have made common cause with the triumvirate of Iliescu, Barladeanu, and Martian, all three actually being old-time communists. This part of the nomenklatura was hoping, as it did traditionally, to preserve its privileges by occupying management positions. That part hopes for a slow reform that will also enable it to adjust to the new conditions by achieving personal advantages during the transition period. The interests of this part of the nomenklatura are, up to a point, different from those of the "young" FSN members. The "young ones" want a relatively more rapid reform that would preserve their advantages gained so far over both a population that has not recovered its senses yet and over "older" nomenklatura members, who have not yet been able to adjust to the changes, even if they are "original" ones. But let us not be deceived! Had we had no other opposition, we would probably have had two FSN formations. Now, however, irrespective of the misunderstandings that have emerged between Messrs. Iliescu and Roman, the nomenklatura will make common cause every time it feels that its interests are being harmed. Now that more and more people are aware of the big lie they have accepted from the former communists, disguised as dissidents, a Roman-Iliescu breach is quite improbable. The "young" and "old" nomenklatura members know that they will succeed only side by side. They know that, at the political level, the party represents the interests of a group to which both belong, irrespective of "generation." Even if the FSN leaders tell us something else, they will not be able to answer a few questions: Why it was now, at the FSN Steering Council ideological charter? What was the political concept on which the activity of this "party" was based? What was its initial economic concept, since it came to the elections without a coherent program? (As a matter of fact, the FSN adopted a "platform-program" only in the spring of 1991). Why does Mr. Petre Roman complain of communist structures now when he is no longer prime minister? Are we dealing with a new diversion?

Whose representative has the FSN actually been and whose interests has it defended?

Note 1. In accordance with a government decision, economic enterprises may purchase dollars through the banks. Who will be favored if hard currency resources are scarce?

Note 2. Mr. Adrian Severin, one of the close aides of former Prime Minister Petre Roman, has been appointed chief of the National Privatization Agency.

Thus, this agency continues to be under FSN control. Who will benefit from information about the profitability of enterprises that are to be put up for sale?

International

500 Soviet 'Volunteers' To Arrive in Serbia

LD1412223191 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] [First announcer] The Serbian media have recently reported that 500 volunteers from the Soviet Union will arrive in Serbia to help their brothers in defense of Orthodox Christianity. These are the details:

[Second announcer] From well-informed republican sources we have learned that professionals from the Soviet-Afghanistan war are willing to sell their occupying and terrorist skills from the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, at a high price, because Serbian and Montenegrin reservists are no longer sufficient in number.

The Serbian Security Service, in cooperation with relevant services of the so-called Yugoslav Army, which is the real enforcer of this project of the Serbian Government, intends to set up shock groups composed of these so-called reservists—terrorist groups—for the liquidation of prominent Serbs, the so-called traitors of the Serbian cause living in the Republic of Croatia. This is because they can no longer recruit a sufficient number of reliable and successful killers from their own ranks.

There are enough indications that these groups are intended to commit crimes against the Serbian population in those places and villages where, despite the war atrocities, Serbs and the Croats live together well. This maneuver aims at manufacturing evidence of the Ustasha-like characteristics of the Croatian Government and of fascism in Croatia.

Romanian Foreign Minister Nastase Continues Visit

Talks With Serbia's Jovanovic

LD1412202491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1248 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 12 Dec (TANJUG)—Serbia's stands regarding current events in Yugoslavia and their development in light of the latest mission of Cyrus Vance, the UN secretary general's special envoy, were the main topic of talks between Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase and Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic in Belgrade today.

Acccording to diplomatic sources, Nastase and Jovanovic exchanged information about Serbia's and Romania's international activities. On this occasion emphasis was again placed on traditionally friendly relations between the two countries. Foreign Minister Nastase and his host also considered bilateral relations between Serbia and Romania in continuation of the dialogue initiated during Serbian Prime Minister Dragutin Zelenovic's recent visit to Romania.

The Romanian foreign minister, who is due to stay in Yugoslavia until 14 December, will today have a meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Later this afternoon Mastase will leave for Skopje for a meeting with Macedonian officials.

Meets Foreign Affairs Official

LD1412202991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1329 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 12 Dec (TANJUG)—Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase, who is in Belgrade on a working visit to our country, met today with Milivoje Maksic, deputy federal secretary for foreign affairs, in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (SSIP). They discussed foreign affairs issues peroccupying the two countries and their efforts to ensure stable conditions in the region, the SSIP announced.

Attention was drawn to the fact that the two countries are prepared and keen to develop bilateral relations and cooperation on the basis of mutual trust and friendship.

Rupel, Germany's Genscher Discuss Recognition

LD1412221691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2058 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher reported in great detail to Slovene Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel about the text of a document which the French and the German Governments prepared for the meeting of EC ministers in Brussels this Monday [16 December]. That document should, as Genscher told Rupel, represent the general framework for the recognition of new states in Europe and for the establishment of diplomatic relations with them.

These details were disclosed this evening by the Slovene Foreign Minister himself in an interview to Ljublajana radio.

"The latest diplomatic activities, which bring into question the extension of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, to a certain degree provoke our anxiety, and therefore," Rupel said, "we sent letters to all EC foreign ministries warning them of the danger if they fail to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. We have been critically assessing all stands of the UN Secretary General and discussions in the UN Security Council.

Rupel said that in a phone conversation today Genscher told him that the United Nations Secretary General "sent him an extremely sharp letter" regarding the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Rupel said Genscher also told him a series of diplomatic initiatives was under way in Europe to dissuade Germany from extending recognition to Slovenia and Croatia.

The United States has made a demarche to Europe, and I really do not understand why Genscher said, according to Rupel. Rupel also stressed that Genscher said Italian

Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis "today confirmed again that he would persevere on the agreed line."

German Postal, Communications Links Operating

LD1412045891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1422 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 13 (TANJUG)—The postal and telecommunications services between Yugoslavia and Germany are operating without any problems, the Community of Yugoslav Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Services has said.

Postal deliveries from Yugoslavia are being transported by international trains which also carry deliveries from other countries, so that any classification of letters, cards and parcels is practically impossible with regard to the time needed. However, air mail is redirected to other routes.

All deliveries except parcels from the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia to the Republic of Croatia are transported via Slovenia while those in the opposite direction are irregular and make a detour, largely via the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, says the community.

The Belgrade and Zagreb postal services are currently negotiating that postal deliveries be sent via Budapest in the future, with which the Hungarian railway has agreed in principle.

Federal

UN, CSCE, EC Asked To Prevent Recognition

LD1412180791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1631 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—In connection with the anticipated unilateral diplomatic recognition of the Republics of Slovenia and Croatian on the part of some European countries, which would greatly hamper the current peace efforts by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and The Hague conference and which would undoubtedly lead to a further worsening of the general situation and stability in the region, the SFRY Presidency is approaching the United Nations, the CSCE, and the EC with a request to take urgent and resolute actions to prevent such unilateral acts and such irresponsible play with people's lives and the fate of nations.

The SFRY Presidency reiterates its firm position that the leadership of Yugoslavia and its armed forces are consistently abiding by and observing the regulations of the signed cease-fire agreement, and it once again underlines its position for the establishment of a stable peace and a political resolution of the overall Yugoslav state and political crisis in a permanent and fair manner, the SFRY Presidency says in a statement.

Karadjole: Sanctions Causing Damage to Economy

LD1512145791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1158 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Assistant Secretary for Foreign Economic Relations Boran Karadjole says that, according to initial estimates, the economic sanctions imposed by the European Community first on the whole of Yugoslavia and then narrowed down to only the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro will cost Yugoslavia between 650 million and 1.2 billion dollars.

In an interview carried by the Belgrade daily POLITIKA today, Karadjole says that the EC had obviously prepared a long time ago its plan of selective punishment of the Yugoslav republics.

Karadjole says that the EC measures have been abused for political purposes. He says that the "break-away Yugoslav republics would not behave as they have done if the EC accepted Yugoslavia as its partner, as it had done until mid-1991."

The consequences will be much worse, because many will have to abandon the EC market because of the abolition of facilities for Yugoslav goods.

The EC market at present accounts for as much as 60 percent of Yugoslavia's exports.

Karadjole says that Yugoslavia will lodge a protest with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) against the sanctions and will request it to protect the Yugoslav interests. However, GATT's ruling is not to be expected before mid-1992.

Party of Yugoslavs Wants To Attend Hague Talks

LD1612110391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1308 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 15 (TANJUG)—Representative of the Party of Yugoslavs of Subotica Stane Zitnik has said that he would represent the interests of the 1,200,000 Yugoslavs and 800,000 children from mixed marriages in The Hague.

Zitnik gave the statement in an interview which is published today in the Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI. A request will soon be sent to Yugoslavia conference chairman Lord Carrington in The Hague to take into consideration also the position of those citizens of Yugoslavia who declared themselves as Yugoslavs at the recent census, Zitnik said.

Zitnik believes that the interests of Yugoslavs cannot be ignored, despite the lack of popularity of "Yugoslavism" now when nationalist euphorias are in full swing. As an argument in favour of those who declare themselves as Yugoslavs, he mentioned that there were more of them than both Slovenes and Macedonians together in Yugoslavia's 24.5-million-strong population.

Representatives of the Party of Yugoslavs informed Yugoslav Presidency Vice President Branko Kostic in late November this year about the intention to secure their participation at The Hague conference and equal status for those who declare themselves as Yugoslavs.

At the time, they expressed to the vice president their disapproval of the fact that Yugoslavia is not mentioned in The Hague documents.

"We are witness to the dismembering of Yugoslavia, but our offspring will be those who will build it anew," president of the Party of Yugoslavs of Subotica Stane Zitnik pointed out in his interview. Zitnik has been authorized by his party to represent its interests.

Presidency Accuses Croatia of Armed Provocations

LD1312193291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1511 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav State Presidency today warned that the armed formations of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia only formally accept the cease-fire and that they are trying to maintain the tension of conflicts with their constant armed provocations. The Croatian forces' aggressive actions are aimed at provoking the reactions of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) at all costs, so that they could later blame it before the international public for the failure of the cease-fire, the State Presidency underscored in its announcement.

The Yugoslav Presidency stated that the JNA consistently observed the cease-fire and that it returned fire only when it had no other choice. The latest, 14th Yugoslav cease-fire was signed in Geneva on November 23 under the auspices of the United Nations. The session of the collective head of state was chaired by Vice-President Branko Kostic.

The Croatian parliament decided on December 5 to withdraw President Stjepan Mesic from his post in the State Presidency.

Kostic Criticizes Macedonian Attitude to Army

AU1412213991 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Branko Kostic, vice president of the SFRY Presidency, visited Prohor Pcinjski today. On this occasion he had talks with members of the economic-political activ of the Bujanovac commune and held a news conference. Zorica Stojanovic of Radio Vranje has a report:

[Begin recording] [Stojanovic] Replying to the many questions from journalists, Vice President Dr. Branko Kostic said that the initiative of France and Great Britain for the Security Council to immediately send a United Nations observer group [to Yugoslavia] preliminary to sending peacekeeping forces showed that the views of the Presidency and the Security Council coincided.

Will there be a general mobilization? This was also one of the questions to which Dr. Branko Kostic replied:

[Kostic] I definitely hope that we will not proclaim either a state of war or general mobilization because, objectively speaking, only under these conditions can the legal regulations be established and allowed to operate that would require an extremely responsible attitude to the response to mobilization and to carrying out obligations to the Yugoslav People's Army. [sentence as heard]

[Stojanovic] Vice President Branko Kostic said the following regarding the situation on the Yugoslav-Albanian border:

[Kostic] I must say that this is a question that is exceptionally important and significant. In my opinion, the most responsible state-political leadership in Macedonia has considerably underestimated this question. As you know, on the one hand, they refuse to send recruits to the Yugoslav People's Army and refuse to take part in financing the Yugoslav People's Army, but at the same time, they expect this Yugoslav People's Army to protect the whole border on the territory of Macedonia when it comes to the borders with Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania.

We think that such a situation is untenable and that as Yugoslavia we will not be able to carry out this part of the obligations even through our own army, the Yugoslav People's Army.

[Stojanovic] Commenting on statements recently made by Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Branko Kostic said.

[Kostic] I think that his political activity as the leader of his political party is very deadly for the Serbian people and that he himself and, I must say, his political party, too, take into consideration or make use of the historical and fateful interest of the Serbian people only to the extent that it can help them. [end recording]

Kostic Proposes 'New, Third Yugoslavia'

LD1612120591 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1903 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Kovin, Dec 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav State Presidency member Jugoslav Kostic today said that "it is possible to create a new, third Yugoslavia consisting of those peoples, republics and citizens who wish so" and that it could stand on "around 73 percent" of Yugoslavia's present territory.

This new Yugoslavia would include 63 percent of the population of "the second Yugoslavia", Kostic said at a memorial gathering in Kovin, Vojvodina, Republic of Serbia.

Citing the "latest analytical estimate", Kostic noted that "the third Yugoslavia would have a young, capable and very well equipped army" which would "guarantee security to all citizens of Yugoslavia."

Kostic underscored that "through a political democratic struggle, non-Moslem population in Bosnia-Hercegovina should be convinced to recognize the existence of a Moslem community in this republic."

"In the contrary", Kostic warned, "Yugoslavia faces the danger of the breaking out of large-scale clashes with disasterous consequences."

Kostic expressed the conviction that "the U.N. will intervene in Yugoslavia", which would "ensure the protection of territories in which Serbs live in Krajinas."

Serbs in the Yugoslav Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina proclaimed territories where they are a majority population as autonomous regions.

Markovic Preparing 1992 Macroeconomic Policy

LD1412050191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1556 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic's government is preparing macro-economic policy measures for 1992 for the whole country, as TANJUG's reporter has learned.

The measures of the macro-economic policy for 1992 include elements aimed at protecting the interests of Yugoslavia as a whole and its republics from those federal units, whose unilateral documents in the economic field are detrimental to the interests of others.

The federal government will discuss the proposed program at its session scheduled for next Tuesday [17 December], while the measures are expected to be made known more precisely and in more detail next week, after the federal government's session, as TANJUG learned.

The federal government estimates that monthly inflation in Yugoslavia will next year stand around 20 percent.

The estimate will be included in the proposed measures of the 1992 macro-economic policy, as indicated.

The government economic "package" will comprise the budget, the monetary and hard currency policies and the balance of payments.

It has been learned that there will be several—six-month and 12-month—variants of the 1992 budget.

Actually, a "mini budget" is in question, which is to finance the Yugoslav People's Army, the federal administration, international obligations (membership fees, etc.) and disablement security.

Slovenia

Kucan Remarks on Hague Meeting, Recognition Issue

AU1312171891 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Excerpts] Today's session of the Slovene Assembly Commission for Foreign Relations, which was also attended by President of the Presidency Milan Kucan and Slovene Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel, endorsed the proposal to sign bilateral cooperation agreements with Albania and Bulgaria, as well as the agreement with Carinthia on exchanging information and assistance on natural disasters.

The main items on the agenda were Milan Kucan's report on the conference in The Hague and reactions to [Prime Minister Lojze] Peterle's proclamation that he will reconsider recalling Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel. Zvone Zorko reports:

[Zorko] From the report by Presidency President Kucan concerning the latest meeting of the presidents of the Yugoslav republics in the Hague—Kucan also referred this report to the report on his recent visit to Bonn—it is worthwhile noting that despite the protests of Serbia and Montenegro, Lord Carrington accepted the position of the EC Arbitration Commission. This states that disintegration of the state and not unilateral secession of individual republics has been the case in Yugoslavia, which means that all republics should be recognized as the successors of Yugoslavia. Lord Carrington has based the work of the conference on this preposition. [passage omitted]

Regarding recognition of independence for those republics which seek it, Kucan rejected the Serbian and Montenegrin position, which has also been maintained by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, that the conflict in Yugoslavia could escalate if some of the republics were recognized. Kucan stressed that the recognition is the most appropriate means to end the fighting, as after recognition this conflict will no longer be internal but international.

The commission unanimously endorsed Kucan's report. It also agreed that the responsible organs should duly prepare the basic outline for the debate on succession and that the process of appointing Slovene representatives abroad, partiucularly in Bonn and Brussels, be speeded up. [passage omitted]

Increasing Numbers of Nationalities Moving Out

LD1612105991 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1242 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Ljubljana, December 15 (TANJUG)—Increasing numbers of people who are members of Yugoslav nationalities other than Slovene have moved out of the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia in the recent months.

According to the statistical figures for Slovenia, a total of 2,579 persons moved out of this breakaway Yugoslav republic in August alone.

The more intense emigration was influenced mostly by this summer's conflict between the Yugoslav Army and the police and Territorial Defence of Slovenia, and the latent tensions in interethnic relations.

Chairman of the Slovenian Council for the Protection of Human Rights Ljubo Bavcon appealed to Slovenes five days ago "to curb their feelings" and not to subject to "discrimination, abuse, or intimidation" members of other nations, children in particular.

Bavcon also warned that it "would not be good if Slovenia were accused of national discrimination before some international forum for the protection of human rights."

Total of Foreign Currency Reserves Announced

LD1512114991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1753 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—The Slovene foreign currency reserves now stand at 300 million U.S. dollars. This was stated at a news conference today by Slovene Finance Minister Dusan Sesok. He added that an increase of approximately 270 million dollars is expected in the next few months which will be earned from the sale of socially owned apartments. Minister Sesok also said that if the banks manage to regain the citizens' trust, a better balance of foreign currency inflow and outflow will be achieved. That would enable the citizens to have access to their foreign currency savings in banks. It is presumed that Slovene citizens have considerable foreign currency savings outside banks.

Croatia

State Council Examines Recognition Issues

LD1312184191 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] At the beginning of the program here is a report on the session of the Supreme State Council [of Croatia]:

[Unidentified correspondent] At the session there was a detailed examination of foreign policy strategy and actions by influential international factors regarding the diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Croatia and the ending of the aggression against Croatia, and especially of the joint note of the Presidency of the EC, the United States, and the USSR which was presented to President Tudjman on Thursday by the Consuls-General of the United States and the USSR in Zagreb.

The Supreme State Council maintains that while the process of the international recognition of the Republic of Croatia is being effectively achieved, at the same time there is a culmination of the conflicts of interest as between international factors over recognition of the Croatian state.

It was stressed in its political activity Croatia has done everything—both in the domestic and in the international arenas—to prevent the escalation of the war and set up a modern democratic state, and has expressed by its state policy the global world interest for the establishment and maintenance of lasting political stability in this part of Europe.

Despite the fact that Croatia, both according to the standpoints of European observers and according to the reports of UN envoys, has been adhering both to The Hague conference and to the Geneva agreement, some international political factors, especially in the context of the current disintegration of the USSR, make the mistake of seeking the prospects of the stability of southeastern Europe in attempting to bolster Yugoslavia.

Despite the fact that Croatia proposed the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states, after the brutal aggression by the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro and the Yugoslav Army, the policy of retaining any kind of Yugoslavia, objectively speaking, today is the point of departure for dangerous instability and the escalation of the most brutal military aggression. Over the past few days this has been seriously borne out by the preparations of the aggressors designed to cause further destruction and the attacks on civilians and Croatian territory.

Hence the Supreme State Council discussed preparations for powerful and active defense by the Croatian Army if the enemy tries to exploit the international recognition of the Republic of Croatia for the continuation and expansion of its aggression. The Supreme State Council considered in particular the reports of the growth of war crimes during the aggression against Croatia.

The President of the Republic has received from individuals, competent organs of the Republic of Croatia, and representatives of Serbs in the political life of democratic Croatia—and especially the Serbian National Party—separate reports of the frightful methods of violence used against civilians - both Croatians, Serbs as well as Magyars, Czechs, and others. Recently reports of the genocidal policy toward Croats in Vojvodina, Kosovo, Srijem, Posavska, and other parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina have been particularly worrying. Political practice, especially in the Republic of Serbia is in sharp contrast to the democratic practice of Croatia, which in its leadership and organs of authority at all levels actively involves Serbs, Jews, and members of other nationalities in Croatia.

Apart from this, the official organs of the Republic of Croatia have taken severe investigative steps to establish the perpetrators of crimes on the territory controlled by the civilian authorities, regardless of the nationality of the victims and of the suspected perpetrators. The President of the Republic has ordered a detailed examination of all known cases of war crimes. Data collected so far and official assessments of the competent organs testify to several examples of provocative crimes committed by Serbian units of outlaws dressed in the uniforms of the Croatian army, but also partly to the arbitrary acts of individual groups of citizens. Details of all crimes and circumstances are within the competence of the organs of the Republic of Croatia which in all established cases will inform the public and take severe punitive measures. [passage omitted]

Greguric Discusses Position, Relationships

92BA0152A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 12 Nov 91 pp 10-12

[Interview with Croatian Prime Minister Franjo Greguric by Mladen Maloca and Marinko Culic; place and date not given: "Force Against Force"]

[Text] A leading figure in the Croatian Government speaks about the first 100 days of his mandate, about his relationship with the president of the republic and with the Assembly, about foreign military formations, poorly organized defense at sea, and about the future under war.

No prospects are given, heaven only knows why, about the first wartime multiparty government. Many "analysts" are convinced that the problem is a real coalition compromise that cannot withstand the challenges of such a stormy time in which we live. However, the Government of Democratic Unity, as they named themselves right at the start, has successfully surmounted the first difficulties and challenges, transforming itself in time into a truly political authority, and why not say it, a factor of political stability in these difficult wartime days.

Its leading figure, Prime Minister Franjo Greguric, is not hiding the fact that he has found himself faced with an especially challenging—and, because of the circumstances—not very attractive task ("Today you get no satisfaction in being the president of the government. This is a great obligation and a great labor..."), but with his behavior—decisiveness and self-confidence—he is confirming that neither he personally nor the government as a whole will fail in the realization of planned tasks. When he speaks about the first 100 days, Greguric openly admits that he was not coping well at first. Part of the ministers conceived of the government at the very beginning as a place for carrying out their own party programs and for viewing things. Greguric says it was a time of getting accustomed to and studying democracy: "Fortunately, all of us realized quickly that this is a coalition government but that it must act as a unit, regardless of organization or adherence to this or that party. Because, unity is a precondition for realizing key goals that we had established for ourselves, primarily those related to ending the war as fast as possible and achieving a free Republic of Croatia. In that sense we made significant progress, so we can say today that the tasks from the agreement on the Government of Democratic Unity have been completed in large measure."

[DANAS] Does the withdrawal of army forces from Croatia enter into those nine points in the agreement?

[Greguric] Then, as you know, we did not include as a goal a demand that the Army leave the Republic of Croatia. It materialized later; by government decision on 16 October, we gave the Army notice that it must pull out of Croatia by 10 November.

[DANAS] Or with a postponement?

[Greguric] That's not up to us. The government took its stand and we are not deviating from it, although only three days remained until the expiration of the deadline. Naturally, what will happen and how the process of withdrawal will proceed are another thing. I personally believe that this goal—withdrawal of army forces from Croatia—could be reached even earlier. However, some objective circumstances—the negotiations in The Hague, the failure to honor twelve agreed-on ceasefires which have done us more harm than good—have resulted in the fact that the deadline is now in question and has not been completely respected. Viewed as a whole, we have, nevertheless, achieved certain success, because after the latest withdrawals, there remain only a few garrisons where, I hope, we will decide about withdrawal in the near future. Nevertheless, when I speak about this, I cannot fail to mention something that has been bothering me for a long time. I must admit that it was quite a surprise to me that the Naval Region has remained practically untouched. Except that their units have withdrawn from Pula by themselves, we have accomplished almost nothing in the Naval Region!

[DANAS] How do you interpret that? Was there really enough Croatian manpower in the navy?

[Greguric] Yes, this disproportion is evident. There have been enough admirals of Croatia, starting with Letica, Grubisic, and so on. I don't want this to be taken as an accusation, I only want to state that we don't have a single warship, a destroyer.... We have not taken anything. In the naval sector we have not accomplished one-tenth of what we have done on land. That is incomprehensible to me, such poor organization in the coastal sector, this disinclination to come into contact with the combat navy, to enter into negotiations and gain part of those facilities that belong to us.

[DANAS] Is it a human error or a lack of coordination among leadership on crisis staffs?

[Greguric] I want to say again that I would not want to be understood as casting blame. My sense is that people in the Adriatic towns realized rather late that war was being waged against Croatia and that the coast's turn would come sometime. As you see, that has proven to be true, and they were unprepared, except in Zadar and Sibenik. Everyone defended or prepared the defense of his own little area, his city or village, and that is not sufficient. I don't want to be too critical, since when we speak about our defense we must mention the other side of the coin. We are defending ourselves against a much, much stronger and more powerful enemy. Nevertheless, despite this, our defense is quite good, since there is a difference between a defensive and an offensive war.

[DANAS] As far as the functioning of the government is concerned, the opinion is often heard that the government has risen above the Assembly, and at times even above the president of the Republic?

[Greguric] Stated briefly, the government is a government because of this. We have adapted our work to current conditions, under which it is necessary to make quick decisions, and they are possible only in straight, direct contact. If you have followed our work carefully, you have been able to observe that we have often made two or even three steps forward.

[DANAS] Even in front of the president...?

[Greguric] My assessment is that cooperation with the president has been very good up to now, even when there have been some slight modifications, e.g., the occasion of the talks on the lifting of the blockade and the withdrawal of the army. Therefore, when the lifting of the blockade of the garrison in Varazdin was in progress, they called from the staff there early in the morning and asked what to do, since the officers said they would carry sidearms with them. I replied that I couldn't decide that by myself, that I must nevertheless ask the president. I call the president and ask him what he thinks it would be reasonable to do. "Good, I think it's all right. Let them start!" This is a small detail, but it shows in an illustrative way how decisions are made. They must be principled and firm, but we must approach them very carefully, so I can say that we cooperate and agree with everyone, from local organs that are in the field there and know conditions best right up to the president of the Republic. Therefore, we have divided this responsibility, or power, if you will.

[DANAS] Nevertheless, comments by representatives in the Assembly are heard that the government has pressured the Assembly into another plan.

[Greguric] I have already said that the name "government" indicates that it must do its job and answer for it. Under the present system, it answers to the president of the Republic and the Assembly. That's how we proceed. The government cannot and may not be under anyone's special influence and deviate from the goals and tasks for which it is responsible. As far as the Assembly is concerned, I must say that a lack of understanding among individuals is noticeable. No one takes away from the Assembly something that is under its jurisdiction. The Assembly has the right, like the president of the Republic, to seek both the resignation and the replacement of the government if it is not working as it should or if it exceeds its authority. This government does not fear this or worry about it, since we do our job, I can say, very responsibly and, politically, expertly. I'm sorry if someone doesn't want to see that, but I must say that I am sometimes surprised at the narrow extent to which representatives discuss the problems of our daily life and the future of our republic. Sometimes the impression is made that they live in the past and not in the present; that they do not live for the future that stands before us, but for some distant future that will come in 100 or 200 years. We must be aware that we live today and now and we should act accordingly.

[DANAS] At the last meeting of the Assembly you gained some greater authority, but some decrees were presented at the meeting that had been issued by the president of the Republic, such as one about information under wartime conditions. Don't you hold that, following democratic logic, the government should issue these decrees?

[Greguric] I don't have anything against the comment; however, the measures and decrees that you mention are connected to the law on national defense. And the president of the Republic passes all measures and decrees about this, including information under wartime conditions—and we are at war. The government makes proposals to him, but he issues decrees.

[DANAS] Nevertheless, aren't we in a declared war?

[Greguric] You can call it what you like, but they're bombing us every day! Forty percent of the economy of Croatia has been destroyed! I agree that constitutionality and legality should be honored, but we are being confronted with a dirty war that includes agression with—at least they so claim—bacteriological weapons! So it is evident that, before we ask questions about logic, we have to talk about the brutality with which attacks are being carried out on Croatian soil.

[DANAS] We asked the question about the decree on information due to possible consequences, because it is written very restrictively and, with a free interpretation, makes possible various types of manipulation for individuals?

[Greguric] I personally think that we waited too long for this decree and that it should have been issued back on the first day of serious wartime conflict. Remember the Americans in the war in the Middle East. They introduced censorship immediately and the public was given only that information that the authorities let pass through their filters, and everything is written in our case, many unnecessary things are heard and seen over the radio and on television, including such things that directly endanger the security of our fighting men and units. This information is frequently demoralizing; this creates depression among both our fighting men and among listeners. Naturally, I would like it a lot more if we were in a different situation and if we could continue with full and objective information within the territory of our whole republic, or, if your prefer, the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

[DANAS] Naturally, the decree on information under wartime conditions can be conceived of in this way, but newspaper reporters, perhaps subjectively, observe that much stricter disciplinary measures are being announced against them, but at the same time there are more and more attacks and shots on our streets and in our cities that evade legal and other control.

[Greguric] And such incidents bother me terribly too, and I spoke out very sharply about this myself in this Assembly. Perhaps someone didn't like my tone either, but the government must be realistic and objective in its performance. It must protect all citizens of the Republic of Croatia, therefore, not only Croats, but Serbs, Hungarians, Italians, and others as well. The government supports the development of democracy on all the territory of Croatia that is under the control of its legal organs of power. I think that we have shown that in our actions too, as well as in our decisions, such as, for example, those prohibiting actions by party troops. We believe that, with the introduction of identity cards, ranks and military police, real members of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the ZNG [Croatian National Guard] can be distinguished from false ones more easily and that military discipline will be maintained better on the battlefield and in the rear. The government is strongly against all illegal insignia on uniforms, weapons and equipment of soldiers, such as the hammer and sickle, five-pointed star, the U insignia or others. This government and the organs of power are democratically oriented and will not permit extremism, illegal acts and limitations on the personal freedoms of the citizens of our republic. The only symbols that we recognize are the coat of arms and the flag of the Republic of Croatia. Therefore, the line of delineation is clear. No one can usurp power, take and seize things, search apartments, abduct people. As a government, we have had great problems, and even I do not enjoy popularity with some people, because I have insisted that all party troops, including those of the Croatian Party of Rights, who were the most numerous, must be placed under the control of the ZNG.

[DANAS] This insistence on the principled and consistent respect for legality does not always meet with support, surprisingly, although this seriously harms Croatia on the international political scene and with democratically oriented governments?

[Greguric] Where these things are concerned, we must be very principled. This is a democracy, and not anarchy. Therefore, decisions that are made must be carried out, and cannot be interpreted in a way that suits someone. This is just inconceivable in America or Germany. Where the Croatian Party of Rights and its armed members are concerned, then I must say that their strolls through the city with weapons were an example of how one should not behave. That wasn't useful for this party either. I don't see and I don't understand why forces go out and display themselves when it would be much more appropriate for them to include themselves in the whole of the defensive forces of the Republic of Croatia. As if a few hundred or a thousand men will liberate Croatia by themselves. Croatia can be liberated only by the Croatian people as a whole, their total movement, with all those who recognize Croatia as their homeland, and not some party no matter what it's called.

[DANAS] And these actions by individual parties, a certain lack of discipline in armed formations, a lack of clarity about who controls them, create some confusion in people. However, people are also confused on a political level, since little from the sweeping promises has been realized up to now, while Europe, by which we swore and in which we believed, wants to leave us in a barren spot. How would you define Croatia today both from the standpoint of its territorial integrity and in respect to the possibility of international recognition?

[Greguric] The situation is not easy and it's not simple to define it. When you ask me about international recognition, then I will say openly that the international public has accepted rather weakly the majority of initiatives that could have led to the rapid resolution of the crisis in this area. This has been seen for these 6 months. Both Slovenia and Croatia obtained support for the development of democracy. Democracy spread, but war erupted, and destruction has been increasing. Mainly great writings and protocols remain of the great support, and there is no recognition and there are no clear conclusions of aggression. It has been said clearly in the Security Council that the aggressors are the Army and Serbia, but these are only resolutions that are not completed acts. This is the same as when you look over from your yard to the neighbor's, in which two people are fighting and one is injured, and then I say that this one is in the right and the other is in the wrong, and I don't do anything to help the one who suffered in the unfair clash. Therefore, it is pleasant to hear that someone is supporting us, is condemning aggression, but we have not had the full benefit of this in the practical plan for the declaration of independence for Croatia and the strengthening of its sovereignty. The European Community is mainly on our side, but there are no moves. Therefore, I believe that we will not achieve peace in these areas only through diplomatic efforts, although they are very important. We must vote for peace through force against force or, as our people say, help yourself and the dear God will help you.

[DANAS] The current position of Croatia is not dictated only by these external circumstances...?

[Greguric] Yes, one shouldn't ignore the fact that Serbia's preparations for this war were of a very high quality, that it readied its machinery for a number of years so that today, without false modesty, we are also paying the price of freedom for other peoples in Yugoslavia. We would like a truce to be achieved quickly because people are tired of war, not only in Croatia but also in Serbia, as are the Bosnians in Bosnia. Many are dying, over 50 people a day; this is terrible and much worse than in Lebanon. Many people are also dying unnecessarily, the innocent, women, children are dying on both one side and the other. These are the horrors of war and thus I want to emphasize that it will not be possible to end this war if the Serbs in Serbia do not realize that this is not their war, that all this that is happening is also against them. And the war has been waged over the last few months in a planned manner by the Army and Serbia, which has been obtaining large quantities of arms through territorial defense and sending them to Croatia, the Army has included itself through its potential, so that the arms are not only Army arms but also Serbian arms. These arms have come here by trucks, army trucks, they have come by helicopter, etc. And it shouldn't be forgotten that the costs for territorial defense arms have increased 20-fold in the last couple of months. Therefore, they have strived for the economic and overall destruction of Croatia, in order to reduce its material might and force it to surrender. All this has been done through perfidious acts and it is not clear to me and I cannot comprehend how they can do everything that they're doing in Croatia. Reports about the destruction of hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, etc., indicate how unprecedented the aggression has been. All this has been done systematically and according to documentation, even where there has been no fighting.

[DANAS] The situation is quite difficult, but aren't there nevertheless spots of hope?

[Greguric] I am an optimist by nature. First of all, the departure of the Army creates the preconditions for an easy and rapid end to the war. However, the problem is that the Army, until it leaves, will get revenge and destroy through brutal and dirty force everything that is Croatian. That is what we cannot prevent for now.

You must know, however, that the Army has lost a lot of its potential and it will lose still more of it. We are stronger every day, and they're weaker. Yesterday Stane Brovet reported, when they asked him about the situation on the Slavonian battlefield, that the Army can no keep up with the Croatian army, and that what it's doing constitutes its maximum range.

If they did not have air support, these ground forces of the former Yugoslav Army would have already been driven out of Croatia.

[DANAS] Doesn't it seem to you that Croatia, in its battle for freedom and independence, is a little isolated? Even Slovenia, which has long acted in tandem with Croatia, very seldom shows sympathy and understanding for Croatian policy.

[Greguric] I can tell you that the government has already appraised the situation and taken the viewpoint that much more will have to be done in this area on contacts with newly created states, or republics, on the territory of Yugoslavia. Especially with Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and with Montenegro, since the breakup of the structure has also begun there, faster for now and, I would say, more substantively than in Serbia. As far as Slovenia is concerned, it is in a much more favorable situation, since it has resolved both the war and the Army. Relations with it are the relations between two sovereign and independent states and, in recent weeks, we have resolved many problems in our relations. We have signed a payments agreement, resolved the customs part, economic cooperation is developing according to present possibilities with the normal minor differences. The situation with Bosnia-Hercegovina is quite different. As you know, Croatia has not wished to become involved in the problems there, because we have believed that they must be resolved within the framework of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

However, it has turned out that very heavy attacks by the Army have come directly from Bosnia, and the government of this republic and its presidency have been powerless to prevent them. They are de facto under occupation and this is now completely clear, so this determines the degree of and the possibility for cooperation with Bosnia-Hercegovina.

We in Croatia are not happy about the conflicts and a possible war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, but I must say that we cannot be indifferent towards the position of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina because we are responsible for seeing to it that this part of our people also live their lives the same way as other peoples in this state. Croats cannot be second- or third-class citizens there.

[DANAS] You are a businessman, but you have not said a single word about the economic situation in Croatia?

[Greguric] From the economic standpoint, we are not in good shape, let's not fool ourselves. We can't be when 37 percent of our large industrial capacities have been smashed. This is the truth and we can't avoid it, and this is confirmation of the theory that the Army, together with Serbia, is attempting to destroy Croatia economically. I agree that we're paying too little attention to this area since we're all burdened with the war and the struggle just for lives.

Moreover, that is completely normal human behavior. It is a time of life and death, but I hope that we shall soon be able to speak about both renewal and development. Croatia has its comparative advantages, and even in times of war the interest of a lot of world capital in our fate has been observed. They're interested in investments, while we're interested in reaching the road to peace and economic prosperity as soon as possible. I hope we'll succeed in this.

Commander Dedakovic's Arrest Examined

92BA0206A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
26 Nov 91 pp 14-15

[Article by Veceslav Kocijan: "When the Hawk Was Away on Business"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The excessive hardships of Vukovar, instead of uniting Croatia, are opening up the door to doubts with the arrest of Mile Dedakovic.

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia has announced that Colonel Mile Dedakovic, until recently the commander of the defense of Vukovar, was brought in for questioning last Thursday [21 November] for deserting the battlefield without the approval of the Main Staff, and that moreover he did not respond to the request by the Main Staff that he submit a report.

Only yesterday a near-legend, like the city of Vukovar itself, Mile Dedakovic was arrested in Zagreb last Wednesday around 2300, in front of the building where he lives. Three vans and several passenger cars, a total of 50 people, took part in this action to bring him in "for a briefing." The next morning, the news of his arrest arrived at the editorial offices, and the information was confirmed on the scene by people who, having heard "the commotion below their windows," observed the entire scene from their apartments.

In the meantime, a fax arrived from HSP [Croatian Rights Party] headquarters addressed "to all public news media," reporting that the military police had apprehended the Hawk and at the same time accusing President Tudjman of attempting to shift the blame for the fall of Vukovar from himself to "the man who defended Vukovar and the other towns and cities around Vukovar."

Our attempt to get at official information on Dedakovic's arrest proved futile. At the Main Staff, we were told that they "have no knowledge" of this and that Col. Dedakovic is on vacation. The police, of course, told us that they too have no knowledge of the matter and that in any event it is not within their authority.

The Ministry of Information, to which the Staff sent us, also told us that Dedakovic is on vacation, while no one answered the phone at the Ministry of Defense. That evening, a statement from the Ministry of Defense was read on the "Dnevnik" news program indicating that Dedakovic had been taken in.

Evil Forebodings

Who is Mile Dedakovic the Hawk? The defender of Vukovar, or a traitor in the Croatian ranks? In September, the previously mysterious commander of the defense of Vukovar was praised by President Tudjman, who spoke his name in public for the first time. According to what was noted in all the media, Dedakovic was the man responsible for organizing the defense of Vukovar and for its success until only recently, which we ourselves had the opportunity to confirm by visiting Vukovar before and after his arrival as the head of defense.

But as the situation on the Vukovar battlefield worsened, there were more and more appeals for help, but also charges leveled at the Croatian leadership. Journalists at Radio Vukovar complained about the drastic editing done on their reports, there was even a boycott of Croatian radio, followed by a telephone press conference organized by Mile Dedakovic.

At the time, there were very strong words about the help that Croatia was (not) sending. This was followed by an announcement by the Main Staff, not addressed directly to Dedakovic, talking about how the enemy is spreading lies about how Vukovar is not being helped. The very next day, in an interview with Slovenian Radio, the Hawk, who by that time had been appointed commander of the Vukovar-Vinkovci-Zupanja Operative Zone with headquarters in Vinkovci, issued a statement, which has never been completely denied, to the effect that certain people in Zagreb, in the government leadership, were plotting to kill him.

At an Assembly session held at the time, an appeal by Marin Vidic Bili, the government's commissioner in Vukovar, was read aloud to the delegates in which both the government and the Assembly were criticized for not doing everything possible to help Vukovar.

Guardists Silent

The situation at the eastern Slavonian front was increasingly difficult, the appeals for help were increasingly dramatic, and it was obvious to the military command itself in this part of the theater of operations that without more significant help in terms of equipment and personnel to break open a line of communication to Vukovar, the city did not stand a chance. There came the famous, and now already well-known accusation in which Vukovar charged the Assembly, the government, and the president of betraying Vukovar. The accusation was immediately declared an act of the KOS [Yugoslav Counterintelligence Service], and nowhere was it broadcast in its entirety, while some people contend that Dedakovic himself insisted that it be published in the Croatian media. It is said that at the beginning of the week before last, an attempt was made to remove Col. Dedakovic from the post of commander by "promoting" him and replacing him with his deputy, the Phoenix, but that did not happen. Reports from Vukovar hinted that the worst was about to happen, and even though the Serbian media were already running pictures from the city, our side did not acknowledge what had happened.

All of the following are the conjectures and stories of only one side. On Friday evening before last, right before the fall of Vukovar, it was necessary to break through into the city in a last-minute attempt to save anything that could still be saved. The HSP alleges that 1,200 of its soldiers were sent to help in this breakthrough, but on that day the Hawk was allegedly dismissed, and there was no one who could give orders to carry out the planned breakthrough. And despite the fact that some of the Vukovar soldiers managed to withdraw from the city and make it to Zagreb, there is still an inadequately clear picture of the last days of Vukovar.

On Sunday, the government authorized its representative, Marin Vidic Bili, to negotiate with representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] as well as with anyone else who could prevent further suffering, for the purpose of protecting the civilian population, while at the same time calling on the military leadership to form a buffer zone against the Chetniks in order to save the civilian population through humanitarian actions. Otherwise, it was warned, a massacre of the population of Vukovar would signify the beginning of chaos, the end of which would be difficult to foresee. On Monday, it was stated in the Supreme State Council that the "enemy is exploiting the difficult situation in Vukovar for the planned staging of defeatism and a shift of responsibility to the leadership, the Assembly, and the government of the Republic of Croatia, the goal being to disrupt constitutional order."

In their statement regarding the situation in Vukovar, the Ministry of Defense and the Main Staff of the Croatian army also warned about the activities of the KOS and other intelligence services that are spreading defeatism and preparing campaigns to subvert the constitution order of the Republic of Croatia.

On Tuesday, the Vukovar guardists, who had arrived in Zagreb the day before, received, at the Assembly and then at the International Hotel, Prime Minister Franjo Greguric, together with Bernardo Jurlina and Ivan Milas. Both meetings were closed to journalists. Afterwards, it was impossible to obtain from the guardists any details about their talks with the members of the government.

They talked only about the tragic situation in Vukovar and the dramatic withdrawal from the city, but at every attempt to turn the conversation to the recent meeting, they simply shrugged. Only one of them said in response to our question about aid to Vukovar that such help did not arrive, but he was unwilling to say anything more about it. "We are warriors, and our job is war, so let the politicians concern themselves with politics." That is what the Vukovar warriors said. The next day, the Hawk was arrested.

Arrest of Paraga

The first reaction came from Dobroslav Paraga, the head of the HSP, who contended that the government had in this way signed its own political death warrant. "Because who will prove that he is to blame? They are trying to charge him with things for which President Tudjman is to blame, but all of this suits only those who want civil war in Croatia. Thus, Dedakovic must be released immediately so that things do not come to that, because one must not forget that many soldiers support the Hawk," Paraga told us. And according to HDS [Croatian Democratic Party] allegations, there are supposedly "indications that Vukovar, without the knowledge of the people of the city, was intentionally sacrificed in the interest of some higher political objective, and according to stories by soldiers who broke through it did not have to fall." The president of the social democrats, Antun Vujic, believes that in this situation it is disgraceful to look for people to blame, criticizing the Croatian defense system, while Mr. Posavec, from the club of Vukovarians, told us that they know nothing, only that Dedakovic was taken in on Wednesday, but that no one knows where and by whom, and that for that reason it is better to have no comment before seeing what is going on.

After Dedakovic's arrest, the Supreme State Council reconvened, this time talking about the increasing evidence of a conspiracy within part of the Croatian defense system which, if not undermined, would create distrust among the people and disrupt the republic's constitutional order. Should one look at this part of the statement for the paragraph under which Col. Dedakovic could be judged to be a hero and/or a traitor?

We learned that the Little Hawk too was supposedly fleeing, and last Friday Dobroslav Paraga, the chairman of the HSP, and his deputy, Milan Vukovic, were also arrested. The two of them were charged under Paragraph 236 with the act of attempted armed insurrection, which could earn them up to eight years in prison.

It is still unknown whether there is a connection between these two arrests. Col. Dedakovic's lawyer, who is also the official legal counsel for the HSP, Zvonimir Hudak, says that he was unable to contact his client even on Friday, although he should have been brought to the district court inquiry center within 24 hours, and that he thus does not even know with what he is being charged. Since Dedakovic was not brought in within the period of time established by law it is possible that he was arrested under the recently passed ordinance that allows a detainee to be held for as long as six days or as long as there is a need to hold him—in other words, indefinitely. Naturally, Hudak hopes that this will not be the case.

Is Dedakovic really a traitor, committed to disrupting the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, or is he just the unfortunate victim of someone's games? There is no doubt that providing political appraisals, as Col. Dedakovic did periodically, is by no means acceptable for a soldier, nor is criticism directed at his commander, the Main Staff of the Croatian army. But the question arises of whether from his position, the position of someone who realizes that without adequate help Vukovar cannot be saved, exerting pressure on the government to do more is not in fact to a certain extent justified. Did he really have any alternative?

Is it possible that by looking for enemies within its own ranks, and in fact among those whom it declared to be heroes not that long ago, the Croatian government this time has acted rashly, not realizing in time the consequences that this could unleash? For example, the arguments of those who accuse the Hawk are based on leaflets thrown out of military airplanes, containing a condensed version of the aforementioned charges against the Croatian government, and signed by the "Committee for the Defense of the Hawk." Is it not a little naive to think that the military intelligence service, trying to defend its own man, would use means that directly point to a connection between Dedakovic and the KOS? Or, if it distributed the leaflets, did it want to compromise a dangerous adversary?

Conflict in the Army

We have been unable to find out whether the Hawk left the battlefield voluntarily and arbitrarily, or whether there is a connection between the assumption of control over the eastern theater of operations by Mercep and Spegelj and the alleged dismissal of Dedakovic.

It is a fact that the Hawk did not go into hiding, and that the Main Staff authorized 10 days of vacation for him. It is hard to believe that anyone who fled the theater of operations would be allowed to go on vacation, only to be arrested in front of his house three days later.

Some people are inclined to believe reports that what is going on here is a conflict within the Croatian army between nationalists and professionals. Such an allegation is not completely unfounded, but only the events, and the possible arrests, of the coming days will provide a premonition of what is really going on here. And while it is heard from the ranks of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] that Vukovar, through its sacrifice, exposed Serbia's imperial policy and the criminal character of the Yugoslav Army and Chetnik hordes, and while Minister Zivko Juzbasic emphasizes that Vukovar is a weight on the scales of Croatian recognition, Mile Dedakovic the Hawk remains both a hero and a traitor.

No one can be indifferent to the tragedy of the Vukovarians, after everything that they have undergone during the months of occupation. Lately, this applies to Europe as well, as if the horrible destruction is simply the last straw. Furthermore, the manipulations of the aggressors in dealing with casualties and refugees from Vukovar are extremely hypocritical and cruel, but seemingly accepted, while the political speculation about blame for the fall of Vukovar and betrayal after heroism suddenly has taken center stage and unnecessarily raises doubts that can only divide Croatia, which at this very moment needs unity most of all.

Serbia

Jovanovic Sends Book on Genocide to EC

LD1312224791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2123 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 13 (TANJUG)—Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic sent on Friday [13 December] to President of the European Community Ministerial Council Hans van den Broek a book with the authentic documents concerning the genocide of the Croatian authorities against the Serbs in Croatia.

Jovanovic asked Van den Broek to hand the copies of the book entitled *Genocide Again—Ustasha Terror Against Serbs 1991* to all the ministers of the European Community Ministerial Council who will attend the December 16 session.

I hope, Jovanovic said, that no E.C. member-country after being informed about the contents of the document, would be in a position to say it was not authentically informed about the genocide the Croatian fascist authorities were committing against the Serbian civilian population, including women and children.

Some E.C. member-countries, which have indicated they would recognize diplomatically Croatia as a christmas present, should understand that in this way they would reward activities so evidently documented in this book, said Jovanovic.

Jovanovic sent the copies of the book on orders from President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic.

In the letter to Van den Broek, Jovanovic noted that the book offered only a fraction of the documents on the massacres committed against the civilian Serbian population.

Bakocevic Discusses Prime Minister Resignation

LD1312200391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1619 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia's parliament Aleksandar Bakocevic said today that "there are no reasons to mystify the resignation" of the Serbian Prime Minister Dragutin Zelenovic.

At today's press conference Bakocevic said that it was Zelenovic's "right to submit his resignation" if he "assessed that he could not carry out his duty anymore."

Bakocevic believed that President of the Republic Slobodan Milosevic would name a new mandator soon, in line with the Constitution and after consulting the parliament's majority.

Prime minister-to-be, Bakocevic added, has large possibilities of reshuffling the current cabinet, and not only to fill vacancies.

The parliament's president, however, refused to say anything about the parliamentary opposition's proposal on creating a national salvation government, specifying that it was in the new mandator's jurisdiction.

Assembly Adopts Defense Minister Simovic's Report

LD1312211991 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1836 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 13 (TANJUG)—The parliament of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia in today's closed session adopted a report by Defence Minister General Tomislav Simovic on the situation on the fronts in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, with emphasis on the front in the region of Western Slavonija.

No details from the report have been given, but journalists were told that General Simovic answered numerous questions asked by deputies.

After the session General Simovic said that he was very happy "with the atmosphere in which the debate had been carried out."

Asked by reporters if there would be a general mobilization in Serbia, Simovic said that the "matter was not currently topical."

Since October, the Croatian authorities have carried out three mobilizations of men aged 16-60.

A group of opposition deputies had demanded a report on the situation on the front in Western Slavonija after reports by journalist and the military authorities in the last few days of a stepped up offensive by Croatian paramilitary formations.

The Serbian parliament today also adopted a government proposal that an initiative for the adopting of a declaration on the recognition of the Serbian Republic of Krajina be put on the agenda of the next special parliamentary session.

The matter relates to the unification of two bordering regions in which the Serbs are the majority population—the region of Krajina in the republic of Croatia and Bosanska Krajina in the neighbouring Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) won last year's multi-party elections in these two regions and at a special referendum the Serbs voted to remain in Yugoslavia and against the secession of the two republics.

The republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina do not recognize these [words indistinct] the declaration on the recognition of the Serbian Republic of Krajina was initiated by the opposition National Party of Serbia (NSS).

Government Examines Kosovo, Metohija Situation

LD1412181991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1548 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—A session of the Serbian Government concluded today that the results of business activities in all spheres of the economy in Kosovo and Metohija are considerably lower than the average in the Republic [of Serbia]. A statement from the session which was sent to TANJUG notes that the government, at a session presided over by Dragutin Zelenovic, examined current strategic problems on the organization of branches of the Serbian Government, economic development, and the political and security situation in the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija. The session was also attended by social and political representatives from Kosovo and Metohija.

It was concluded that the situation in the reviewed work spheres in this part of the republic showed changes in the planned direction.

The Serbian Government organized its branches for this part of the territory of the republic to more efficiently discharge the functions of state, organize the production process, and eradicate separatism. Government actions from certain places in Kosovo and Metohija will enable the government to supervise and discharge its administrative, inspection, and other duties in a legal, responsible, and effective manner. The secretariat for the development of underdeveloped Serbian municipalities will be located in Kosovo and Metohija, as will others.

It was concluded that acute problems are being exacerbated in the sphere of employment and social and demographic policies; that there is a lack of appropriate expert cadres; that the educational system is blocked, etc. The government believes the situation would have been much worse had not emergency measures been taken in some collectives. This prevented—or in some cases lessened—all kinds of destruction or illegal appropriation of property. Work and technological discipline was improved, and in some enterprises production processes were initiated, equipment was overhauled, and financial documentation was updated. In general the emergency measures stopped the drastic negative trends and their possible consequences and thwarted the most aggressive forms of Albanian separatist actions. All this created the initial conditions for the settlement of economic and social problems in the province. [passage omitted]

The government separately examined the political and security situation and actions organized by separatist opposition in the province, the statement concludes.

Guard Leaders Resign Over 'Party Army' Policy

LD1312201191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1638 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 13 (TANJUG)—The command headquarters of the Serbian Guard, consisting of volunteers from the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, said today that they had resigned because they were opposed to efforts being made by the leadership of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the largest opposition party, at presenting the Serbian Guard as a party army.

The announcement says that the command headquarters of the Serbian Guard had resigned on December 7 with the explanation that they did not wish to come into conflict with the SPO.

The Serbian Guard was formed with the aim of defending threatened Serbian interests and as the nucleus of a future nonparty, professional Serbian Army, as set out in the announcement. It goes on to say that the SPO leadership is now bent on presenting the Serbian Guard as a party army, thus giving it the status of a paramilitary formation.

The announcement underscores that the Serbian Guard numbers 80,000 volunteers and that it is recognized by the military authorities as a legal military formation and the basis of the future Serbian Army, thus resolving the status of its 1,000 fighters on the front, the social status of the wounded and the families of killed members.

The Yugoslav Presidency adopted a decree two days ago putting all volunteer units and formations under the single command of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), thus ensuring volunteers the same status as that of all JNA members.

Opposition Party Supports Serbian Guard

LD1412051291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1952 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 13 (TANJUG)—The leadership of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the strongest opposition party in Serbia, requested on Friday [13 December] of the Serbian Defense Ministry to legalize the Serbian Guard, made up of volunteers from Serbia.

A letter sent to Serbian Defense Minister Gen. Tomislav Simovic, the SPO urged that the Guard be recognized as an armed formation of the state of Serbia with unified symbols and command.

The SPO, which initiated the forming of the Serbian Guard, believes that the "Guard as the nucleus of the future Serbian Army", must be under the command of the Serbian Defense Ministry, and not the Yugoslav Army.

Gen. Simovic was also sent a protest against the "propaganda campaign" which, as set out, certain Army officers led with a view to breaking up the Serbian Guard.

The command staf of the Serbian Guard, however, accused on Friday the leaders of the SPO of trying to represent the Guard as a party army and in this way give it the status of a para-military formation.

According to the announcement, the Serbian Guard command staff resigned on December 7, because it did not want to create a conflict with the SPO.

Serbian People's Party Warns of 'Massive' Exodus

LD1412044891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1337 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Zagreb, December 13 (TANJUG)—The Serbian People's Party, which rallies Serbs in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, warned on Friday [13 December] of a possible massive flight of Serbs from Croatian towns in order to "save their lives."

The party's president Milan Djukic says in a statement sent to the Croatian media that a "series of crimes committed lately in Zagreb, Zadar, Ogulin" and other parts of the republic controlled by the Croatian authorities may result in a possible exodus of Serbs from Croatian towns.

The Serbian People's Party has so far not been in collision with the Croatian authorities and its president is a high-ranking official in the republican parliament.

Noting that the crimes have caused "shock and panic among the Serbian population, especially in Zagreb," Djukic particularly mentions the killing of Mihajlo Zec in Zagreb on December 6.

Zec, a prominent figure in the Croatian capital, was killed and his wife and daughter kidnapped by "persons in combat fatigues identical or similar" to those worn by Croatian guardsmen and police.

"The uniformed persons committing such crimes are threatening the safety of the citizens and may, unless urgently stopped, jeopardize the democratic character of the authority in Croatia," writes Djukic.

The statement, delivered on December 11, has not yet been published by any Croatian paper, or broadcast by radio or television.

The Croatian media is subject to censonship under the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's decree.

Opposition Leader Veselinov Condemns JNA

92BA0194B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Nov 91 p 6

[Interview with Dr. Dragan Veselinov, professor in the School of Political Science at Belgrade University and leader of the People's Peasant Party, by Ivkica Bacic; place and date not given: "Dr. Veselinov: Vukovar Is Not Serbia"]

[Text] The subject of our interview, Dr. Dragan Veselinov, professor in the School of Political Science at Belgrade University, even before he founded the People's Peasant Party [NSS] and set out as its leader, along with the other opposition leaders, to win over voters, was politically and personally recognizable—by his speech, by his sharp-edged writing style, by the way he dresses, and by his manner. For official Belgrade, he was long ago an advocate of Vojvodina autonomy, and in the recent past he has been something still worse, an unpatriot who "refuses to understand" that the devastation and seizure of Yugoslavia to Serbia's advantage through war is the true Serbian interest. For Dr. Veselinov, peace is worth practically any price. In the Serbian opposition, with its political bends and twists, in that part of it which is still holding together, he has been the most consistent in this respect.

[Bacic] The Hague sessions, and requests to the United Nations, and the threats of an oil embargo..., but the war continues to blaze. As though Europe and the world do not know or do not want to know what is going to happen to us, as though the casualties and destruction recorded still are not enough for them.

[Veselinov] Our casualties do not upset them! They do not have the ability to overcome internal differences concerning Yugoslavia. The petroleum threat is not particularly important. Milosevic will have reached Hvar before the world shuts the oil valves. Finally, Serbia will keep on obtaining petroleum from the Russians as long as Washington is hesitating about putting up money for Moscow's degenerated socialism. As I see it, Serbia is not going to stop; it still has not converted to war communism in consumption; the stores in Belgrade are still full of goods essential to a shameless life. The Army has no reason to stop, because the financial status of officers and retired military personnel has not been resolved. Were it to stop now, it would risk Milosevic's making a Serbian Army in peacetime—which in fact he wants to do, but does not dare to now, because he needs a Yugoslav cover for his intervention in Croatia. The Army, if there is no Yugoslav agreement on its status, must spread the war through Croatia so that tomorrow, by turning over the territory it has captured to Serbia, it would increase the economic might of what is called Yugoslavia, but is actually an expanded Serbia. At this point, the interests of Kadijevic and Milosevic do not coincide: Milosevic risks international intervention with the penetration of the Army and a continuation of Serbia's decline, but if it stops, he risks a conflict with the Army. He will let the Army advance, because that is what the autonomized Serbs in Croatia also want, and because this is a lesser conflict than the one he would have with the world. Two devils are running a race—the war with the world and the war in Yugoslavia. Belgrade has chosen the lesser of the two evils.

Milosevic Caught in His Own Trap

[Bacic] Up until recently the Serbian regime was proclaiming nearly the entire world to be in a general plot against Serbia and Serbism, and then when it saw that Kadijevic's mobilization was not recruiting enough fighters, there came the request, through Kostic's Presidency, that the United Nations send in peacekeeping troops. Do you think that those troops might arrive in the foreseeable future?

[Veselinov] I support the idea of sending international troops into Yugoslavia. I proposed an international protectorate of Kosovo two years ago. But I see this proposal of Kostic's pseudo-Presidency as a maneuver on Milosevic's part to gain time. While the place and character of the intervention are being negotiated, Milosevic can in political terms consolidate his power in Baranja, Slavonia, and Knin. It is no accident that he is settling the Croat Serbs in Baranja. Why does he not settle them in Kosovo?! He is filling the region with Serbs, he is carrying out an ethnic purge of Croatia, and he is establishing a military region against Croatia. I am convinced that Croatia is conducting a poor policy in this respect, although it does have the sympathy of the international public. Zagreb could demand establishment of an international protectorate over Slavonia and Baranja, proposing that that be a custom-free zone and serve to separate Serbia from Croatia without affecting Croatia's territorial integrity. And later, in 20 years, say, a plebiscite might be held. Much can happen in 20 years—a new generation of voters will grow up, the duty-free zone would attract capital and an interethnic population. After 20 years, the population might vote to extend the status of the protectorate another 20 years, why not?! It is important to quiet passions and to guarantee development, and in the meantime the borders will in any case become less visible than today.

[Bacic] You recently wrote in the liberal periodical VREME that if Milosevic were to openly say that he was waging war for an expanded Serbia, he would gain more adherents in Sumadija and Vojvodina. Is there a valid defense for that proposition even today?

[Veselinov] Milosevic became a nationalist when he renounced Yugoslavia by an act of nationalism, but in this war he has fallen into a trap: The Yugoslav idea cannot be preserved by any nationalism, including Serbian nationalism. However great that tragedy may be, it does prevent Belgrade from bringing about a still greater tragedy—the people of Sumadija will not fight for Yugoslavia. The man from Sumadija knows that history shaped Serbia from Vranje to the Drina, not to Dubrovnik. Which is why he will not fight. Perhaps he would fight if Milosevic established a Serbian Army and set out to incorporate the Serbs in Croatia. But I am not convinced that he would get more soldiers from Sumadija even then. The people there favor peace, and they want to pay for it with money and through solidarity with the Serbs outside Serbia. They reject Tudjman's policy, but they do not see why policy in Serbia must be conducted solely by Milosevic, they do not see why bullets are the only way of talking things over with the Croats. When we have lived in peace up to now—to whatever extent it was the result of a communist totalitarian ideology—is it not better to remain in peace, not necessarily the previous kind, even if its price has to be paid, just so it is in money?

[Bacic] How do you explain the fact that Kadijevic's army withdrew so rapidly from Slovenia, while it has been devastating Croatia mercilessly for months now?

Kadijevic's Revenge for Slovenia

[Veselinov] Kadijevic and the generals want revenge. They remember their childhood and the suffering of their families in Lika, Kordun, and Banija. But that is not enough for a war. They are taking revenge in Croatia for their defeat in Slovenia and they are fighting to obtain a secure financial status, pensions, and a secure life. Both Croatia and Serbia would be wise not to irritate the Army with threats as to status. That is where Zagreb made its mistake. It attacked the Army before it had armed itself. Prison must have drained out of Tudjman all recollection that in warfare it is the one who is armed who has the advantage. He has committed other mistakes typical of nationalists. At the first sign of Serbian nationalism, he should have offered some kind of autonomy. My thinking is the opposite of a nationalist; I would give them everything they want, because immediately thereafter their patriotic temperature would drop to that of Antarctica.

[Bacic] It is still a great riddle for many people how the opportunity which the Serbian opposition had in its fight against the regime on 9 March was so carelessly gambled away. At that point, the regime was seriously shaken, but it is a fact that since that time the opposition has been withdrawing and losing more and more.

[Veselinov] The 9th of March was a surprise even for the opposition itself. We did not believe that the Serbian government was so stupid as to attack us. That is why we did not prepare a provisional government. We began to think about that only when we got through to the Serbian Assembly. At that point, it was late, the external temperature had dropped, and we were unable to maintain it by announcing a putsch and by organizing it properly in just a few hours. We also let something else slip—the opportunity to take power in Novi Sad a few days after Belgrade. Had we been able to agree that we did not give a damn about possible accusations from Belgrade that we are advocates of Vojvodina autonomy, we would have taken Novi Sad in one day. But Novi Sad will not get away from us! Belgrade is wriggling away from us, it is unclear both to the Socialists and to us, no one yet has been able to charm it.

[Bacic] Nor has the Serbian opposition gained any more ground with the attempt to oppose Milosevic with an antiwar policy.

[Veselinov] We were unable to stick with the antiwar policy, because the decisive opposition parties are nationalistic, and they prefer border disputes to dialogue. The leaders of those parties wanted to refrain from war, but they could not save themselves from accusations that they might be traitors. The entire opposition stopped at that point, the Socialist Party, which is in power, boosted the temperature for war, knowing that that would neutralize us. And the price for that has been paid by the economy, by the impoverished population, and finally, by families in Croatia and Serbia in terms of the casualties. Croatia also bears responsibility for that. A clever politician must be aware of the deep pockets of Croatia's national vulnerability. Zagreb was putting up with Milosevic quite well until Tudjman arrived. I pay recognition to the people of Zagreb for having put up with Belgrade nationalism for two and a half years without a single incident in Croatia. But they let the opportunity slip. If Racan was unable to propose a civil reform of Croatia and offer autonomy to the Serbs, why was no one else able to do so?! The Serbs in Knin were on the move even before Tudjman, but then the smothering of their ethnic rights resulted in a general escalation of irreconcilable nationalism, both Serbian and Croatian, and—the gunfire dance began.

The Opposition Is Favorable to Peace

[Bacic] Does that mean that the Serbian opposition is lying in wait for the end of the war and its outcome?

[Veselinov] The Belgrade opposition continues to favor peace, but it is not offering any particularly convincing political solutions for the Serbian question in Croatia nor for the question of Yugoslavia. Although I think that it is nevertheless offering better solutions than those being offered by Milosevic and Tudjman. But the opposition is divided from within—the Democrats are waiting for the Socialists to smash to pieces in the war, which is risky, because this war could always last a long time, so long as to exhaust any opposition in Serbia; the Serbian Renewal Movement is offering reasonable solutions, but it has problems with the political standing of many people in it; the Reformists have melted away.... As for the People's Peasant Party, it has a better chance of explaining to Milosevic and Tudjman the difference between corn and watermelon than between war and peace!

[Bacic] In the quite recent past, the biggest fad in the Serbian opposition, including the party which you head, is the desire to bring the king back to Belgrade and reestablish a parliamentary monarchy. Does the opposition seriously think that the king is the only trump it still has in the attempt to bring down the regime in power?

[Veselinov] One thing is quite possible, and that is that the inevitable economic disintegration, the despair of families and young people, the growing crime in the government, and robbery in the private sector could take Serbia to such a state that everyone would need the illusion of salvation. After a nationalistic war, one can hardly expect reason. One ought rather to expect the birth of a new illusion, because in the case that everyone is human, no one wants to understand man, but rather God. The king, the savior king, in the name of history, and the spirit of all the Serbs, could meet that deified political need which people have. We have thrown out that card, it is on the table, and we will play with it all the more, the longer the state of war lasts and the greater the disintegration of the state and the human tragedy it brings about. Myself, I am not a monarchist as a matter of principle. For me, today, a republic or a kingdom is a tactical question. I did not throw out the monarchist card on the principle of the best government in the spirit of Aristotelian analysis, but because of the Serbian situation. The renewal of the monarchy is not certain at all. This is a complicated project, and it would not even surprise me if the Socialists took it over. One day, after all, they will get tired of Milosevic, and they will have to save themselves. Why should not the Communists bring back the monarchy; what principle are they not ready to tread under foot on behalf of their own survival!?

A Wave of Political Terror

[Bacic] Official Serbia is still persistently passing off the phrase that it is not at war, and at the same time it is arresting people and mobilizing them by force. The most drastic example of this is Nenad Canak, who was forcibly taken into custody at the front. Do you foresee that the regime will be still more brutal in pursuing those who do not want to fight?

[Veselinov] Nenad Canak's arrest did not change people's political disposition in Vojvodina. It intimidated people, it forced them to shut themselves up in their houses and to talk quietly. The streets, the opposition's main weapon, have remained empty. That was in fact the Socialists' main objective. It is only in the streets that they are not stronger than we are, and they took that away from us in Novi Sad. This is an ominous arrest, because it suggests a wave of political terror in Serbia, although it must encounter its own limits. Young hooligans can attack two women in the Belgrade office of the Reform Party, but if they lay a finger on the Serbian Renewal Movement, they are risking everything. There may be individual terror, manipulation of the population through the constant use of radio and television, the prosecutors and judges can be neutralized—right at the moment all prosecutors and judges in Vojvodina and Serbia are up for reappointment, and it is the republic justice minister who appoints them—but still they cannot intimidate the hard core of the strongest opposition parties in Serbia. I can tell you right now: The opposition is physically capable of bringing down the government in Serbia, but our problem is justifying power to the Serbs outside Serbia and agreeing among ourselves in Belgrade on the character and composition of the provisional government. The opposition of which I speak, many people also know that Serbia is not in Vukovar, just as they know that Dubrovnik does not belong to Serbia. Vukovar's fall did not encourage that Serbia to go further, it did not disrupt the sense the man from Sumadija has that Slavonia is not Serbia, because they are not ready to acknowledge that the military conquest of Yugoslavia on behalf of Serbia is in the Serbian interest.

Serbian Export Ban Harms Bosnia, Montenegro

LD1412045691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1418 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—The decision of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia to ban exports of strategic commodities, primarily basic food products, has caused a chaotic situation on the markets in other republics, especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro.

Faced with the European Community's sanctions, Serbia was forced to protect its food surplusses, said Serbian Assistant Trade Minister Budimir Boskovic.

The Trade Ministry may issue special permits exempting products which can be exchanged for raw materials necessary to the Serbian market, said Boskovic.

The Belgrade daily BORBA writes today that shops in Bosnia-Hercegovina are already half-empty, and that edible oil, sugar, flour, pastry and even bread are in short supply. This republic has so far purchased over 50 percent of food products from Serbia and Croatia.

BORBA says that rumours are circulating in Sarajevo that the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government has banned the sales of iron, steel, raw materials, cosmetics, timber, and other products to other republics.

Although Serbia has granted a special status to Montenegro, according to a statement by Montenegrin Trade and Tourism Minister Nebojsa Zekovic, food shortages have affected the population of this republic as well. Montenegro has so far obtained 90 percent of its food supplies in Serbia.

BORBA says that the Serbian Trade Ministry has recently received numerous requests from other republics and abroad to lift the ban on certain products.

According to BORBA, Serbian businessmen also react differently to the government's decision. While Smiljan Isakov, manager of Granexport which exports grain, claims that "the decision is good and necessary", Belgrade dairy-plant PKB manager Vlado Sparalo says that "businessmen view this as ridiculous because the market should not be limited."

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Bogicevic Briefs Assembly on Work in Presidency

AU1312215291 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Zdenko Jendruh report]

[Excerpts] Good evening, esteemed listeners. I am reporting from the assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina. After the break, the Assembly resumed its work at 1730 GMT by counting the number of deputies in attendance. It was established that there were 70 deputies of the Chamber of Citizens and 59 deputies of the Chamber of Communes, constituting a quorum. This validated the decision to support the measures and efforts of the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina on continuing, within its abilities, all efforts to secure normal conditions for the functioning of the economy and enabling workers to work and earn salaries for decent lifelihoods. [passage omitted]

This ended a three-day discussion on the situation in the economy of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Patient Bogic Bogicevic, member of the SFRY Presidency from Bosnia-Hercegovina, was finally allowed to speak. Addressing the deputies, Bogicevic submitted a report on his work in the state presidency. He said that he believed personally that he had performed his job in accordance with the Constitutions of both Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, and in accordance with the oath he took when upon assuming membership in the SFRY Presidency.

Bogicevic presented his assessment of the political crisis in the country, its causes, and possible solutions, which, according to him, still exist. As Bogicevic said, the only way to solve the crisis is to oppose madness and war with reason and democracy.

Explaining his absence from SFRY Presidency sessions in the last few months, since the Presidency has been acting as a four-member presidency, Bogicevic said that he did not boycott the work of the Presidency nor that he had been obstructing it, but that this simply happened because of the changes in the constitutional situation in Yugoslavia. The SFRY Presidency, Bogicevic said, is a collective organ and functions on the basis of the consensus principle. These principles have been violated, Bogicevic said. Besides, there was a new political reality. Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonian proclaimed independence and sought international recognition. All this, according to Bogicevic, made him decide not to take part in the work of the SFRY Presidency after 1 October. Immediately after he had made such a decision, Bogicevic asked the deputies of the Assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina to express their views on his work, something that had not happened until today.

Speaking on behalf of the club of the deputies of the Party of Democratic Action, Dr. Naim Kadic, speaking after Bogicevic, said that Bogicevic had adequately represented the stands and interests of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which, as Kadic said, even if all other Yugoslav republics can, cannot be a national state. He also said that the deputies of the Party of Democratic Action believe that Bogicevic should not take part in further work of the SFRY Presidency, considering the political situation in our country.

Speaking on behalf of the deputies of the Serbian Democratic Party and the Serbian Renewal Movement, Jovo Mijatovic said that the Bogicevic report was (?weak), that it resembled a report that could have been heard last year and the year before. He criticized Bogicevic for not having spoken self-critically about his responsibility for the current situation in Yugoslavia. Mijatovic then said that Bogicevic was one of the rare Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia who is working against the interests of his people and that people in Zvornik call him Dragosavac. He also said that if elections for members of the SFRY Presidency were held today, Bogicevic would not be elected by Serbs. Mijatovic ended his speech by presenting the demand of the Serbian people, whom Mijatovic said he represented, that Bogicevic continue work in the SFRY Presidency and that he represent the interests of the Serbian people. Otherwise, Serbs will justifiably call him a traitor, Mijatovic said.

Bogicevic replied that he was elected as a member of the SFRY Presidency from Bosnia-Hercegovina from the ranks of the Serbian people, but that he was elected to represent the interest of all peoples and nationalities of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Therefore, he invited only valid criticisms as to when, where, and in what cases he had violated the Constitutions of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, which he had been guided by in his work.

Aleksa Buha then took the floor and is still speaking. He represents the deputies of the Serbian Democratic Party. He addressed Bogicevic directly, saying that he did not represent anyone because he has not been working since 1 October. In other words, by being absent he did not (?represent) anyone. As I said, Buha is still speaking. The discussion on this point is continuing. We will inform you about everything else that happens in our next newscast.

Bogicevic To Boycott 'Rump' Presidency's Work

LD1412002191 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2313 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Sarajevo, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—With a majority vote, both chambers of the Bosnia-Hercegovina parliament this evening assessed positively the work of Bogic Bogicevic, the republic's representative in the Yugoslav Presidency.

Nevertheless, in keeping with the parliament's earlier decision, Bogicevic will as previously not take part in the work of the "rump" presidency.

Bogicevic has not attended the Yugoslav Presidency sessions since October 3. The representatives of Slovenia and Croatia, the two republics which unilaterally proclaimed secession from Yugoslavia, were the first to stop attending the presidency sessions.

A delegation, made up of Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) representatives in the Bosnia-Hercegovina parliament, assessed negatively Bogicevic's work in the state presidency and described him as a "traitor to the Serbian people."

Bogicevic replied that he was elected member of the Yugoslav Presidency "as a man of Serbian nationality, but represented all Bosnia-Hercegovina's nations."

The SDS deputies decided not to participate in the work of the republican parliament, but only to send their delegation, to protest that the deputies of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Moslem Party of Democratic Action (SDA), have proclaimed the republic's sovereignty, without their presence.

The SDS shares power in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the HDZ and the SDA.

Bogicevic said the possibility of Yugoslavia's survival still existed.

He criticized most participants in the current developments in Yugoslavia, describing them as the "creators of politically most inadequate form of a community organization—the concept of a nation state."

In the negotiations so far, the creators of the nation state policy "have never been frank when Yugoslavia's future and its survival were concerned," Bogicevic set out.

Therefore, they "failed to seek the ways for an integration and new political relations between the republics and nations, based on tested concepts of the rule of law, and on a civil, democratic and market-oriented state."

Bogicevic Claims Yugoslavia No Longer Exists

LD1412044191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1329 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—Member of the Yugoslav Presidency Bogic Bogicevic says in an interview published by the Belgrade daily BORBA today that claims that Yugoslavia no longer exists are not true.

Bogicevic, a Serb who represents the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina in the Presidency, explains that, regardless of unilateral decisions of some republics to secede from Yugosalvia, the country still officially exists as the only internationally recognized subject.

The recognition of the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia would lead to the creation of new states in Europe which would in turn result in further changes of borders and start processes which would be difficult to stop, says Bogicevic whose work in the Yugoslav Presidency came under strong attacks by politicians from Serbia and by Serbs from his republic.

Such developments would slow down the European integration processes and put into question the entire process of the future European security system, he adds.

Speaking about the blockade of the state Presidency, whose sessions he has not attended since October 3, Bogicevic says it is not only due to secessionist acts but also to other unilateral political options of the Yugoslav republics.

Emphasizing that the keys to war and peace are in the Yugoslav republics, he claims that more goodwill and mutual respect could help in the quest for a model which would enable the implementation of aspirations towards independence and sovereignty in a common state.

Expressing great reserve as to the concepts proposed by the Yugoslav republics, Bogicevic says that he does not believe in the possibility of a peaceful and just settlement of border issues after some Yugoslav republics have become independent.

Supporting Europe's and U.N.'s activities in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, he says he opposes the approach taken by the European Community that Yugoslavia no longer exists, as well as economic sanctions and blockade.

This would only further complicate the Yugoslav political situation, says Bogicevic and proposes objective and impartial mediation of international subjects instead.

Muslims Asks Presidency To Take Stand on Army

AU1312125191 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] The Assembly of the Serbian Nation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which is a [words indistinct], cannot be a partner in the talks on the future of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Only the political parties represented in the parliament can do this, (?Zlatko Hadzibegic), spokesman for the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] stated today.

At the news conference in Sarajevo, he emphasized that the Muslim Bosniak Organization believes it is high time that the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency take a stand on the (?presence) of the Yugoslav Army on the (?territory of Hercegovina).

HDZ: Non-Serbs in Bosanska Gradiska Persecuted

AU1312142391 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 12 Dec 91

[Text] What is happening in Bosanska Gradiska is evil and resembles hell. The Croatian houses are being demolished and everything Croatian is being attacked, Vlado Pandzic, president of the club of deputies of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] in the Bosnia-Hercegovina Assembly, stated at the news conference today.

Emphasizing that the Yugoslav Peoples' Army is helping to carry out genocide against Croats and other non-Serbian residents, even against the members of the Ukrainian minority, Pandzic added that the fascists' Stalinist behavior toward the non-Serbian population has been encountered in Bosanska Gradiska and its surroundings.

Criticizing the Bosnia-Hercegovina Ministry of Internal Affairs for failing to take any effective measures in this area, Pandzic also said it is a shame that the media in Bosnia-Hercegovina, especially Sarajevo Television, Sarajevo Radio, and YUTEL, are hushing up the truth and in this way participating in the genocide.

Croatian Democrats on Relations With Serbians

LD1412214791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1151 GMT 10 Dec 91

[Text] Sarajevo, 10 Dec (TANJUG)—We have always been and still are for talks between the three national parties, which were offered by Izetbegovic and Koljevic, but regarding the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, we first demand that two important conditions be met: Its deputies should return to the republican parliament, and the party should distance itself from military decisionmaking, i.e. the party should recognize the legally elected government in Bosnia-Hercegovina. This was stated today at a regular weekly news conference by Stijepan Kljujic, chairman of the

Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and a member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina presidency.

Kljuic reiterated his earlier view about the need for Bosnia- Hercegovina to protect itself from the flood of false dinars with its own currency by 1992 at the latest. Referring to an embargo imposed by the Republic of Serbia on food exports, Kljuic said that under normal transport conditions, Bosnia-Hercegovina could obtain foodstuff, especially wheat, rice, and oil from abroad at much cheaper prices. According to him, if the embargo continues for a longer period of time, Bosnia-Hercegovina must respond by not just countermeasures such as banning the export of its goods, but also by blocking road transport for Serbian goods.

Mariofil Ljubic, member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina HDZ inner leadership and vice president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Assembly, expressed his firm belief that the republic's parliament would soon consider a report on the work of Bogic Bogicevic, the SFRY presidency member from Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as the conduct of the Bosnia-Hercegovina delegates in the Yugoslav Assembly's Federal Chamber who, as he put it, have neither legitimacy nor legal status to represent the republic in that Assembly body.

Discussions View Refugee Problem in Republic

LD1612114591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2230 GMT 15 Dec 91

[Text] Banja Luka, 15 Dec (TANJUG)—Addressing a group of refugees from Papuk and Psunj in the Borik sports hall in Banja Luka, Stanko Cvijan, Serbian minister responsible for relations with Serbs outside Serbia, said that it would be best for the refugees if they were to stay in Bosnian Krajina. According to him, Serbia is already full of refugees and is prepared to offer Bosnian Krajina material help. In a very tense atmosphere, Veljko Vukelic, president of the Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slavonia made an attempt to address the refugees but was jeered. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina, promised that the Serbian people would not leave the refugees in the lurch. He announced plans for additional mobilization of the Serbian people in the Bosnia-Hercegovina municipalities who would join the Western Slavonia territorial defense forces in the fighting for Papuk and the Slavonska Pozega area. Speaking in a similar vein, Dr. Nikola Koljevic, Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency member, promised the refugees all necessary help and support. According to the Banja Luka refugee center, there are about 5,000 refugees in the town who fled their homes near Daruvar, Podravska Slatina, and Slavonska Pozega. Their number is expected to increase in the light of a 20-kilometer long column of refugees near Okucani.

Foreign Trade, Services Steadily Decreasing

LD1512110291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0855 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Dec (TANJUG)—Bosnia-Hercegovina exported products and services valued at over 2 billion dollars between January and the end of November. At the same time, imports were valued at approximately 2 billion dollars. Compared to last November, imports have decreased by 8 percent and exports by 22 percent. However, the fall in foreign trade, in November of as much as 50 percent, because of the great fall in the physical volume of industrial production and the interruption of transport, will have a very negative effect on this year's overall results, as well as on the export-import start in 1992, said the Bosnia-Hercegovina Chamber of Economy.

Reaction to Founding of Croat Community

92BA0206B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 26 Nov 91 p 27

[Article by Fahrudin Radoncic: "Partition or Warning"]

[Text] The decision on the establishment of Croat autonomy in Bosnia-Hercegovina is testing the unity of Croats and Muslims in preserving a common state.

For entirely different reasons, unpleasant doubts about whether Stjepan Kljuic and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] have in fact betrayed Bosnia-Hercegovina are plaguing the leaders of at least two national blocs. The SDA [Party of Democratic Action] believes that the founding of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna as a political, cultural, economic, and territorial entity has now made it at least twice as difficult to preserve the territorial integrity of this republic.

On the other hand, an impatient Karadzic, who for months now has been drawing Croats into the risky game of dividing Bosnia-Hercegovina, is not hiding his joy at the formation of the HAO [Croatian Autonomous Region]. Nevertheless, the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] too has reason to be wary: First of all, he must find out what the source of this change in Croat politics is, because for months Kljuic has shown himself to be an obstinate defender of the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Karadzic is vexed by another problem: There are new disagreements about Bosnia-Hercegovinan territory. For example, Bosanski Brod is listed as part of the HAO Bosnian Posavina, but before that it was also included in the Serbian autonomous region of Northern Bosnia?!

As Long as Bosnia Is Independent

Although the memory of Tudjman's and Milosevic's meeting in Karadjordjevo is still fresh, as are the reports that emerged at that time about a partition of Bosnia, it appears that one should not immediately and unwisely invoke passions in answering the question of what the

HDZ wants to achieve through this step. Before accusing the HDZ of betraying Bosnia-Hercegovina, one should first take a look at Article 5 of the Resolution on the Establishment of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, which states that "the Community respects the democratically elected government of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina as long as the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a state exists in relation to the former or any future Yugoslavia."

From the Croat point of view, there is little to find fault with in this position. Obviously, this is the most serious message to date. It was directed most of all towards the Muslim coalition partner in the government, and it states that Croats, after what has been done to Croatia and what members of that nation have experienced at the hands of the Yugoslav Army in Bosnia-Hercegovina itself, will no longer accept any type of Yugoslavia under Serbian domination. Because of this, it seems that the current Croat territorial-ethnic grouping represents more of a warning than actual secession. This is also indicated by the fact that, unlike in the Serbian autonomous regions, no governmental mechanisms whatsoever have become operational in the Croatian regions for now, nor has there been a disavowal of the republican center.

Still, this does not appease those who think that it is extremely counterproductive for the Croats to unilaterally set up their own ethnic regions, and even Alija Izetbegovic found it necessary to say that this "is not the right way to ensure the interests of the nations of Bosnia-Hercegovina, including the Croatian nation. This is a mistake, an unfair and unreasonable position." He added that he is certain "that after this resolution, Karadzic arranged for a celebration with his organization, because this is a further step towards dissolving Bosnia-Hercegovina, which is obviously the goal of Karadzic's party."

On What Is the JNA Gambling?

For Izetbegovic and the Muslims, the fact that the Bosnia-Hercegovinan state does not have the strength to respond to the Army's occupation is a compelling argument in favor of maintaining neutrality, but in no sense can this lessen the Croat disappointment with the overall situation. This collision between an objective position and justified interests is clearly the conscious and strategic essence of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], and it is surely no coincidence that the Army is strengthening military pressure on Croat territory in Bosnia-Hercegovina. This has a dual effect: It strengthen's the Army's own position, and at the same time it stirs up accusations between Croats and Muslims to the effect that "the Muslims and their leaders are not doing enough to prevent attacks on Croatia from inside Bosnia-Hercegovina" on the one hand and that "the Croats are helping the Serbs to break up Bosnia-Hercegovina" on the other hand.

The Army can also take advantage of the self-organization of the Croatian nation is a way that it has probably not considered. Specifically, after the dangerous incident near Neum, where a real battle almost broke out between the Army and local residents, it is not unrealistic to expect that the General Staff will begin preparing for war operations in the territory of the Croatian autonomous region. And this under the demagogic-propagandistic pretense of conducting operations in that region, but not in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Even though, logically speaking, this makes no sense and is devoid of reason, it should be remembered that the Army has already used much more unconvincing explanations to justify its actions and the spilling of blood.

But one thing must be said, if not as dramatically as some Muslims contend. One cannot rule out the possibility that through its latest move, the HDZ simply wants to shake up the policy of equidistance that the SDA is pursuing towards Serbia and Croatia. In any event, the HDZ believes that it has a right to make it more than clear to the Muslim party that from the Croat side, there can be no concessions to the Serbo-Yugoslav option. Nor does this necessarily have to make conditions more difficult for the SDA. In terms of political tactics, the SDA can use this HDZ pressure as an effective defense against any sort of forcible incorporation of Bosnia-Hercegovina into a truncated Yugoslavia, and in this regard there are no differences between the two parties.

What Zagreb Said

Aside from these—one might say—internal republican calculations, the proclamation of Croatian autonomous regions is interpreted in some quarters as a directive from the Zagreb headquarters of the HDZ. If this is in fact the case then it could at least be a sign that Tudjman is preparing a reserve variation for a political end to the war in Croatia. For example, one in which Croatia would emerge from this war intact, and the Serbs would be compensated for this "loss" with Bosnia-Hercegovinan territory. Does this also mean the end of the Balkan Switzerland, as some people view the future Bosnia-Hercegovina?

But as far as the participation of the Croatian government in the destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina is concerned, this would be a commercial venture with Byzantine cheaters, by whose deceit Croatia has already been tricked. It remains to be seen whether Tudjman's staff, which tried to vary its position on the Bosnian question earlier, has learned its lesson. If everything has been well-analyzed and if Zagreb-Belgrade underground diplomatic operations have dug a deep enough channel for this idea, there is still little hope that the prognoses by the most gloomy futurologists about how everyone in Bosnia-Hercegovina will be fighting against everyone else will miss the mark.

Izetbegovic Faced With Riddles

No matter how extremely difficult the current situation is for the Croats in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and thus in Bosnia-Hercegovina as well, the

Muslims too are not in for a pleasant time. Because while the Bosnia-Hercegovinan Croats are under the pressure of the horrible suffering of their conationals in Croatia and the increasing danger that they themselves will enter into a similar Golgotha, the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina are being pulled between the Serbo-military blackmail of the unconditional survival of a truncated Yugoslavia and, from the other side, the ultimatum-like Croat rejection of any Yugoslavia. The Croats are threatening to leave in the territorial sense of the word, while the Serbs are threatening to wage war and stay put. It is once again up to Izetbegovic and the Muslims to extract Bosnia-Hercegovina from this sort of Inquisitional torture device with contrary commands, and in so doing to see to it that this republic is not reduced to the "Pashaluk of Sarajevo."

Up to now, Izetbegovic has complained, but only about Karadzic and the SDS, "that they continually confront the Muslims with new riddles and puzzles." Now he faces a dual riddle.

Montenegro

Bulatovic Speaks Out Against EC Sanctions

AU1412220291 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Text] Momir Bulatovic, president of the Presidency of Montenegro, spoke in the Green Megahertz program on Belgrade Radio's second channel. In our News of the Day program we are carrying his view of the EC's economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

[Begin Bulatovic recording] The economic sanctions—(?and I will now repeat this)—really are no means for resolving the Yugoslav crisis, but, as you reminded me of an earlier statement, I still think that they actually only (?protect) the existing conflicts. Unfortunately we cannot at this moment (?justify) the current state of affairs with economic sanctions.

I think that we could have used somewhat more consistent and flexible but in any case more skilled diplomatic activities to show [words indistinct] that not all blame for the conflicts in Yugoslavia can be put on the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, I even think that they do not bear this blame but, objectively speaking, the sanctions are decided upon by Western Europe and the Western world and we should have made our arguments more understandable and accessible to them.

The talks that we have had show that at least regarding the specific case of Montenegro, there is absolutely no reason for sanctions to be imposed on Montenegro. We have often said that if our only guilt is in the fact that we are allies of the Republic of Serbia then we are not at all ashamed of this fact. Moreover, we are proud to stress it because at key historical and crucial times such as ours now—like times in 1914 and 1941—those great powers that are now determining the dominant political map of the world—the United States, Great Britain, and France—were actually in alliance with Serbia and Montenegro and with Yugoslavia in the second case. [end recording]

Macedonia

Foreign Minister Maleski Supports EC Mediation

LD1412050491 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1537 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Skopje, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—Foreign Minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Denko Maleski today sent a message to the president of the E.C. Council of Ministers, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, in which he stressed the wish of his republic for The Hague conference on Yugoslavia to resume and for all six Yugoslav republics to participate in it.

In the message sent on the eve of the E.C. ministerial meeting in Brussels on December 16, Macedonian Foreign Minister Maleski underscored that Macedonia supported the efforts of The Hague conference for a solution to the Yugoslav crisis and insisted on equal standards for all sides involved.

"Anything else would lead to chaos and imminent disintegration, which would be coupled with nationalism and radicalism of different colors," Maleski said in the message.

Kljusev Notes Citizenship Requirements

LD1412045191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1425 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Skopje, December 13 (TANJUG)—Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Nikola Kljusev on Friday [13 November] announced the adoption of a new law envisaging fluency in the Macedonian language as one of the main criteria for obtaining Macedonian citizenship.

Another criterium will be the length of time spent in Macedonia, which is to be established by the republican parliament, Kljusev told a press conference.

He added that the law would allow a possibility that emigrants also obtain the Macedonian citizenship.

Kljusev also announced that the government would soon submit to parliament a draft law on passports and the crossing of the state border.

The procedure for issuing passports and personal identification papers will be simplified and more efficient, while tighter control will be established on Macedonia's borders, said Kljusev.

Party Protests Army Persecution of Personnel

LD1412050791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1840 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Skopje, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—The Presidency of the Social-Democratic Union of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia today sent a letter to the republican parliament and other competent bodies, requesting legal protection for the military personnel from Macedonia who do not want to participate in the war in the Republic of Croatia.

The party said that it had information that a large number of military personnel and also civilians working for the Army had been leaving their jobs in the absence of other means of opposing orders to go to war.

The Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia said that these individuals were proclaimed deserters, were forcibly detained and brought to trial before military courts.

The Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia urged the republican parliament to form a special parliamentary commssion to propose steps for the solution of the problem, and, among other things, to organize the reception of these individuals and their families and to solve their financial and housing problems.

Republic To Introduce State Symbols, Passports

AU1312165591 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Macedonia will soon introduce new state symbols, while its citizens will have new travel documents. This was stated at a new conference by representatives of the Macedonian Government. Boris Djordjioski reports.

[Begin Djordjioski recording] The first package of new laws of sovereign and independent Macedonia will be proposed to the delegates of the assembly at the next session. We are talking about the laws on citizenship, travel documents, and the crossing of state borders.

As Macedonian Prime Minister Kljusev stressed, this marks the beginning of the more concrete implementation and realization of the new Macedonian Constitution. Some details are already known. Citizenship may be granted if a citizen satisfies certain requirements. Among these conditions are the length of residence in Macedonia, employment, and knowledge of the Macedonian language. It is, however, unclear what the political-security-economic- demographic suitability means. The citizens of this republic will receive new passports even before Macedonia is internationally recognized. The authorities will not wait for recognition.

Regarding the law on crossing state borders, it was only said that this bill includes many novelties which will facilitate easier movement of people and goods. The Constitutional Commission of Macedonia today proposed that the assembly initiate the process for adoption of a new Macedonian anthem and all other state symbols at its session scheduled for next week. That entire task should be completed in six months, at the latest. [end recording]